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Abstract
There is an increasing number of ICT systems (e.g. to communicate, do business,
vote, control industrial processes or critical infrastructures, etc.) whose security
depends intrinsically on human users. Concomitantly, there are many reported critical
vulnerabilities that are due to users failing to follow security procedures or to behave
as ICT scientists have decided is appropriate. A solution to this problem will only
be found by addressing it radically differently, by treating it as a true socio-technical
problem rather than just a technical one. We must understand how the technical
components (e.g., software processes and digital communication protocols) and the
social components (e.g., user interaction processes and user behaviour) of a system
interoperate, and thus consider the system as a true socio-technical system, with
people at its heart. This requires extending the technical analysis approaches with a
mature understanding of human behaviour, as humans are complicated and nothing
guarantees that, even if they learned how to operate a technology, either from a manual
or through its use, they will comply with what they learned. Reasons include cognitive
biases, fallacies, ignorance, distraction, laziness, curiosity of different uses, insufficient
awareness of the security sensitivity of their behaviour, etc.
This thesis focuses on developing an innovative methodology to analyse the socio-
technical security of ICT systems. To advance the state-of-the-art to the point where
the wide spectrum of socio-technical security features of systems can be modelled
formally and automatically analysed, this thesis aims to: (i) design a methodology to
viii
tackle the socio-technical security of systems; (ii) define a formal modelling language
expressive enough to cover the diverse security features of socio-technical systems; (iii)
define libraries of prototypical socio-technical security properties, behavioural user
models, socio-technical attack/threat models; (iv) implement a toolkit, an integrated
front-end to holistically conduct formal security analysis of socio-technical systems; (v)
demonstrate a proof-of-concept on a number of archetypal case studies.
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In the last two decades, technology has seen a drastic target change, from systems
used by experts-only to systems accessible to a plethora of different types of users,
thanks to the simplicity with which it has been possible to adapt them. A new idea
of pervasive informatics [90] took ground establishing a new set of theories [95] that
brought researchers to study pervasive spaces as complex domains using different
theoretical approaches, i.e., socio-technical systems, computer-supported cooperative
work, semiotics, considering the new era and the new technologies available.
The term socio-technical system (STS for short) was initially coined by Emery
and Trist [59] to describe systems that involve a complex interaction between humans,
machines and the environmental aspects of the work system.1 Nowadays, the term
socio-technical system is widely used to describe many complex systems, also in the
cybersecurity domain. There are, in fact, an increasing number of cybersystems
(e.g., to communicate, do business, vote, pay, control industrial processes or critical
1A work system is a system in which human participants and/or machines perform work (processes
and activities) using information, technology, and other resources to produce products/services for
internal or external customers.
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infrastructures, etc.) whose security depends intrinsically not only on the security of
the systems themselves but also on the human users and their sociality.
This intertwining of systems’ security and humans has been fully captured by Kevin
Mitnick, a renowned and reformed hacker, who, in his book [110], explains how an
attacker can successfully deceive people to get access to their systems. Let me quote
here from Mitnick’s book:
A company may have purchased the best security technologies that money
can buy, trained their people so well that they lock up all their secrets
before going home at night, and hired building guards from the best security
firm in the business.
That company is still totally vulnerable.
Individuals may follow every best-security practice recommended by the
experts, slavishly install every recommended security product, and be
thoroughly vigilant about proper system configuration and applying security
patches.
Those individuals are still completely vulnerable.
[...]
Why? Because the human factor is truly security’s weakest link.
(The Art of Deception, Kevin D. Mitnick, p. 3. [110])
Since the publication of Mitnick’s book, the security and privacy problem has
gained a new and fresh dimension that requires extensive study. The many security
failures due to users bear witness to the fact that humans cannot be designed out of
the security loop: we must deal with security as a socio-technical problem rather than
a mere technical one. Recent attention to the human nodes came from one of the
NIST reports [82], where Jansen stressed that the protection of the client-side is often
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overlooked, but has become more crucial in service computing. Reasons for this can be
found in the intensive use of browsers, of social media, and of other public services or
platforms, which make the consequences of social engineering and/or other types of
attacks more critical.
The new socio-technical dimension has also to deal with understanding the psychol-
ogy of users when interacting with digital resources: for instance, the user’s perception
of the security of a system might be utterly non-aligned with respect to the security
that the system is able to guarantee. A wrong approach to these auxiliary aspects can
make a system insecure.
Such aspects can be studied at least empirically. Schaik et al. [171] assessed a set
of 16 security hazards (i.e., situations with the potential for harm to be done) on the
Internet between UK and US students, measuring perceptions of risk and other risk
dimensions, while Zhang et al. [180] assessed the security of password expiration and
the replacement of a password with a new one. Recently, in addition to the empirical
studies, a number of formal studies have been carried out [50, 133, 131, 20, 22, 84].
Bella et al. [22] applied formal methods to investigate the TLS certificate validation, a
property whose enforcement may require getting the user involved. The study included
considerations among all the most used browsers, corroborating the main concerns
of Jansen [82] and giving support to Jagatic et al. [81], who asserted that technical
security flaws are just one of the possible bases of social engineering attacks and that
flaws that exploit the sociality have to be taken into account.
Many socio-technical attacks are also possible because security mechanisms are
not designed for the users: many users view current security measures as unhelpful
if not entirely irritating [76, 94]. This leads them often to bypass even the strongest
security mechanism, sometimes in unexpectedly smart ways [47, 79, 65]: in fact, the
recommended “secure” measures are not sustainable from the usability-centred and
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psychology-centred points of view of users. Users prefer a more economical approach,
which security designers usually ignore. Once we find the reasons why the systems are
insecure, also including the human in our analysis, the application of these insights to
secure system design can be effective [122].2
Considering socio-technical aspects under the psychological and usability lenses
is just one side of the coin. On the other side, computer scientists have also been
recently reflecting on the socio-technical aspects of cybersecurity. Even though several
investigations have been carried out so far to study, mathematically and systematically,
the nature of the socio-technical deficiencies of systems and protocols, of socio-technical
attacks, and of the possible defences, much more needs to be done, considering also
expanding the studies to involve several different fields. For instance, Human-Computer
Interaction (HCI) studies have tried to apply rigorous formal techniques [32, 50, 134] for
the analysis of human factors, with fewer still applying this to security [133], whereas
Deception studies, as well as HCI, have contributed using formal approaches [40],
dealing with automated auditing of trustworthy trade procedures for e-commerce.
Carrying out security analysis motivated Ellison in publishing a work on security
ceremonies [58]. According to him, the term “ceremony” was first coined by Jesse
Walker [96] to indicate those communications between human nodes and other nodes
that usually happen not via network connections, but instead through face-to-face
interactions, user interfaces, peripheral devices, or transfers of physical objects that
carry data (e.g., USB memory sticks, SD cards and more recently smart cards, tokens,
smartphone, etc.). Examples of ceremonies include two-factor authentication [16, 144],
registration procedures [19], or protocols that users follow interacting with ATM
machines [133], and many more due also to the pervasiveness of technological systems
in our life. Martina et al. [102] have highlighted the importance of studying security
2This inspired me to carry out the study in Chapter 3.
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ceremonies and the differences between a traditional protocol analysis methodology
and ceremony analysis.
In fact, bringing the human nodes, so far never considered, into the so-called
ceremony analysis, revealed flaws that a reductionist classical approach to technical
security is not able to capture. Radke et al. [131] proved this assumption in their work,
identifying a flaw in the Opera Mini browser ceremonies using the HTTPS protocol
when used in a specific context, even though the protocol is secure in the traditional
sense. However, the approach suggested by Radke et al. [131] was based on incomplete
assumptions caused by the young age of ceremony analysis: since the topic was moving
its first steps, researchers were still using the classical approach of threat models with
the Dolev-Yao attacker [56] to model the malicious agents who act in the ceremonies.
An adequate threat model for security ceremonies, in fact, has to move in a non-
technical dimension that brings us quite far from the use of the Dolev-Yao attacker.
Creese et al. [48] recognised the Dolev-Yao attacker as inappropriate as a threat model
for ceremony analysis, proving it by analysing protocols in a pervasive environment,
which is what we here called a socio-technical protocol. Carlos et al. faced the problem
of defining an adequate threat model for ceremonies [104]. Starting from the Dolev-Yao
model, they derived a more realistic one, removing capabilities from it. They applied
their approach to authentication protocols (e.g., WiFi printers, Bluetooth pairing).
The work started by Carlos et al. [104] continued considering smart tokens and smart
cards [101], and then was expanded via Carlos’ PhD thesis [35], through the use of
channels between human-to-human or human-to-machine.
However, the work towards threat models for socio-technical analysis is just at the
beginning [64, 37]. In fact, even though the existing works defined threats that are
reasonable, they generally failed to treat the threats systematically within the given
ceremony, hence potentially missing relevant combinations of threats.3
3This inspired me to carry out the study in Chapter 4.
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A further study by Bella and Coles-Kemp [20] went beyond the original ceremony
between users and systems and produced what has been called full security ceremony,
putting in place more aspects that have to be considered, such as interfaces between
humans and machines (similarly to Carlos’ notion of channels) but also the outermost
layer whereby society influences behaviour (e.g., media, users’ engagement with tech-
nology etc.). In order to study a full security ceremony, Bella et al. introduced what
they called concertina, a multiple-layer framework that aims to provide the basis for a
formal analysis. A multi-layered approach has become necessary due to the number
of layers that must be traversed for a security property that the protocol enforces to
reach the human.
The approach defined and adopted a user’s persona model in formal analysis which
can be influenced by cultural values, the belief systems and other factors. The defined
personas take stock of the human persona introduced by Cooper [44] in the design
process, but improving it making a persona able to express more than a single user’s
persona in front of the same technology at different times. Kumar et al. introduced the
rushing user, who tends to skip anything, not directly connected to his main goal [93].
Both persona and the rushing user, however, seem to be the first steps for what could
be a complete model of the human, capable of expanding his capabilities by increasing a
potential library of behavioural patterns useful for the analysis of security ceremonies.4
This complete model needs to be applied in critical socio-technical domains where
security and privacy analyses are decisive to unveil potential threats. Bella et al.
identified and inspected some of these domains, i.e., file hosting, collaborative editing,
electronic exam [21] and, similar to the electronic exam’s domain, the electronic voting
domain has also been taken into account [92] under the ceremony lens. Likewise
in spirit to these domains, security issues are resumed by Blaze under the term
“Human-Scale Security Problems” [30]. The study, in fact, aims to treats “human scale”
4This inspired me to carry out the study in Chapter 5
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security problems and protocols as a central part of computer science, identifying and
stimulating research on “non-traditional” protocols that might either have something
to teach us or be susceptible to improvement via the techniques and tools of computer
security. A number of human-scale security problems have been reported by Blaze [30],
such as ordering wine (but in general food) in a restaurant, paying the check in a
restaurant, drug testing in sports, voting in democratic elections but also railroad seat
checks5 highlighting how much human-scale systems are interesting and important and
speculating on some future research directions.
1.2 Research Aims
The overall goal of this thesis is to develop a methodology and a formal and automated
toolkit that encompass user studies and formal analysis in order to establish the
security of ICT systems socio-technically, by targeting both the technical and the social
components of the system. This methodology and analysis will also provide a stepping
stone for run-time testing and behaviour change techniques.
Taking the socio-technical standpoint allows one to refuse the conclusion that “users
are the weakest link in the security chain”, which suggests, without providing insights
or solutions, that users should not be involved in the practical task of establishing
security. Instead, the socio-technical standpoint advocates that users are at the heart
of the system: they must be part of the requirement elicitation process, of the security
problem statement, of the solutions.
The overall goal has been achieved by considerably extending practices and tools for
the formal analysis and assurance of security properties of ICT systems to include the
human element together with the technical in a holistic, socio-technical methodology
for security.
5This inspired me to carry out the study in Chapter 6.
1.3 Thesis Outline 8
More specifically, the main research goals of this thesis are (listed here not in order
of importance but in their sequential order within the project):
1. Beautification methodology: Is it possible to identify socio-technical aspects
dictated by a sense of beauty that drive the behavioural choices of users of
security ceremonies?
2. Charting methodology: Is it possible to define a chart of the threat models
for (the socio-technical components of) a security ceremony?
3. Formal and automated approach: Is it possible to use formal languages to
model the wide spectrum of security features of STSs focusing in particular on
security ceremonies (communication steps, behavioural user models, user-machine
interactions, etc.) and provide tool support allowing an analyst to input a model
of a ceremony and obtain in output either a set of attacks to the concrete ceremony
or a proof of the ceremony’s security (typically under a set of conditions).
4. Socio-technical study: Is it possible to enable reusability of models and results
when moving from one case study to another?
The main research goals just listed here are tackled as in Table 1.1.
1.3 Thesis Outline
This thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 introduces the basic concepts and definitions employed in this thesis.
Starting from what a protocol is, a brief description of security protocols is given,
followed by a summary of formal techniques and tools to analyse formal models of
security protocols, concentrating the attention to model checking, one of the particularly




• Definition of a beautification process for security
ceremonies based on some guidelines.
• Application of the process and test of its effectiveness
on real case studies.
(2) Charting
methodology
• A systematic definition of an encompassing method
to build the full threat model chart for security cere-
monies.
• Demonstration of the application of the charting
technique for discovering new vulnerabilities that
have not been considered so far and have arisen




• Definition of a formal approach that allows secu-
rity analysts to model mistakes by human users of
security ceremonies.
• Development of a prototype tool for the automatic
creation of mutated models based on human mis-
takes.




• Extension of my framework to prove reusability to
perform a socio-technical approach analysis of a hu-
man ticket inspection ceremony.
Table 1.1 Research aims linked to the actual work carried out.
successful formal protocol analysis techniques. Then, the concept of security ceremony
analysis is explained along with the explanation of existing and promising automated
tools that are suitable (and extendable) for the analysis of security ceremonies.
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Chapter 3 investigates why many users view current security measures as unhelpful if
not entirely irritating, suggesting four new general guidelines to improve these security
measures. These guidelines have been extracted from the results of a user study I
carried out. The approach, then, is applied to four security ceremonies formalised
using Message Sequence Charts (MSC) in order to make them more sustainable from
the usability-centred and psychology-centred points of view of users. To corroborate
these results, I carried out also a second user study which provided interesting insights
on future research directions.
Chapter 4 introduces a new systematic definition of an encompassing method to
build the full chart of threat models for security ceremonies. The methodology defines
a classification of the principals participating in security ceremonies and continues
with a motivated labelling system for their actions and principals. Principals are then
combined to derive a number of threat models that, together, form the full chart of
threat models for security ceremonies. I demonstrated the application of the method
on three existing ceremonies. In the end, I investigated the Danish Mobilpendlerkort
ceremony, the inspection ceremony for the mobile transport ticket in Denmark, finding
a threat model that has not been considered so far and that has arisen here thanks
to my charting method. To demonstrate the relevance of the chart, I modelled and
analysed this threat model using the formal and automated tool Tamarin.
Chapter 5 introduces a novel mutation-based approach for the formal analysis of
security ceremonies that focuses on the vulnerabilities that result from the mistakes
that human users might make, such as skipping one or more of the actions, replacing a
message with another one, adding an action of a ceremony, and their combinations.
Using an extension of a formal language based on multiset rewriting rules, I define a
new language expressive enough to model security features of ceremonies. The resulting
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formal language enables reusability as I have shown modelling a number of different
ceremonies (see also Chapter 6). The novel mutation-based approach I define allows
matching mutations to adjust non-human roles so that they can be executed together
with a mutated human role, and propagation rules to create an executable trace that
can be analysed in search for attacks. In order to automatise the analysis of security
ceremonies, I have developed a prototype tool called X-Men, which creates mutated
models that can then be input to Tamarin, and applied it to two relevant ceremonies,
one of which one had never been considered before.
Chapter 6 describes an original socio-technical study on coach services operating in
different countries by targeting both the technical and the social components of the
system. The study consists of two phases: observation and analysis. The observation
concerns the interaction between customers (who are using the services to travel from/to
airports) and drivers of coaches (who are usually inspecting the tickets). After having
introduced a generic coach service ecosystem, a security analysis has been carried out,
formally and semi-formally, on the ticketing inspection ceremony, showing that the
customer can attack the socio-technical system in order to travel for free. I verified my
assumptions and considerations using and extending my novel methodology described
in Chapter 5, proving once again that my methodology enables reusability and it is
successful for discovering new threats in ceremonies.
Chapter 7 provides conclusions and a discussion on potential future work.
Chapter 2
Background on Security Ceremony
Analysis
The main topic of this thesis is the formal and automated security analysis of Socio-
Technical Systems (STSs). This chapter reviews essential concepts, methods and
work related to this topic and paves the way for the proposed methodologies and
results produced in the following chapters. More specifically, this chapter includes an
introduction to protocols, security protocol analysis, security ceremony analysis, formal
techniques for the analysis of security protocols, state-of-the-art of techniques for the
analysis of security ceremonies and other techniques aimed to analyse the security of
protocols involving humans. This chapter works as a background chapter, however,
every single approach and solution described in this thesis have a dedicated detailed
discussion of related works for that specific approach or solution, in addition to a
detailed comparison of relative advantages in each chapter where they are explained.
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2.1 From Protocols to Security Protocols Analysis
A protocol is defined simply as a set of rules or instructions that determine how “actors”
act or interact in a given situation: a recipe for a cake, the procedure for boarding, the
steps for buying a movie ticket are all possible examples of protocols.
Any protocol that is designed to satisfy some kind of security property can be
called a security protocol. A security protocol, indeed, describes how agents exchange
messages, built using cryptographic primitives, in order to obtain security guarantees
such as confidentiality (to ensure that particular pieces of information are kept secret
from certain parties) or authentication (to ensure that an agent A is talking to the
agent the agent A intends to talk to). Security protocol specifications are parametric
and prescribe a general recipe for communication that can be used by different agents
playing in the protocol roles (sender, receiver, server, etc.).
The most (in)famous security protocol is, perhaps, the Needham-Schroeder Public
Key (NSPK) protocol [117], which is shown in Figure 2.1.
A → B : {NA, A}pkB
B → A : {NA, NB}pkA
A → B : {NB}pkB
Figure 2.1 Needham-Schroeder Public Key (NSPK) protocol
The NSPK protocol is a security protocol that was proposed for the mutual
authentication of a pair of agents A and B in a distributed computer system. For
instance, agents want to be assured of each other’s identity before they exchange
security-critical data. Thus, an attacker should not be allowed to impersonate another
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agent. For this purpose, initiator and responder of a communication need to mutually
authenticate each other.
NSPK uses public key cryptography, i.e., each agent possesses a public key which
can be accessed by all agents and a secret key, which is the inverse of the public key.
Moreover, the protocol makes use of nonces, which are freshly generated, random
numbers to be used in a single run of the protocol. It is assumed that these numbers
are generated in such a way that they cannot be guessed by other agents.
In this protocol A plays the role of the initiator and B reacts in the responder
role. A encrypts his nonce NA with the public key of B and sends it along with his
identity to B. Now A is in a waiting status. B decrypts the message, creates a new
nonce and sends back to A the concatenation of both nonces encrypted with the public
key of A. After this, B is waiting for the answer from A. A can decrypt the message
sent by B. In case the contents of the message is the concatenation of his own nonce
NA with something else, A can be assured that the message was sent by B, because
by the perfect cryptography assumption B is the only agent who can decrypt the
message sent by A containing the nonce NA. Thus, A establishes a communication
with B. Moreover, to acknowledge to B the receipt of B’s nonce, A separates it from
the message and sends it back. If B receives this message from A, he can be assured of
being talking to A and, therefore, of having established a communication with A.
Several techniques and tools have been developed to detect security flaws in security
protocols, but formal methods [176] have proved to be the best approach. In fact,
there exist a number of flawed protocols that received an extensive manual analysis
without discovering any flaw (or discovering just a subset of the flaws). The NSPK
is a well-known example. In fact, Lowe discovered that the protocol was vulnerable
to a Man in the Middle (MITM) Attack, wherein an attacker i, who is responding to
a protocol run initiated by A, can falsely authenticate itself to an agent B as A, by
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replaying A’s message to B. Thus, B is fooled to believe that a session is established
between A and B [98]. Lowe’s attack is shown in Figure 2.2, where i(A) indicates that
i is pretending to be A.
A → i : {NA, A}pki
i(A) → B : {NA, A}pkB
B → i(A) : {NA, NB}pkA
i → A : {NA, NB}pkA
A → i : {NB}pki
i(A) → B : {NB}pkB
Figure 2.2 Lowe’s Attack on Needham-Schroeder Public Key (NSPK)
The difficulty of designing and analyzing security protocols is well-known. This
difficulty stems from a number of considerations:
• The protocols are (often) complex environments. In order to analyse them
properly, it is necessary to describe them accurately modelling the environment
which comprises the capabilities of honest and dishonest agents.
• A dishonest agent, often called “intruder” or “attacker” deliberately tries to
undermine the protocol. Capturing the capabilities of the attacker is difficult,
but we are able to to make good models of the attacker that can be progressively
enhanced as new styles of attack come to light.1
• The properties the security protocols are supposed to ensure harbour a number
of subtleties and come in various guises.
1In Chapter 5 I introduce a new way to see the attacker in security protocols.
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Further considerations contemplate modelling the different channels between agents,
algebraic properties of the cryptographic operators and more.
2.1.1 Modelling
Modelling the honest agents The standard way to formally model a security
protocol is to formalize how agents execute the roles of the protocol to attempt to
achieve one or more security goals in the presence of an attacker. Roles are sequences
of events (sending or receiving messages, generating fresh values, etc.), which are
usually represented graphically by a structure generated by causal interaction such
as strands [166, 63] or the vertical lines in MSCs and Alice&Bob notation [4], or less
graphically by a process in a process algebra such as in the applied pi calculus [1] or
by a so-called role script, basically the projection to an individual role of an extended
Alice&Bob specification, and corresponds to a strand or an applied pi calculus process.
Dishonest agents Dishonest agent capabilities are based on the Dolev-Yao attacker
model [56]. Even though the presence of many dishonest agents that acts in different
points of the environment can be considered, it has been proved that it is sufficient
to consider, in a security protocol, the presence of a single dishonest agent modelled
using the Dolev-Yao attacker [13]. The environment where the agents interact can be
seen as a network that allows the agent to communicate with each other by sending
messages over communication channels assuming that the network is under the control
of an active attacker (the so-called Dolev-Yao attacker) who has control of the entire
network and can perform some actions on the messages that transit on it. In particular,
the Dolev-Yao attacker can read, modify and destroy any message, and create new
messages as long as he does not break cryptography (following the perfect cryptography
assumption). Approaches that go beyond the Dolev-Yao attacker exist: some of these
approaches introduce restrictions such as restrictions on the communication channels
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that the attacker can control, some others introduce extensions such as extensions on
allowing the attacker to attack the cryptography2).
Security properties Security properties are often outlined using their high-level
description and this supposedly widely understood description is given different inter-
pretations, sometimes within a single document or design. It is for this reason that
it is so essential to give precise, formal meanings. It is not sufficient, for example, to
assert that a particular protocol is “secure”, or worse “correct”. A protocol can only
be claimed to be secure with respect to a given, precisely defined property and even
then only against certain classes of threats and subject to various assumptions. Here
are some of the common security properties:
• Confidentiality. This term covers two related concepts.
– Data confidentiality, which assures that private or confidential information
is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals. Specific
to security protocols, it means that the attacker is not able to derive the
plaintext of messages passing between the honest nodes, if the message is
protected using cryptography.
– Privacy, which assures that individuals control or influence what information
related to them may be collected and stored and by whom and to whom
that information may be disclosed.
• Integrity. This term refers to data integrity, which assures that information
and programs are changed only in a specific and authorised manner. Specific to
security protocols, it means that data cannot be corrupted, or at least any such
corruption will always be detected.
2It is not in the scope of this thesis to deal with cryptographic analysis, which is debated in
e.g., [34, 29, 27, 12, 57, 42]
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• Availability. This assures that data/services can be accessed when desired.
• Authentication (entity). This property assures that an agent can be confident
that the claimed identity of an agent with whom he is interacting is correct.
• Authentication (origin). This property assures that an agent can be sure that
a message that purports to be from a certain agent was indeed originated by
that agent. This is typically related to assuring that the message has not been
tampered with.
• Non-repudiation. The property assures that actions can be traced to responsi-
ble agents, who cannot deny their actions.
• Anonymity. The property describes situations where the acting person’s name
is unknown. This is commonly achieved creating a set, called “anonymity set”,
where the “anonymity” of an element of this set refers to the property of that
element of not being identifiable within this set. If it is not identifiable, then the
element is said to be “anonymous”.
Channels Channels are an abstraction of the many concrete techniques to enforce
particular properties of message transmissions such as encryption [112]. The Dolev-Yao
represents an active attacker that has complete control of the communication network.
However, we can limit the attacker’s control over the protocol agents’ communication
channels by specifying channel rules, which model channels with intrinsic security
properties. Such security properties can define:
• an authentic channel, where an agent B can rely on the fact that the agent A
has sent the message M and meant it for B.
• a confidential channel, where an agent A can rely on the fact that only B can
receive the message A is sending.
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• a secure channel, where the channel is both authentic and confidential.
2.1.2 Automated Tools for the Analysis of Security Protocols
Many techniques and tools have been developed to analyse formal models, e.g., inductive
reasoning [124], theorem proving [97], generic verification systems [78, 167]. However,
one of the formal techniques particularly successful in the analysis of security protocols
has been found to be model checking [10] along with similar techniques based on
reachability analysis.
Given a formal representation of a system (also called system model) along with a
property of interest that should be analysed on the system, a model checker automati-
cally checks whether the property holds on the system.
The properties of interest describe what the system model should do or what the
system should not do and depend on the requirements on the system itself, for example:
does Alice authenticate Bob and vice versa, agreeing on two secret nonces?
Once the system model and the properties that should hold in the system are
formalised, they are then given to a model checker, which explores the possible states
of the system in a systematic way. Such systematic exploration aims to find a state or a
trace that violates the property defined on the model. If so, the model checker provides
a counterexample that indicates how the model can be attacked. A counterexample
describes an execution path that starts in the initial state and leads to a final state
where a property is violated.
Dedicated tools (based on model checking and automated reasoning) have been
developed starting from the Dolev-Yao paradigm [109, 155, 6, 5, 61, 28, 49, 108]. In
the following I provide a brief description only the most important and relevant ones
for this thesis:
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• The AVISPA tool [6] is a push-button tool for the Automated Validation of
Internet Security Protocols and Applications. It provides it own formal language
for specifying protocols and their security properties. It integrates different
back-ends that implement a variety of automatic protocol analysis techniques.
• The AVANTSSAR platform [5] is the successor of the AVISPA tool, and
is an integrated toolset for the formal specification and automated validation
of trust and security of SOAs and, in general, of applications in the IoS and
their security protocols. The platform comprises three back-ends: CL-AtSe [170],
OFMC [14] and SATMC [8], which operate on the same input specification
providing complementary automated reasoning techniques (including service
orchestration and compositional reasoning, model checking, and abstraction-
based validation);
• Maude-NPA [61] is a protocol analysis tool that takes into account algebraic
properties of crypto systems such as cancellation of encryption and decryption,
Abelian groups (including exclusive-or), exponentiation, and homomorphic en-
cryption. Maude-NPA performs backwards search from a final state to determine
whether or not a state is reachable;
• ProVerif [28] is an automatic cryptographic protocol verifier based on a rep-
resentation of the protocol by Horn clauses. The ProVerif verifier can handle
many different cryptographic primitives, including shared-key and public-key
cryptography (encryption and signatures), hash functions, and Diffie-Hellman
key agreements, specified both as rewrite rules or as equations. It can also
handle an unbounded number of sessions of the protocol (even in parallel) and
an unbounded message space. The ProVerif tool can prove properties of secrecy,
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strong secrecy, authentication and equivalences between processes (that differ
only by terms);
• Scyther [49] is a push-button tool for the verification, the falsification and the
analysis of security protocols based on a pattern refinement algorithm, providing
concise representations of (infinite) sets of traces introducing novel features such
as the possibility of unbounded verification with guaranteed termination, analysis
of infinite sets of traces in terms of patterns, and support for multi-protocol
analysis;
• The Tamarin prover [108] provides automated, unbounded, symbolic analysis
of security protocols. The Tamarin prover employs the backwards search used by
the Scyther tool [49] to enable protocol specification by multiset rewriting rules,
property specification in a guarded fragment of first-order logic, which allows
quantification over messages and timepoints, and reasoning modulo equational
theories. Due to its importance in this thesis, Tamarin is described in more detail
in Section 2.3; moreover, my approach to extend the prover with the capabilities
to analyse security ceremonies is described in Chapter 5.
These tools (and other ones) have been successful at uncovering a large number of
vulnerabilities. However, they do not take into account the wide range of side-channel
attacks, social engineering, human behavioural and cognitive aspects in their relation
with “machine” security, and interfaces to other protocols and the environment, which
occur in the real world.
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2.2 Security Ceremony Analysis
A security ceremony expands a security protocol with everything that is considered
out-of-band to it, including, in particular, the mistakes that human users might make
when participating actively in the security ceremony.
The term ceremony was coined by Jesse Walker [96] to describe the interaction
between a user and computing devices. In cybersecurity, the term “ceremony” has
been used by Ellison [58] as an extension of the concept of security protocol, with
human nodes alongside computer nodes and with communication links that include
UI, human-to-human communication and transfers of physical objects that carry data.
In particular, Ellison remarked that “what is out-of-band to a protocol is in-band
to a ceremony, and therefore subject to design and analysis using variants of the
same mature techniques used for the design and analysis of protocols”. An example
of security ceremony analysed by Ellison considers the process of getting an e-mail
certificate and delivering the key by which that certificate is validated. The ceremony
is shown in Figure 2.3 as Message Sequence Chart (MSC). In the ceremony, there are:
• Alice, the sender with computer AC,
• Bob, the receiver with computer BC; and
• Carol, the Certification Authority with computer CC.
The sub-ceremony (a) in Figure 2.3 shows the process by which Bob gets a certificate.
This must start with a human-to-human interaction by which Bob convinces Carol
to issue him a certificate. Bob then interacts with his computer, BC, to cause it
to generate a certificate request to Carol’s computer, CC. Then, Carol instructs her
computer, CC (the CA), to issue the requested certificate and send that certificate
to Bob’s computer (e.g., via his e-mail address). To conclude, Bob’s computer then
uploads the newly received certificate to a directory. The sub-ceremony (b) in Figure 2.3
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Figure 2.3 The Cryptographic E-mail ceremony
can occur before or after the issuance of Bob’s certificate. This is the sub-ceremony
by which Alice receives the CA’s key, KCA, from Carol and depends on the security
of human-to-human channels. The sub-ceremony (c) in Figure 2.3 shows the normal
signed e-mail ceremony. A message is composed by Bob, which is also digitally signed
and sent by its computer using Bob’s private key K−1B . In this phase, Bob’s computer
could also transmit:
(i) Bob’s S/MIME signature certificate or PGP signed key (binding Bob’s common
name and e-mail address to his public key, KB),
(ii) an S/MIME encryption certificate (binding Bob’s common name and e-mail
address to his encryption public key, KBE),
(iii) nothing, and Alice’s computer might then fetch the certificate it needs from a
directory.
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To conclude, in the sub-ceremony (d) in Figure 2.3 Alice transmits her response
after having looked up Bob’s e-mail address in the directory.
The reason why Ellison stressed that we need to investigate security ceremonies
lies in the last message in the sub-ceremony (c), from AC to Alice. This message,
according to the procedure, is delivered as a body of text with header information
based on the results of the signature validation. The mail client, based on the design
and its implementation, could show:
• the common name from the certificate,
• the e-mail address from the certificate,
• the common name provided in the mail header;
• the e-mail address provided in the mail header.
Once Alice obtains the message, Alice needs to evaluate the message from Bob.
Her process will involve comparing what is displayed to her to what she has in her
memory. She could compare:
• the “from:” address,
• the picture (if present),
• the “signed by:” address,
• the text in the message itself (phraseology, word choice,...),
• etc.
What could possibly happen if Alice evaluates the message sent from a malicious
agent Charlie, claiming to be Bob? If Alice were a computer (a robot, for instance) the
fact that, maybe, the “signed by:” address differed in one character from the correct
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one would make the header incorrect and she/it would detect fraud. But what if Alice
were a real human?
In this case, some factors (e.g., sociality, personal circumstances, technological and
communications capabilities, etc.) have to be considered, as also highlighted, using
other examples, by Bella et all. [20]. This is exactly where security ceremony analysis
can fit, finding fertile ground for research. Let’s also point out that a formal definition
of security ceremony does not exist. Inspired by Ellison [58], in this thesis I focus,
in particular, on security ceremonies that consist of security protocols where some of
the agents are interpreted by humans (e.g., the humans Alice, Bob, Carol who were
operating with the computers AC, BC and CC respectively).
Similar to security protocol analysis, I have to deal with three main problems:
• Define a formal language expressive enough to model the wide spectrum of
security features of security ceremonies (communication steps, behavioural user
models, user-machine interactions, etc.) but also enable reusability of models
and results when moving from one case study to another.
• Deal with the concept of dishonest agents while I am investigating security
ceremonies.
• Provide tool support, creating an integrated front-end to holistically conduct
formal security analysis of security ceremonies, in order to input a model of a
security ceremony and obtain in output either a set of attacks to the concrete
security ceremony or a proof of the security ceremony’s security (typically under
a set of conditions).
In this thesis, I study security ceremonies tackling (i) the modelling problem for
security ceremonies, (ii) the threat models for security ceremonies, (iii) the tool support
for security ceremonies.
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2.2.1 Formal Languages and Automated Tools for the Analy-
sis of Security Ceremonies
To the best of my knowledge, there does not exist any tool for the full-fledged formal
analysis of security ceremonies. However, the recent awareness that security protocols
need better attention to their “human element” spawned several works, both on the
formal and on the practical level (e.g., adapting and using existing tools).
The semi-formal and formal analysis of socio-technical systems is not new. In
order to understand why the presented approach has been chosen, a comparative
discussion of related works on socio-technical systems is needed. As my approach
takes inspiration from the mutation-based testing technique, generating mutations of
the security ceremony to characterise the human user and deal with critical security
aspects on security ceremonies, I also include a brief description of existing works on
mutation-based testing, discussing the similarities and differences with my approach.
A large body of work on researching methodologies to model socio-technical systems
(STSs) spans reaching the use of Business Process Model And Notation (BPMN) [111,
120, 177, 85]. The reason for this has to be found in the term “socio-technical system”
and in the purpose for which BPMN was born. On one hand, we have the term
socio-technical system that, as I mentioned in Chapter 1, was initially coined to
describe systems that involve a complex interaction between humans, machines and the
environmental aspects of the work system. On the other hand, we have BPMN, whose
primary goal is to provide a notation that is readily understandable by all business
users, from the business analysts who create the initial drafts of the processes to the
technical developers responsible for implementing the technology that will perform
those processes and, finally, to the business people who will manage and monitor those
processes [175].
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As said in [137], an STS can be conceptualised as a complex organisation where
interactions among its operative units are represented as business processes (as rep-
resented in a BPMN) and security policies are used to regulate or prevent undesired
behaviours.
The modelling language STS-ml, proposed in the context of the European Project
Aniketos [120], includes high-level organisational concepts such as actor, goal, delegation,
etc. Security requirements in STS-ml models are mapped to social commitments [52].
Expressing security needs via commitments allows the modeller to deal with some
common security properties such as non-repudiation, integrity, data confidentiality
expressed as “non-disclosure”. However, other security properties are missing (e.g.,
anonymity, confidentiality as privacy, availability).
Although BPMN is the de-facto standard for representing the interaction among
components of complex systems, it does not allow for representing security restrictions.
Extensions of BPMN have been proposed to remedy this problem, introducing what
has been called “SecBPMN” [138, 139]. However, these approaches do not consider how
agents communicate, representing the communications as standard BPMN relations
(e.g., flow, message flow). In fact, BPMN approaches lack the ability to formally
model, in a simple way, channels between agents and the applications of cryptographic
operators in messages sent on these channels.
Moreover, and perhaps even more importantly, agents in protocols/ceremonies are
characterised by what is usually called “knowledge”: each agent’s state is represented by
its initial knowledge which changes during the protocol/ceremony execution. Given that
entities are represented by simple tasks in BPMN approaches, representing dynamic
knowledge requires an extension of this notion of task. Even though “SecBPMN” and
“STS-ml” represent good approaches to study STSs from a wider perspective, taking
into account how independent components socially interact with one another, their
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granularity is insufficient to deal with security protocols and ceremonies as they are far
more complex (cf. Section 2.1 and Section 2.2).
Other formal approaches that consider STSs exist and rely on tools such as Is-
abelle [20, 129], PVS [105] or PIE [106], but also other popular tools such as ProVerif [28]
and the AVANTSSAR platform [5] could be extended to cope with socio-technical
protocols. Generally, it can be expected that whenever the interaction between agents
can be specified as a distributed protocol, then traditional tools for security protocol
analysis could help out. Isabelle has been recently used to support a work that com-
bined formal modelling and analysis of infrastructures of organizations with sociological
explanations to provide a framework for insider threat analysis [87, 86]. However, as
explained, the framework can fruitfully be applied to the characterisation of insider
threats (e.g., fraud, theft of Intellectual Property, sabotage), but left unanswered
the important question of how to deal with external threats, tackled in this thesis
in Chapter 4 where I discuss the importance of considering threat models with an
external attacker. Bella and Coles-Kemp [20] defined a layered model of socio-technical
protocols between a user persona and a computer interface, and used Isabelle to analyse
the Layer III of the concertina model of security ceremonies formally.
So, even though Isabelle is promising to deal with security ceremonies and an
extension seems feasible, it is not powerful nor flexible as Tamarin. This is the reason
why I decided to use Tamarin at first.
More works that consider STSs and threats in STSs exist. At the formal level there
is the work by Martimiano and Martina [100], who showed how a popular security
ceremony could be made fail-safe assuming a weaker threat model than normally
considered in formal analysis and compensating for that with usability. Basin et al. [16]
provided a formal model for reasoning about some errors that humans involved in
security protocols may make. They specified rules formalising different types of humans
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(untrained, infallible or fallible humans and some combinations of these characteristics),
and focused on errors disclosing information to the attacker. They successfully applied
their model to analyse some authentication protocols using the Tamarin prover. Similar
to [16], Curzon et al. [50] proposed a formal human model that includes a specific
attacker able to exploit the errors against the human user. The errors considered are
those caused by the humans’ interpretation of the system and by the design of the
interfaces, but not those entailed by human choices or mistakes. Moreover, they do
not consider communication channels. As far as I know, the approach proposed by
Curzon et al. [50] has never been implemented in any automated tool.
As I will illustrate in more detail in Chapter 4, these works cover only a small
portion of the landscape of possible threat models, so a transformative approach is
called for.
At the practical level there is the work by Hall [74], who provided real-world
summaries of weak passwords in use, with 2018’s weakest one still being “123456”,
and the work of Bella et al. [24], who focussed on protocols for secure exams and
provided a novel protocol that they have formally analysed using the tool ProVerif.
The work carried out by Bella et al., however, focused on making secure a protocol
on specific seven authentication, five privacy, two verifiability, and one accountability
requirements. The attacker model used is the Dolev-Yao attacker in addition to the
following specific threats: corruption of candidates, corruption of authorities (i.e.,
administrator, invigilator and examiner). Each of these agents is not modelled per
se, as I am doing instead in Chapter 5 modelling the human agent who is travelling
using the Oyster card. The analysis of possible threats caused by these agents is not
automated and is based on guessing, differently from what I have achieved with my
framework, since it allows me to discover threats caused by implemented behavioural
patterns on human mistakes.
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Other relevant related works targeting threats and humans exist. Some stress the
threats deriving from humans, for example humans repeating a previous sequence of
actions without considering whether it would be currently appropriate [88], or humans
making errors during text entry [156]. In Chapter 5, I introduce a framework to reason
on human errors, but considering whether they can fit with the actual actions that
a human is carrying out during the ceremony. Others discuss the human behaviour
that may be maliciously induced by a third party, for example by deception [110] or by
following precise coercion principles [158]. My work does not consider deception per se,
however in Chapter 6 I demonstrate how it would be possible to exploit human errors
to gain some advantages, such as travelling for free. Some others consider threats in
e-mail phishing [119], out of scope for this thesis as it would be a Human–computer
interaction issue, or focussed on modelling insider threats using a structured model
that emphasises individual and organizational socio-technical factors [71] through
ontologies. Another study performs security threat modelling for a global software
supply chain [136], proposing a socio-technical framework for studying the software
supply chain security problem from a systemic viewpoint, however the framework
seems less powerful than the concertina framework introduced by Bella and Coles-
Kemp [20] not carrying out any formal analysis but corroborating their insights using
an ontological analysis. Overall, ontologies are definitely insufficient to be used for
formal security analysis and to model humans and attacker capabilities.
As mentioned above, my approach has been inspired by the idea behind the
mutation-based testing technique, which is a well-known and used technique in software
testing [55, 39, 118, 153, 83] that is finding fertile ground even in security [154, 152, 33,
51]. Mutation testing is a fault-injection testing technique that improves the quality of
test cases using versions of a program in which artificial changes are introduced to the
target program. These versions are called mutants.
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My approach focuses on design-time analysis, i.e., analysis of specifications of
security ceremonies, rather than run-time testing. However, in the spirit of model-
based testing, the results of X-Men could be used for testing by concretising the
attack traces found into test cases to be applied for testing the code of the security
ceremonies [127, 172]. Generally, mutation-based testing techniques apply mutants
to verify the correctness of the implementation. Approaches that use mutation-based
testing techniques at specification level exist [62, 115]. In fact, recently, it has been
proposed that the concept be applied to specification-based (black box) testing [115].
The approach, however, generates test cases by systematically replacing data items
relevant to a particular part of a specification with a data item relevant to another,
looking for code or programming errors. Other approaches that consider the application
of mutation testing for validating specifications are used with statecharts [62] and
Estelle [54]. Differently from these works, I am generating mutations, based on
behavioural patterns, targeting parts of the specification. The behavioural patterns
represent my mutants, which are not related with the specification itself but more with
the high-level interpretation of human mistakes.
Before going into further details, an exhaustive description of the Tamarin prover
is needed in order to understand my approach. This description is in Section 2.3. I
made extensive use of this tool: in Chapter 4 to prove security properties of ceremonies
without any modifications, in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 as a starting point of my
framework which considers the extension of the Tamarin prover capabilities to analyse
human errors in security ceremonies.
2.3 The Tamarin Prover
The Tamarin prover [108, 161] is a tool for the symbolic modelling and analysis of
security protocols. It takes as input a security protocol model, specifying the actions
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taken by agents running the protocol in different roles (e.g., the protocol initiator,
the responder, and the trusted key server), a specification of the attacker, and a
specification of the protocol’s desired properties. If Tamarin is not able to find an
attack, then it provides a proof that, even when arbitrarily many instances of the
protocol’s roles are interleaved in parallel, together with the actions of the attacker,
the protocol fulfils its specified properties.
Tamarin’s workflow for proving the validity of security properties is depicted
in Figure 2.4 (this picture is based on the one presents in Schmidt’s thesis [142]). As
shown in Figure 2.4, Tamarin:
• Considers protocols and their attacker specified using an expressive language
based on multiset rewriting rules. These rules define a labelled transition system
in which states consist of a symbolic representation of the attacker’s knowledge,
the messages on the network, information about freshly generated values, and
the protocol’s state. The attacker and the protocol interact by updating network
messages and generating new messages.
• Supports the equational specification of some cryptographic operators, such as
Diffie-Hellman exponentiation, asymmetric-encryption and bilinear pairings.
• Works also using a sequence of restrictions specified as guarded trace properties.
• Deals with security properties modelled as trace properties, checked against the
traces of the transition system, or in terms of the observational equivalence of
two transition systems.
In order to explain the syntax, I am going to refer to the Needham-Schroeder Public
Key (NSPK) protocol in Figure 2.1, with minor deviation due to the tool’s syntax.
Let’s see how it is possible to model NSPK using Tamarin.
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Figure 2.4 Tamarin workflow for proving validity of security properties
Equational Theory. The modeller specifies the built-in function symbols used in
the protocol from a set of functions available. The latest version of Tamarin (version
1.4.1) provides the following function symbols:
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• diffie-hellman: this theory models Diffie-Hellman groups. It defines the function
symbols inv/1, 1/0, and the symbols ˆ and *. I use g ˆ a to denote exponentiation
in the group and *, inv and 1 to model the (multiplicative) abelian group of
exponents (the integers modulo the group order).
• hashing: this theory models a hash function. It defines the function symbol h/1
and no equations.
• symmetric-encryption: this theory models a symmetric encryption scheme.
It defines the function symbols senc/2 and sdec/2, which are related by the
equation sdec(senc(m,k),k) = m.
• asymmetric-encryption: this theory models a public key encryption scheme.
It defines the function symbols aenc/2, adec/2, and pk/1, which are related by
the equation adec(aenc(m, pk(sk)), sk) = m.
• signing: This theory models a signature scheme. It defines the function sym-
bols sign/2, verify/3, pk/1, and true, which are related by the equation
verify(sign(m,sk),m,pk(sk)) = true.
• bilinear-pairing: this theory models bilinear groups. It extends the diffie-
hellman theory with the function symbols pmult/2 and em/2. Here, pmult(x,p)
denotes the multiplication of the point p by the scalar x and em(p,q) denotes
the application of the bilinear map to the points p and q. Additional equations
are available.
• xor: this theory models the exclusive-or operation. It adds the function symbols
/2 (also written as XOR/2) and zero/0 and it is associative and commutative.
• multiset: this theory introduces the associative-commutative operator + which
is usually used to model multisets.
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• revealing-signing: this theory models a message-revealing signature scheme.
It defines the function symbols revealSign/2, revealVerify/3, getMessage/1,
pk/1, and true, which are related by the equations
revealVerify(revealSign(m,sk),m,pk(sk)) = true and
getMessage(revealSign(m,sk)) = m.
In addition, it is possible to define here new function symbols with their arity. To
define new function symbols f1, ..., fn with arity a1,...,an the syntax is:
functions: f1/a1, ..., fn/an
In the NSPK example, I use Tamarin’s built-in functions for asymmetric-encryption,
declared as:
builtins: asymmetric-encryption
Model specification. The protocol is defined specifying multiset rewriting rules.
Multiset rewriting is a formalism that is commonly used to model concurrent systems
since it naturally supports independent transitions.
A multiset rewriting system defines a transition system, where, in Tamarin, the
transitions will be labelled. The system’s state is a multiset (bag) of facts.
A rewrite rule in Tamarin has a name and three parts, each of which is a sequence
of facts: one for the rule’s left-hand side (prem), one labelling the transition, which in
Tamarin are called ‘action facts’ (a), and one for the rule’s right-hand side (conc).
prem a−→ conc
A rewrite rule in Tamarin has the structure as:
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rule rule_name:
[] –-[]-> []
Facts are of the form F(t1,...,tn) for a fact symbol F, terms ti and arity n.
Tamarin has three types of special facts built in. Two are used to model interaction
with the untrusted network and the other one to model the generation of unique fresh
(random) values.
The In(...) fact is used to model an agent receiving a message from the untrusted
network that is controlled by a Dolev-Yao attacker, and can only occur on the left-hand
side of a rewrite rule. Out(...) is used to model an agent sending a message to the
untrusted network that is controlled by a Dolev-Yao attacker, and can only occur on
the right-hand side of a rewrite rule.
Fr(...) must be used when generating fresh (random) values, and can only occur
on the left-hand side of a rewrite rule, where its argument is the fresh term.
In Tamarin, the sort of a variable is expressed using prefixes, such as ~x for a
fresh variable, $x for a public variable, #i for a temporal variable and m for a message.
Moreover, a string constant ‘c’ denotes a public name in pub, which is a fixed, global
constant.
NSPK’s first message A → B : {NA, A}pkB is modelled in Tamarin as shown
in Listing 2.1.
rule A_1:
let m1 = aenc{’1’, ~nA , $A}pkB in
[ Fr(~nA) , !Pk($B , pkB) ]
--[ OUT_A_1 (m1)]->
[ Out( m1 ) , St_A_1($A , $B , ~nA) ]
Listing 2.1 First message of the Needham-Schroeder Public Key protocol
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The rule uses the fixed unary fact symbol Fr in the left-hand side to generate a
fresh nonce (the symbol ~ denotes a fresh value). The rule uses the let-binding let
... in expression offered by the Tamarin syntax, which can be used to specify local
term macros within the context of a rule. The let-binding, in this example, is used to
define the message m1. The message m1 is built with: (i) a constant ‘1’, (ii) the nonce
~nA, (iii) the name of the agent $A who generated the message. The message is then
encrypted using an asymmetric-key pkB, which is the public key of the agent $B . To
send the message m1 to the network, the fixed unary fact symbol Out is used in the
right-hand side. To conclude, a state fact St_A_1, which represents the state of the
agent $A (basically the knowledge of the agent at that time), is defined, containing
the agent name $A, the other agent participating in the rule $B and the fresh nonce
generated ~nA.
The full NSPK protocol modelled in Tamarin is in Section A.1.
Restrictions. It is possible to restrict the set of traces to be considered in the protocol
analysis taking advantage of restrictions. Since there are no restriction specified in
the NSPK protocol, I can consider a simple authentication protocol, where an agent A
sends a signed message to an agent B as shown, using the Agent B rule (and omitting
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, Authentic (A,m), Honest(B), Honest(A) ]->
[ St_B_1(B, ltkB , pkA , A, m)
]
Listing 2.2 Agent B receives first message
Here, agent B verifies the signature sig on the received message m, checking that
the message m was really signed using the private key associate with the public key pkA.
The result of the verify function is true or false. In this example, the function Eq
is used to check that the result of the verify function to the received message is the
constant true. The restriction Equality uses the function Eq to restricts the traces
considered by the protocol only to those in which the equivalence is verified. This is
achieved in the restriction imposing that the values x and y in the function Eq will be
the same, as shown in Listing 2.3.
restriction Equality :
"All x y #i. Eq(x,y) @i ==> x = y"
Listing 2.3 Equality restriction on two messages
Properties. Desired security properties of the protocol are defined over traces of the
action facts of a protocol execution. Each label of action section must therefore contain
enough information to state the properties. In Tamarin, properties to be evaluated are
denoted by lemmas.
In Tamarin, a rule can be applied to a state if it can be instantiated such that its
left-hand side is contained in the current state. In this case, the left-hand side facts
are removed from the state, and replaced by the instantiated right-hand side. The
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application of the rule is recorded in the trace by appending the instantiated action
facts to the trace. All action fact symbols may be used in lemmas.
Tamarin provides the follow syntax for specifying security properties:
• All for universal quantification, temporal variables are prefixed with #;
• Ex for existential quantification, temporal variables are prefixed with #;
• ==> for implication;
• & for conjunction;
• | for disjunction;
• not for negation;
• f @ i for action constraints, the sort prefix for the temporal variable ‘i’ is
optional;
• i < j for temporal ordering, the sort prefix for the temporal variables ‘i’ and ‘j’
is optional;
• #i = #j for an equality between temporal variables ‘i’ and ‘j’;
• x = y for an equality between message variables ‘x’ and ‘y’.
NSPK’s security property is modelled in Tamarin using injective agreement as
shown in Listing 2.1. A protocol guarantees to an agent agent injective agreement
with an agent peer on a message params if, whenever agent completes a run of the
protocol, apparently with peer in role peer, then peer has previously been running
the protocol, apparently with agent, and peer was acting in role peer in his run, and
the two agents agreed on the message params. Additionally, there is a unique matching
partner instance for each completed run of an agent, i.e., for each Commit by an agent
there is a unique Running by the supposed partner.
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To analyse a protocol with respect to this property, an appropriate rule in role A with
a Commit(a,b,<’A’,’B’,t>) action and in role B with a Running(b,a,<’A’,’B’,t>)
action have been labelled. Here a and b are the agent names (public constants) of roles
A and B, respectively and t is a term.
// Injective agreement from the perspective of
both the initiator and the responder .
lemma injective_agree :
" /* Whenever somebody commits to running a session ,
then */
All agent peer params #i.
Commit(agent , peer , params) @ i
==>
/* there is somebody running a session
with the same parameters */
(Ex #j. Running (agent , peer , params) @ j & j < i
/* and there is no other commit
on the same parameters */
& not(Ex agent2 peer2 #i2.
Commit(agent2 , peer2 , params) @ i2
& not (#i = #i2)
)
)
/* or the attacker perform a long -term key reveal
on agent or peer */
| (Ex #r. RevLtk(agent) @ r)
| (Ex #r. RevLtk(peer) @ r)
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"
Listing 2.4 Example of property of the Needham-Schroeder Public Key protocol
In order to prove if the lemmas are correct, I need to execute the Tamarin prover
from the command line. A browser-based window will be shown as in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5 The GUI of Tamarin
The table in the middle shows all loaded theories. It is possible to either click on a
theory to explore it and prove the security properties, or upload further theories using
the upload form at the bottom.
By clicking on the “NSPK3” entry in the table of loaded theories, a new window
appears, showing the theory on the left-hand side, with the links to the message
theory describing the attacker, the multiset rewrite rules and restrictions describing
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the protocol, and the raw and refined sources, followed by the lemmas to prove. This
is shown in Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6 The NSPK3 model displayed in Tamarin
By clicking on the label “sorry” on a specific lemma, it is possible to see the
applicable proof methods for that specific lemma, as shown in Figure 2.7. Tamarin
proves lemmas using constraint solving. Namely, it refines the knowledge it has about
the property and the protocol until it can either conclude that the property holds in
all possible cases, or until it finds a counterexample to the lemma.
By clicking on the command ‘autoprove’, Tamarin selects the next steps for the
proof, based on a heuristic. The lemma is coloured in green if it is successfully proven.
If Tamarin finds a counterexample, it is coloured in red, as shown in Figure 2.8.
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Figure 2.7 The proof methods for the NSPK3 lemma
Tamarin has been chosen for this work because it is one of most powerful tools
for security protocol analysis and, in particular, provides support for cryptography,
cryptographic channels and intruder capabilities. However, my approach is general and
independent of Tamarin and could be applied similarly to other tools, even though
once a tool has been chosen, it is typically necessary to adapt the approach to that
specific tool. A short discussion about how to provide reusability of my approach with
other tools is in Section 5.8.6.
Now we have all the necessary background to understand the following chapters.
Wherever needed, I will provide additional information (e.g., about Tamarin, etc.).
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In this chapter, I introduce a study that I carried out to understand how to “beautify”
security ceremonies. The work described here is based on the paper: Bella, G., Renaud,
K., Sempreboni, D., Viganò, L. (2019). An Investigation into the “beautification” of
Security Ceremonies. In Proceedings of the 16th International Joint Conference on
e-Business and Telecommunications, ICETE - Volume 2: SECRYPT, pages 125–136.
Scitepress Digital Library. [25].
3.1 Motivation
Security measures can trigger unintended and unanticipated side effects if users consider
them unattractive. By unattractive, I mean difficult, arduous, inconvenient and
generally a nuisance. If people perceive their interactions with security systems
negatively, instead of something that is there to protect them and their data, they
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might try to bypass or game them (for instance, by using weak passwords). People will
dread an encounter with a system they consider unattractive. Yet “beauty” is likely
to be in the mind of the beholder, and it is not necessarily obvious how to beautify
security systems.
Bella and Viganò introduced the beautiful security approach [26], postulating that
security should:
1. become a primary, inherent feature of the system; at the same time,
2. not be disjoint from the system functionalities; at the same time,
3. contribute to the very positive experience that the user has of the system,
ultimately making that experience beautiful.
While the first two are dealt with elsewhere, the third is the one that this chapter is
concerned with: how can security ceremonies contribute to the positive experience that
a user has of a secured system, ultimately triggering a perception of beauty?
Because users are an essential and integral part of the greater socio-technical system,
they have to engage with security ceremonies [58], which are added to systems in order
to secure them.
Users engage in a kind of ‘ritual’ with security ceremonies, with predetermined
actions being actioned by the two parties in a prescribed order when they interact with
the ceremony. The result may be that interaction with the security ceremony is far
from straightforward. The need to ensure the security of systems may unintentionally
make interaction with security ceremonies complex (and possibly unattractive).
As remarked above in Chapter 2, a number of approaches have been developed
to inform the design and analysis of secure ceremonies, e.g., [20, 131, 88, 104], but
these seem to neglect the notion of beauty. I coin the term “beautification” to refer to
the process of making security ceremonies (more) beautiful. I know that beautifying
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existing ceremonies by merely simplifying them has sometimes led to the deployment
of insecure ceremonies. Such ceremonies contain vulnerabilities that could be exploited
by an attacker. A prime example is the use of fallback questions to allow people to
recover from forgotten passwords, but which often serve as a convenient back door for
attackers [141]. In sum, it is known that security ceremonies have functional goals that
guarantee requisite security properties. For example, a password recovery ceremony
must ensure confidentiality of the replacement password.
This need motivates the need for a methodology that makes beautiful security
practically applicable.
3.2 Contributions
The main contribution of this chapter is thus the definition of a methodology that
makes beautiful security practically applicable through new general guidelines. More
specifically, I provide four concrete contributions.
1. Preliminary investigation I leveraged crowdsourcing to help me to orient
security ceremony design towards greater beauty. Answering the question “what
constitutes a beautiful user experience of a security ceremony?” Bella and Viganò [26]
asked is far from trivial both because of the vastness of the spectrum of possible
answers and because, as researchers working in security, our own point of view is likely
to be biased. For these reasons, I decided to source an answer to this question from a
heterogeneous global crowd of people by means of a questionnaire.
2. Definition of guidelines The insights of the questionnaire have been gener-
alised as a set of four guidelines. Each guideline reflects the result of a single question,
which in turn reflects how people characterise the beauty of security ceremonies.
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3. Operationalisation of the guidelines As proof of concept, I apply the guide-
lines to four real-world security ceremonies aimed, respectively, at voting, logging into
a computer, setting up a password and entering physical premises. The result of this
phase is the generation of new security ceremonies that respect the guidelines.
4. Final investigation Once again, I leveraged crowdsourcing to help me to
determine whether applying my guidelines to ceremonies, or highlighting improvements
based on my guidelines in existing ceremonies, had been effective. My findings are
promising but require careful interpretation, as I shall explain. Furthermore, I address,
through a semi-formal analysis, the security concerns regarding the beautification
process.
3.3 Outline
A brief review of the relevant literature is in Section 3.4. My approach to consulting
crowdsourcing platform participants using questions aimed at gathering their views on
what makes cybersecurity beautiful is in Section 3.5. Taking the results in Section 3.5,
beautifying guidelines that have been formulated to inform the design of more beautiful
ceremonies are in Section 3.6. Application of the guidelines listed in Section 3.6 to
existing ceremonies, attempting to make them more beautiful is in Section 3.7. Further
consultation to crowdsourcing platform participants to determine whether the intended
beautification of the ceremonies was successful is in Section 3.8. Security concerns are
tackled in Section 3.9. Conclusions are discussed in Section 3.10.
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3.4 Beauty in Security
Beauty is traditionally thought of as something visual, but it has also been applied to
music [128], mathematics [60, 135], truth [116] and design [67].
The experiments carried out in [168] indicated that a strong correlation between a
system’s perceived aesthetics and its perceived usability. The study highlights that
users are capable of distinguishing between various properties of a system that can
potentially contribute to make the perception of that system “beautiful”, leaving room
for me to consider security as one of those properties. Findings of this study seem to
suggest that the use of a system does not affect the perception of it, however further
research [169] suggests that this initial perception can be changed through use of the
actual system. This study seems to corroborate two aspects: (i) there is space to
consider the correlation between usability and beauty, (ii) beauty is interwoven with a
person’s experiences. Hassenzahl et al. [75], however, have criticised (i), showing that
the relationship between beauty and usability is mediated by goodness.
Carritt [38] supports (ii), claiming that beauty is not simply related to the agree-
ableness or usefulness of an item or experience. He says that beauty has more to
do with a contemplation of a feeling experienced during, or remembered after, an
encounter with a particular artefact.
What characteristics of this experience might contribute to beauty? The literature
suggests the following: ease of use (fluency) [132], a sense of pleasure [162], simplic-
ity [41, 89, 69], aptness [67], elegance [67], the value of the system in a given context
(goodness) [75] and responsiveness [121]. This review suggests that beauty will be
attributed to an artefact if it elicits positive feelings, based on prior user experiences.
Let me now consider the idea of beautiful security software. This is especially impor-
tant because its non-use or, worse, a negative experience of an unattractive ceremony,
will compromise security and leave holes open for hackers to exploit. Current experiences
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of common security software appear to confirm their general unattractiveness [47, 43].
The consequence is that users might act to circumvent the ritual [31]. Awareness and
training programmes are the standard organisational response to this [179], but the
effectiveness of such drives is patchy [11, 91]. Training does not work because it can not
overcome a reluctance that stems from previous negative experiences with unattractive
software.
What I am proposing is to beautify security ceremonies so that people will want
to use them because the beauty thereof results in positive feelings. What I seek to
discover is exactly how to achieve this. In summary, I want to build security ceremonies
that users will want to engage with because doing so has been a positive experience.
This might mean that the software displays one or more of the general characteristics
listed above. It could also be that beautiful security ceremonies have their own set of
characteristics: identifying these is the topic of this work.
3.5 Crowdsourcing for the Concept of Beautiful Se-
curity
Bella and Viganò [26] asked a fundamental question: what constitutes a beautiful user
experience of a security ceremony? Answering this question is far from trivial both
because of the vastness of the spectrum of possible answers and because, as researchers
working in security, our own point of view is likely to be biased. For these reasons,
I decided to source an answer to this question from a heterogeneous global crowd of
people by means of a questionnaire.
My questionnaire aimed to gain an understanding of how the users of security
ceremonies perceive and describe them by means of a scale of “emotional” values,
leaving them free to express as many values as they desired. In other words, I designed
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the questionnaire to explore a correlation between security ceremonies and how their
beauty is sensed. The questionnaire consisted of the following four questions:
Q1 Think about when you log into your bank account, and you use one of those
little devices the bank sends you that displays a number for you to enter as
your password. Do you consider this process to be: Fun, Beautiful, Excessive,
Annoying, Engaging, Essential, Reassuring, Appealing?
Q2 When you were a child, did you ever read a book about a group of children
having a secret club, with meetings where people were allowed in when they
knew the secret password? In this case, how would you rate the security of this
process in terms of: Fun, Beautiful, Excessive, Annoying, Engaging, Essential,
Reassuring, Appealing?
Q3 Think about a web-based system that requires you to provide a password that
meets certain rules (e.g., upper case, lower case, digit, special character, minimum
length). In this case, how would you rate the security in terms of: Fun, Beautiful,
Excessive, Annoying, Engaging, Essential, Reassuring, Appealing?
Q4 Think about old-fashioned burglar alarms that used to go off every time a bird
landed on the roof, or lightning struck nearby. The only way to correct a false
alarm was to get home as quickly as possible to enter the PIN to shut it up.
Modern systems are different. They are often controlled from your smartphone.
Now you can keep an eye on them from wherever you are in the world, and even
see if everything at home is in order, by linking to cameras in your home. False
alarms can quickly and easily be dealt with, without annoying your neighbours
for hours on end. This is an example of how physical security has become more
engaging. Can you think of a way that cybersecurity could improve in the same
way?
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The first three questions were closed-ended, allowing people to respond with multiple
preferences (and thus allowing me to gain insights into their feelings, where these
could not be represented by only one choice). The final question was open-ended. The
rationale behind the questions is as follows.
3.5.1 Q1 — Token Device
The first question concerns the technology that people use to confirm their identity
upon login to their own online bank accounts. Originally, when a customer activated
the e-banking functionalities on their bank account, the bank would supply them with a
plastic card or a sheet of paper with several one-time passwords (OTPs) to enable them
to carry out two-factor authentication1, in this case using their username-password
pair as well as an OTP. More recently, banks started handing out small electronic
devices to their customers that are capable of generating an OTP on the fly, instead of
their having to consult a pre-printed list of fixed OTPs. Nowadays, these devices are
very common2.
I devised the first question to explore reactions to OTPs as a mechanism that is
widely used to prevent bank-account hacking but that is sometimes not as usable as it
should be [159]. OTP devices are intended to help users to handle a situation in which
security ought to be the first goal, even though the way it achieves this might not be
ideal. I wanted to find out what respondents thought about needing to possess such
a physical device to generate OTPs. This question allowed me to gather evidence to
1Two-factor authentication asks the user who wishes to be authenticated to provide two different
secrets: something the user knows (e.g., a password), something the user has (e.g., a device), something
the user is (e.g., unique biometric features such as fingerprints or the patterns on a person’s retina
blood vessels). This can be straightforwardly extended to multi-factor authentication, where the user
has to provide multiple different authentication factors.
2In fact, mobile applications have been developed to enable users to generate OTPs on their
smartphones, thus replacing also these small electronic devices. However, given that these mobile
applications are not yet widespread (only some countries and some banks have adopted them so far),
I decided not to include this option in my questionnaire.
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understand whether current two-factor authentication ceremonies are in line with my
ideas or whether I ought to start thinking about alternative approaches.
3.5.2 Q2 — Secret Club
The second question is about using an episode of the British pre-school animated
television series “Peppa Pig” [26]. In this episode, titled “The Secret Club”, Peppa’s
friend Suzy Sheep is building a secret club whose membership is identified by wearing




Peppa: Why have you got that mask on your face?
Suzy: So people don’t know it’s me. I’m in a
secret club.
Peppa: Wow! Can I be in your secret club?
Suzy: Shh! It’s not easy to get into. You have to




Suzy: Right, you’re in.
Later on Suzy will comment that the password changes all the time to keep it secret!
It would appear that anything related to secrecy is perceived to be an enjoyable game,
even before the rules are set, and Bella and Viganò use this to propose that a user’s
experience of a security ceremony could be appealing and beautiful as is demonstrated
by the childish enthusiasm with which Peppa reacts in this episode.
3.5 Crowdsourcing for the Concept of Beautiful Security 54
What would my respondents think of a similar situation? Even though it could
seem a fairly childish example, I devised the second question to help the respondents
connect with similar experiences from their own childhoods, thereby allowing me to
determine whether the respondents agreed with Bella and Viganò’s assessment of the
attractiveness of this example. Thus, this second question aimed to give me a reference
point for the kind of user experience that I would like to achieve when security is seen
in terms of beauty and attractiveness.
3.5.3 Q3 — Password Creation
Given that the second question considered passwords in a childish context, I devised the
subsequent question to ask about passwords in a more adult context, thus also allowing
me to check whether the answers obtained would be in line with those given in response
to Q2. More specifically, Q3 considers a thorny situation that users have to face at
least once a day. A cloud service, an email account, a favourite e-commerce website, or
maybe a laptop account, all require the user to enter a secret password correctly to
gain access. Nowadays, this usually requires a strong password that respects certain
criteria (such as a minimum length, different characters, special characters) and is
also semantically different from the user’s sensitive information (such as name or birth
date). I asked respondents to express how they felt about engaging with this particular
security ceremony. I expected to obtain results that would reflect the users’ frustration
with current password management systems.
3.5.4 Q4 — Cybersecurity Improvement
I chose to conclude with an open question to capture the respondents’ different points
of view. Cybersecurity will continue to evolve and I believe that this evolution could
take many different directions. I devised the final question to collect a wide variety of
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suggestions about the different ways of making security ceremonies more attractive,
and thus of pursuing beauty. By using an analogy with an old-fashioned burglar alarm,
I asked respondents to assess the attractiveness of modern solutions and to propose
improvements related to cybersecurity.
3.5.5 Findings
I administered the questionnaire to one hundred respondents. I used the CrowdFlower
platform and did not constrain respondents in terms of language or geography. Crowd-
Flower workers span the globe and heterogeneity of the sample is assumed. The
results for the first three questions are summarised in Figure 3.1, whereas Table 3.1
shows the results of the answers to Q4.




















Figure 3.1 The answers to questions Q1, Q2 and Q3
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Findings from Q1, Q2 and Q3
The answers to Q1 show that users most often perceive these kinds of ceremonies to be
Essential (48) and Reassuring (41). The third most popular reaction is that engaging
with the ceremony is Annoying (20), confirming that users find it frustrating. The
least chosen options are: Fun (5), Appealing (4) and Beautiful (2). This reinforces my
initial assertions about the unattractiveness of current security ceremonies.
In Q2, users largely chose Fun (66), followed by Engaging (19) and Beautiful (12),
and finally Annoying (7) and Excessive (6). This could mean that the users see that
the situation is less serious but also that they perceive this to be less burdensome
than rigorous security ceremonies. This is so even though the secret mentioned in the
cartoon is very similar to an actual password.
In Q3, we can observe similar responses to Q1. I obtained a high number of
preferences for Essential (46) and Reassuring(42), reflecting the fact that users sense
the importance of a tangible feeling of reassurance. Similar to Q1, the third most voted
response is Annoying (23) followed by Excessive (16). Very few respondents considered
the password management to be Fun (2) or Beautiful (5).
What we can understand from the responses is that the respondents seem to
grasp the Essential nature of security ceremonies, and they also feel Reassured by
security measures such as passwords and mobile tokens. However, they undoubtedly
feel annoyed and consider the security measures Excessive, especially for password-
like ceremonies. The burden of having external devices such as token generators or
complicated passwords could be responsible for the number of Annoying responses. In
designing more beautiful security ceremonies I have to take this into account.
If we focus on the Fun and Beautiful aspects, I can see that a majority of the users
believe that having a secret code in a childish context is funny but also beautiful and
Engaging, as compared to the other two contexts. In Q2, I did not mention details like
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the complexity of the secret but, even so, the perceived positivity of this Peppa Pig
experience reveals the negativity of existing real-life security measures.
If we return to what Carritt [38] says, these negative experiences and perceptions
will lead to users not considering the engagement with security ceremonies to be
“beautiful”.
Findings from Q4
In Q4, I analysed the 100 open-ended question responses. From an open-ended question
I expected several possible kinds of answer, which I had not only to check but also
to classify. In questions like this, some respondents just provide a random answer as
they are not interested, or are too lazy, to think and provide a meaningful answer.
My analysis approach was the following. First of all, I skimmed the list for yes/no/I-
don’t-know answers, removing 27 answers. After that, I removed 32 answers that I
deemed to be out of context (e.g., due to apparent misunderstandings). I classified
and grouped the 41 remaining answers based on the general idea or suggestions that
they communicated.
The results are shown in Table 3.1. The general categories that emerged from the
analysis are: SMS, Geolocation, Biometric, Alert and Password. SMS suggests to use
text messages to warn the users that something is happening. Geolocation suggests to
use the GPS position or Wi-Fi location to prove that some operations are allowed from
the place where they are executed. Biometric suggests the use of fingerprint or face
recognition, or other biometric-recognition technology to authenticate the users. Alert
suggests the use of some kind of notification (e.g., push notifications) to alert the users.
Password suggests that passwords be used, but that they be improved in different ways
(e.g., reducing the number of characters, relaxing some of the constraints on character
type, or the “distance” from the previous password).
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SMS Location Biometric Alert Password
7 2 17 8 7
Table 3.1 Categories for the answers to question Q4
Biometric technology was suggested by 17 respondents as a viable way to beautify
the security experience, thanks in particular to the recent spread of fingerprint and face
recognition facilitated by smartphone manufacturers. 8 respondents expressed the will
to improve cybersecurity by using some kind of alerting system through notifications,
as long as this is integrated into a two-factor or multi-factor authentication solution
with multiple devices enabled to receive warnings.
New methods based on passwords and SMS-enabled technology were indicated by
seven respondents. Finally, two respondents suggested using geolocation as a method
that checks the position of devices to authorise certain operations.
3.6 Operationalising the Findings
The idea behind the questionnaire was to understand how people characterise the
beauty of security ceremonies in such a way that I could formulate general guidelines to
inform the design of beautiful security ceremonies, or of beautified versions of existing
security ceremonies. The previous section discussed the answers to my questionnaire
and reported the insights I gained. It is possible to extract a series of guidelines
from these insights. These guidelines would represent a concrete link between the
users “emotional” values as responses and the security aspects within the ceremonies
considered in each of the questions. So, it is possible, for the four questions, to derive
four guidelines.
G1. Feel unencumbered: you do not need to carry anything along.
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G2. Leverage the sense of the group.
G3. Simplify the rules, even though they seem essential.
G4. Use biometrics techniques.
G1 enhances the sense of freedom and it comes from the insights originated from
Q1. At some point, security analysts ruled that “possessing” something enables us
to pursue security through what we hold. This changed the pre-existing password
approach due to the perception that holding something is easier than remembering
complicated password. Unfortunately, this is not always true. Human nature makes us
prone to forgetting seldom-used objects and we also easily lose small objects. Cards
and one-time token generators are good examples of objects that are easily lost or
mislaid.
However, a ceremony that asks a user to prove that they hold an object might not
be the best solution to the perceived unattractiveness of existing security ceremonies.
The need to possess an essential security ceremony object could easily be considered
burdensome. It can lead to frustration each time a user cannot engage with it. This is
why I advance guideline G1 as a solution to this burden every time a person needs to
demonstrate ownership of a physical object.
G2, which derives from the insights for Q2, is oriented at a ceremony design that
makes the user feel part of a group. This situation is well represented in the Peppa
Pig episode [126] where having a secret word implies being part of a secret club. This
view was supported by the responses that I obtained in the questionnaire because the
situation I described was perceived as being Fun by most respondents. Although it
would seem unusual to achieve this level of agreement in a such diverse context, I want
to strive towards exciting that same feeling of enthusiasm when people interact with
systems securely.
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The simple matter of having a password could be changed thanks to a change of
context such as the episode but also in terms of the way you prove that you have
knowledge of it. The idea of being enthused in some way could make the experience
more positive. This is why we argue that guideline G2 could be a way to imbue a sense
“charm” into security ceremonies, from the users’ perspective.
G3, stemming from Q3, is a reasonable assumption based on the fact that having
simpler ceremony rules improves the user’s experience while preserving security. What
G3 advances is an approach that urges a return to simpler rules, thereby freeing the
users from any extra burdens in the execution of essential security ceremonies. Einstein
famously said that things should be “made as simple as possible, but no simpler”. This
applies admirably to my security context.
G4 suggests using “something you are” in security ceremonies. The answers to Q1
and Q3 revealed that users considered “something you know", such as a password, as
well as “something you have" burdensome. An alternative approach that might be
more acceptable could be the use of biometrics, as highlighted in the responses to Q4.
Although the use of biometrics is not exempt from critique as many users (and some
developers of security solutions) are concerned about their privacy ramifications, a
variety of different biometrics are available and they do appear to represent a reasonable
compromise, also conveying a sense of play and of being “cool and modern” in achieving
security.
If I am able to introduce G4 in ceremonies, I will likely obtain a positive response
from the users.
3.7 Applying Beautifying Guidelines
Bella and Viganò [26] highlighted the crucial aspects of security ceremonies to ac-
knowledge the value of beautifying ceremonies. Developers can avoid their ceremony
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becoming ineffective when people bypass it due to its unattractiveness. However,
achieving cybersecurity requires systems to interact with many other pre-existing
systems’ ceremonies. Some of these are so part-and-parcel of others’ systems that
it might be difficult to replace them with more beautiful ceremonies built following
my guidelines. I am concerned with the possibility of improving an existing security
system with as little effort as possible. My intention is (i) to take a system that does
not reflect the beautiful security approach [26] yet it is secure in the (often) optimistic
assumption that the users will use it precisely as intended by the system designers, and
(ii) to beautify the system following my guidelines so that this assumption becomes
less optimistic and more realistic.
I consider four ceremonies that are, I believe, in dire need of beautification:
1. the Italian voting ceremony,
2. the Laptop login ceremony,
3. the Password setup ceremony, and
4. the European (EU) premises access ceremony.
I discuss ways to make such ceremonies more beautiful and for each of them I present
a specific beautified version that I have devised, with the exception of the improved
Laptop login ceremony that has already been developed by Apple.
The beautification changes that I propose reflect the guidelines I identified in
the previous section (and also reflect the authors’ combined experience of designing
Socio-Technical Systems). In the following section, I will then report on the second
questionnaire that I issued to assess whether the new versions of the security ceremonies
that I present here are indeed perceived to have been beautified.






V matches(face, id_info, votingCard_info)
if OK(all_checks)
then V finds(votingCard_info, voterList)




P puts(votersheet) into VC
pencil
id,votingCard
Figure 3.2 The current Italian Voting Ceremony
3.7.1 Italian Voting Ceremony
Figure 3.2 shows the voting ceremony currently used in elections in Italy. Here, and
in the following, I represent security ceremonies by means of Message Sequence Charts
(MSCs), which show the messages exchanged by the principals (agents) participating in
the ceremony, as well as the internal computation that is performed by the principals.
The MSCs that I consider in this work are, hopefully, quite self-explanatory.
In the Italian voting ceremony in Figure 3.2, there are only two principals: a user
(the voter) and an employee of the polling station (the voting officer). This ceremony
could be considered outdated in comparison with the voting ceremonies adopted in
other countries (e.g., UK, Germany). Even if the UK voting ceremony seems to be
more “hussle-free” since it does not require to carry anything along compared to the
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Germany voting ceremony, which requires to take an ID card to go to vote, proceeding
to make these ceremonies more “beautiful” is something that has to be done trying to
minimise the changes in order to potentially reduce the introduction of security issues.
The outdated part of the ceremony would be represented by the need of the voter to
have two different documents:
1. a national ID card (or any other identification document such as a passport or a
driving licence) and
2. a votingCard, issued by the city hall to record that a voter has cast a vote in this
election.
This votingCard, which is shown in Figure 3.3, represents the ceremony’s main sticking
point for two primary reasons. Firstly, votingCards are stamped at each election, and
they fill up. If this happens, there are no more spaces for the voting officer to stamp the
votingCard to register the voter’s presence. A second problem occurs when a voter loses
their votingCard. In both cases, the voter will first need to obtain a new votingCard
from official sources at the city hall in order to be able to vote in this election (and
some of the following ones, until the new votingCard is full).
During electoral rounds in the last years, these two issues have created particularly
obvious difficulties, with long queues snaking out of city hall offices across Italy,
populated by voters needing to obtain new copies of their votingCards.
The complication comes from the use of a single document (the votingCard) for two
different purposes: (1) a voting register and (2) an eligibility proof. Voters experience
frustration, especially if the votingCard’s spaces have been filled up, in which case the
votingCard only satisfies one of its two purposes: eligibility. Recrafting this ceremony
offers me a clear-cut opportunity for improvement.
The new ceremony in Figure 3.4 applies what I have suggested with the beautification
guidelines G1 “feel unencumbered: you do not need to carry anything along” and
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Figure 3.3 votingCard currently used in Italian elections
G3 “simplify the rules, even though they seem essential”. Italy, indeed, is among
the stragglers with regard to digitalisation in Europe. Few improvements have been
implemented recently on the e-health system, however, Italy is still far behind on
the integration of digital technologies in the economy and Internet usage and this
lack is pushed to the end user, making them carry several documents, some of them
potentially redundant, in the case of the voting ceremony.
I suggest, in fact, to remove part of the burden voters see in having to use a
votingCard, reshaping the ceremony and demanding one part of the security components
of the voting ceremony that comes from this change to the polling station which is
represented by its employees. Removing the “what you hold” object (the votingCard
in this case) reflects the guideline G1 and, considering the voter’s point of view, the
ceremony should benefit of the changes reflecting also the guideline G3.
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Figure 3.4 Potentially beautified Italian voting ceremony
The simplest way to replace the votingCard would be to use a system that needs
the voter only to present their national ID card (or identification document), in its
electronic form but also with the possibility to insert the data of the oldest ID card. The
polling station employee would check the voter’s eligibility and record their presence in
a centralised database, by interacting online with a third principal in the ceremony
(the “system”). The voter would no longer need to “hold” the votingCard that causes
all the problems stated earlier. Overall, the beautification process here aims to make
the user more willing to go to vote, trying to unburden the user and removing also
some of the pitfalls that can happen due to the need for more voting documents.
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Further improvements on the beautified version of the Italian voting ceremony as
well as other voting ceremonies can be discussed, especially considering improvements
that brings the voter to not carry anything along in addition to e-voting ceremonies. I
leave this study as future work.
3.7.2 Laptop Login Ceremony
Every day, users have to enter multiple passwords into their laptops (and computers).
These passwords are becoming longer and more complex over time due to the security
requirements enforced by operating systems. Figure 3.5 shows “password entry”, the











Figure 3.5 The widespread Laptop login ceremony
We can of course all agree that passwords are essential, but my questionnaire
respondents confirmed my personal intuition (and my personal experience) that users
increasingly dread this ceremony. To simplify the login, Apple has developed a new way
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to login on its latest laptops by means of its Apple Watch product.3 It is coherent with
my guideline G2 if we see the Apple Watch as a distinctive feature of a group. This
authentication method is incorporated in the beautified ceremony shown in Figure 3.7.
Every time the user needs to wake up her MacBook, she just needs to press a key on
the keyboard or touch the trackpad; after that, the system looks for a paired Apple
Watch and if it finds one, the MacBook unlocks itself without requesting any other
actions. A successful outcome is demonstrated in Figure 3.6. Similar ceremonies using
one or more small portable/wearable devices have also been proposed [157].
Using the “something that I possess” paradigm here to replace the need of inserting
the password, which reflects the “something that I know” paradigm, into the login
ceremony, successfully validates the beautification guideline G2. Similarly to this case,
the “something that I possess” is used in situations that require two-factor authentica-
tion (2fa) with hardware OTP tokens replaced by software OTP tokens generated by
smartphone apps, taking also advantage of the pervasiveness of smartphones. In fact,
people would feel as part of a group that uses a smartphone app, which seems more
cool, instead of the old fashion OTP token device, to do banking operations.
3.7.3 Password Setup Ceremony
In 2003, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, published the NIST
Special Publication 800-63 [70], where they suggested that users protect their accounts
by inventing “awkward”, new passwords that include upper case and lower case
letters, numbers and special characters, and by changing their password regularly.
Such passwords aim to be less guessable (e.g., more resistant to dictionary attacks).
Nowadays, this is common practice, with websites and services forcing users to craft
3Google and Microsoft are similarly planning to remove passwords using the protocol Fido in
conjunction with Android phones or physical tokens, respectively.
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Figure 3.7 A potentially beautified Laptop login ceremony (by Apple Watch)
passwords respecting these constraints. Figure 3.8 shows a ceremony that reflects this
practice.





















Figure 3.8 The Current Password Setup Ceremony (using NIST 2003 rules)
In 2017, Bill Burr, the person who originally proposed the rules, declared that he
regretted publishing those strict rules [107]. In fact, the new NIST document published
in June 2017 [70, Section 5.1.1.1] contains the following novel guidelines:
“...memorised secrets shall be at least 8 characters in length if chosen by the
subscriber. Memorised secrets chosen randomly by the Credential Service
Provider (CSP) or verifier shall be at least 6 characters in length and may
be entirely numeric. If the CSP or verifier disallows a chosen memorised
secret based on its appearance on a blacklist of compromised values, the
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subscriber shall be required to choose a different memorised secret. No other
complexity requirements for memorised secrets should be imposed.”
Applying these guidelines, it is possible to propose a new ceremony that allows users to
choose whatever password they want, morphing the security component into a check on
the number of times a password is typed incorrectly. By doing so, I simplify the rules
imposed by the ceremony as suggested by G3. Figure 3.9 shows the new “Password














loop [checks not OK | counter < N ]
ack
Figure 3.9 A potentially beautified Password setup ceremony (using the new NIST
rules)
3.7.4 European (EU) Premises Access Ceremony
Those wishing to gain access to highly-secure buildings, such as some EU premises,
have to engage with an authentication ceremony like the one shown in Figure 3.10, in
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which the security staff check both a visitor’s photo-ID (e.g., a national ID card or a















loop [entrance ⩾ 1]
Figure 3.10 The current EU premises access ceremony
This ceremony thus requires a first-time visitor to engage in a time-consuming
fingerprint-registration process. This ceremony is repetitive in the case of returning
visitors, hence especially frustrating if a person needs to access the premises, for
example, multiple times a day.
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I can apply G4 to make the ceremony (more) beautiful. Still using biometric
technology, it is possible to devise a leaner ceremony that requires the user to engage
with fewer interactions. In this beautified ceremony, shown in Figure 3.11, I have
removed the document check for the entrances after the first one, so that the main















loop [entrance ⩾ 1]
Figure 3.11 A potentially beautified EU premises access ceremony
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3.8 Crowdsourcing for the Application of Beautiful
Security
My second questionnaire aimed to determine whether applying my guidelines to
ceremonies, or highlighting improvements based on my guidelines in existing ceremonies,
had been effective. I wanted to find out whether the beautified alternative I present to
the respondents is indeed considered a positive improvement, or not.
3.8.1 Design of the Second Questionnaire
I designed the questionnaire to present two alternative versions of the same ceremony:
an original and a beautified one, the latter arrived at by applying one or more of the
beautification guidelines. To that end, I presented respondents with the four different
ceremonies I described in Section 3.7. Respondents were asked to answer by giving
a preference on which of the two versions of each ceremony they think is the most
beautiful. However, before proceeding, it is necessary to make some observations.
First, note that users are not specifically asked to express a preference on which
ceremony they would prefer to use (this would have required an additional question
for each ceremony presented asking for their preference), nor to respond that there
was no difference between the two given ceremonies. Here I wanted to capture to what
extent the users, with their understanding of security ceremonies, would have perceived
the “beautified” versions as a positive, ultimately as a beautiful, improvement of the
original ceremonies.
Second, statistical significance was not tested. This could be a part of a further
investigation, considering also to carry out the investigation with a larger sample.
The questionnaire consisted of the following four closed-ended questions, allowing
people to respond with a single preference:
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Q1: You have to choose a new system to be authenticated to vote in an election.
Which of the following two alternative systems is more beautiful?
1. A system that requires you to bring your “voting eligibility certificate” in
addition to your ID Card.
2. A system that requires you to bring only an electronic ID document.
Q2: You have to choose a new system to log in on your laptop. Which of the following
two alternative systems is more beautiful?
1. A system that requires you to type in your password.
2. A system that requires you to approach your laptop with your smartwatch.
Q3: You have to choose a new authentication system. Which of the following two
alternative systems is more beautiful?
1. A system that requires you to insert a complex password (including require-
ments such as minimum number of characters, or the use of capital letters,
numbers and special characters).
2. A system that requires you to insert whatever password you want but it
limits the number of times you may type the password incorrectly before
getting locked out.
Q4: The security officers at the entrance of a secure building have registered your ID
and fingerprint on the system once you have completed the registration. Which
of the following two alternatives to access the building from now on is more
beautiful?
1. ID + fingerprint every time.
2. Fingerprint every time.
3.8 Crowdsourcing for the Application of Beautiful Security 75
Q1 thus refers to the two versions of the Italian voting ceremony; Q2 to the two versions
of the Laptop login ceremony; Q3 to the two versions of the Password setup ceremony;
Q4 to the two versions of the EU premises access ceremony.
3.8.2 Findings
I administered the questionnaire to one hundred respondents using the CrowdFlower
platform, not constraining respondents in terms of language or geography. As I
remarked above, CrowdFlower workers span the globe, so heterogeneity of the sample is
assumed. In order to obtain more focused answers from semi-expert respondents, I also
administered the questionnaire to 24 students of the “Cryptography and Information
Security” course that one of the authors is teaching. The students attending this module
are computer science or mathematics students in the final year of their undergraduate
studies or in the first year of their master’s studies. We can thus call these respondents
“security-savvy”, in contrast to the “generic” respondents on CrowdFlower. Security-
savvy respondents were asked the same questions Q1–Q4 but were also shown the
MSCs of the ceremonies.
The combined results of the second questionnaire are shown in Figure 3.12 and I
now wish to take stock and reflect on the responses that I received. The respondents
provided me with extremely useful, and to some extent slightly surprising, feedback.
The answers to the first question clearly indicate that both generic and security-
savvy users find the beautified Italian voting ceremony that I propose to be considerably
more beautiful than the ceremony currently in use.
The answers to the fourth question indicate even more strongly that both generic
and security-savvy users find the novel EU premises access ceremony that I propose to
be considerably more beautiful than the ceremony currently in use.
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Figure 3.12 Data obtained from the second crowdsourcing
The answers to the second and the third question indicate that my respondents were
almost equally split between the original versions of the second and third ceremonies
I considered and their beautified versions. It is, however, instructive to analyse the
responses in more detail.
Consider the password setup ceremony. It is interesting to note that the 100 generic
respondents have a minimal preference for the proposed beautified ceremony that uses
the new NIST rules (51 vs. 49), whereas almost 60% of the semi-expert students would
rather engage in the original ceremony based on the 2003 NIST rules. I believe that
these results are evidence to the fact that the respondents, especially the security-savvy
ones, perceived the original ceremony to be more robust than the newly proposed
ceremony, although the latter is potentially more lean and beautiful.
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Finally, consider the laptop login ceremony. In this case, 54% of the generic
respondents preferred the original ceremony, whereas 62.5% of the security-savvy
respondents preferred the novel ceremony using the smartwatch. I believe that this
indicates that young computer-science/mathematics students are more likely to embrace
novel technologies than the cohort of generic respondents, which includes people of
different age, education and background, who are thus more likely to meet such
technologies with suspicion or even rejection (perhaps also due to the elitist nature of
such technologies).
3.9 Beauty and Security: Friends or Foes
The beautification process allows the designer to reason on burdensome aspects of
security ceremonies based on my guidelines. The considerations that the designer can
make are user-based. However, the beautification process cannot be exempted from
considering a security analysis of the ceremonies produced. Such a security analysis
can, for instance, be carried out using formal methods as I have done in Chapter 5 for
the Oyster and Single Sign-On ceremonies and in Chapter 6 for the ticket inspection
ceremony, where I demonstrate how tools can support the formal analysis of security
ceremonies in which human users play a key role. These analyses are typically carried
out by security analysts rather than the ceremony designers.
What is interesting here is to focus on the designer’s point of view, allowing him
to carry out a first skimming of the security issues, which does not require a full-
fledged formal analysis — which will be necessary at some point — but that provides
the designer of a semi-formal state of mind to identify pitfalls and problems. For
instance, one can reason if and how the beautification process has introduced errors
and vulnerabilities that didn’t exist before. The following are a couple of examples on
how one can perform this type of reasoning.
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Consider the Italian voting ceremony in its current version in Figure 3.2 and in its
beautified version in Figure 3.4. The security property to be guaranteed is authenti-
cation, admitting to the voting phase the only voters that have been authenticated.
Typical attacks for this property can be impersonification, but also man-in-the-middle
attacks. Having highlighted the possible attacks, one can reason about two questions:
• Are these attacks possible in the beautified version of the ceremony?
• If, yes, were these attacks introduced by the beautification process?
Looking at the Italian voting ceremony in its beautified version, one can notice
that a new channel has been introduced between the polling station employee and
the system. On one hand, without any assumption on the security of the channel,
this channel can be vulnerable to potential man-in-the-middle attacks, which can
compromise the authentication security property. In fact, in this case, an attack can
be performed in the beautified version and it has been introduced by the beautification
process. On the other hand, in case the channel is secure using, for example VPNs
over IPSec, then the channel is not vulnerable and the security is guaranteed in that
part of the ceremony. So, if there is still a vulnerability of the authentication property,
it has to be in another part of the ceremony, and since no other parts have been
changed, the vulnerability is present also in the original ceremony. This means that
the beautification process has not introduced a vulnerability.4
This kind of analysis can unveil these scenarios, which allow one to reason on the
changes introduced to the beautification process. This type of analysis, however, does
not aim to replace a formal analysis, but is complementary and helpful to the designer.
4More formally, one could prove the conditions under which attacks on the ceremony produced
by the beautification process can be reduced to attacks to the original ceremony. Dually, one could
identify the conditions under which a specific beautification process maintains security, meaning that
if one has proved the security of the original ceremony then this specific beautification yields, provably,
a secure beautified ceremony. These kinds of analysis are complex and require considerable work that
goes beyond the context and scope of this thesis.
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3.10 Conclusions
This chapter described how I went about finding a way to beautify security ceremonies,
thereby making beautiful security achievable in practice. I first explored the literature
to find out what beauty means to users, specifically in the context of interaction
with software systems. I then explored general perceptions of security ceremonies
by posing questions to crowdsourcing respondents. Having gained insights from this
process, I proceeded to “beautify” four security ceremonies. I then posed another round
of questions to crowdsourced participants to judge the success of my beautification
of ceremonies. Overall, the outcome of the final stage confirmed that two of the
four beautified ceremonies were indeed perceived to be more beautiful than they had
previously been. The other two beautified ceremonies were not perceived to be more
beautiful by the respondents.
The use of crowdsourcing enabled me to explore and implement the “beautiful” secu-
rity paradigm, and gain feedback from a diverse and global audience. My experiments
confirmed that security ceremony design has plenty of scopes to consider instilling
beauty — with the general aim of achieving more beautiful security ceremonies. The
assumption that people are normally attracted to beauty, as vastly substantiated by
the relevant literature, will then strengthen such a design because it will be secure
not just in isolation but when used by its users. Beauty may reinforce the designers’
assumptions that the users will conform to the ceremony as intended.
A variety of real-world ceremonies would benefit from being subjected to a beauti-
fication process based on guidelines such as those proposed here. The process itself
could be developed further, for example by combining and leveraging several guidelines
at the same time. This will be particularly important in the case of ceremonies such as
Password setup, on which my experiments showed that beauty will also need to convey
robustness. The Laptop login ceremony, where newer technologies such as the Apple
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Watch are used, might not yet be considered to be beautiful by the wider population
today.
The methodology discussed here has reached the development stage of a proof
of concept but I am aware that it must be developed further as this study is just
skimming the surface of linking the perception of “beauty” with security. For instance,
I have already repeated the crowdsourcing experiments over a larger sample population
to reinforce the actual beautification guidelines and to find others. I am applying a
qualitative methodology [140] on the data in order to classify the results. The next
phase will be to understand if the potential new guidelines can be applied to the
security ceremonies and in which instance I can confirm that the beatification has
succeeded, taking advantage of another crowdsourcing or using different methods, e.g.,
focus groups.
Moreover, although beautifying existing ceremonies may sometimes lead to simpli-
fying them, simplicity did not turn up in the categories that emerged from the analysis
of answers to open question Q4. Arguably, simplifying a security ceremony might
compromise security; as part of future works, I thus also plan to develop combinations
of empirical, analytical and formal approaches [20, 131, 88, 104] to help ensure that
when the new paradigm is applied to a ceremony, possibly simplifying it, it remains
secure. This will require defining degrees of ceremony attractiveness for humans in a
formal, logico-mathematical way, in order to then be able to reason about the interplay
of beautification and security, ultimately ensuring that the beauty of a ceremony does
not come at the expense of its security (which might be the case for some of the
ceremonies I considered, e.g., if users choose weak passwords), but instead provably
reinforces its security. I expect that this will ultimately lead to defining criteria that
formalise when beautification preserves or reinforces security.
Chapter 4
What Are the Threats?
(Charting the Threat Models
of Security Ceremonies)
This chapter addresses the underlying, fundamental question of what are, and how
to define, the threat models for a security ceremony. This work has been published
as: Sempreboni, D., Bella, G., Giustolisi, R., and Viganò, L. (2019). What Are the
Threats?(Charting the Threat Models of Security Ceremonies). In Proceedings of the
16th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications, ICETE -
Volume 2: SECRYPT, pages 161–172. Scitepress Digital Library. [147]
4.1 Motivation
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there is increasing awareness that security protocols need
better attention to their “human element” than what is traditionally paid. This trend
is confirmed by recent works, both on the formal [20, 100, 16] and on the practical
level [74, 23, 88, 156, 110, 158].
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While existing works (such as the ones cited above) define threats that are reasonable,
they generally fail to treat the threats systematically within the given ceremony, hence
potentially missing relevant combinations of threats. For example, a vulnerability in a
website might be exploited by a specific sequence of user actions, which an attacking
third party would need to deceive the user to take. This attack cannot be discussed
without admitting a complicated threat model that combines at the same time (but
without any form of collusion): (i) a bug in the website, (ii) a user who makes wrong
choices and (iii) an active attacker capable of deception.
A huge variety of similar situations may underlie modern security ceremonies, and
that variety is, in turn, due to the variety of the ceremonies themselves, with different
levels of intricacies and innumerable applications, ranging from pre-purchasing a cinema
ticket via the web to obtaining an extended validation certificate. A remarkable, recent
and large-scale, attack saw the “Norbertvdberg” hacker advertise his online seed
generator iotaseed.io through Google for a semester; but the generator was bogus, so
that Norbertvdberg could hack a number of seeds and harvest a total of $3.94 million
worth of IOTA at the only extra effort of mounting a DDoS against the IOTA network
to prevent investigation. Here, both the hacker and his website acted maliciously,
though arguably in different ways, mounting a complex socio-technical attack against
both users and the IOTA infrastructure [80].
Therefore, it is clear that security ceremonies don’t succumb to the “one threat
model to rule them all” proviso as security protocols traditionally did with the Dolev-
Yao attacker model [56]. In fact, the Dolev-Yao model has proved to be very successful
for the analysis of security protocols, where the almighty attacker “rules” over the
other protocol agents who are assumed to behave only as prescribed by the protocol
specification. However, in the case of security ceremonies such an attacker provides an
inherent “flattening” that likely makes one miss relevant threat scenarios. By analogy,
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one could say that the Dolev-Yao attacker is a powerful hammer... but to a man with
a hammer, everything looks like a nail, forgetting that there are also screws and nuts
and bots (for which a hammer is inadequate). I advocate that for security ceremonies
we need an approach that provides a birds-eye view, an “over-view” that allows one to
consider what are the different threats and where they lie, with the ultimate aim of
finding novel attacks.
4.2 Contributions
The main contribution of this chapter is thus the systematic definition of an encompass-
ing method to build the full threat model chart for security ceremonies from which one
can conveniently reify the threat models of interest for the ceremony under consideration.
More specifically, I provide four concrete contributions.
1. Classification and labelling The method starts with a classification of the
principals participating in security ceremonies and continues with a motivated labelling
system for their actions and principals. Contrarily to some of the mentioned works, my
method abstracts away from the reasons that determine human actions such as error.
2. Combination of the principal labels The method systematically combines
the principal labels to derive a number of threat models that, together, form the full
chart of threat models for the ceremony. We shall see that the higher the number of
principals in a ceremony, the more complicated its full threat model chart: we shall
represent it as a table, where each line signifies a specific threat model.
3. Testing my method For concreteness, I demonstrate the application of the
method on four ceremonies that have already been considered, albeit at different levels
of detail and analysis, in the literature:
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• MP-Auth [16, 99],
• Opera Mini [131],
• Cash-point [133], and
• the Danish Mobilpendlerkort ceremony [68].
I discuss how the full threat model chart suggests some interesting threats that haven’t
been investigated although they are well worth of scrutiny. In particular, it turns out
that the Danish Mobilpendlerkort ceremony is vulnerable to the combination of an
attacking third party and a malicious phone of the ticket holder’s. The threat model
that leads to this vulnerability has not been considered so far and arises here thanks
to my charting method.
4. Formal proof using model checking To demonstrate the relevance of the
chart, I modelled and analysed this threat model using the formal and automated
tool Tamarin [161], which enables the unbounded verification of security protocols,
although it is important to highlight that my method is generic and can be used with
any tool for the analysis of security protocols and ceremonies.
4.3 Outline
A full threat model chart for security ceremonies is in Section 4.4. The application of
my chart on three example is in Section 4.5 and Section 4.6: MP-Auth, Opera-Mini
and Cash-point are discussed in Section 4.5, whereas I devote the whole of Section 4.6
to the Danish Mobilpendlerkort ceremony. Conclusions are discussed in Section 4.7.
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4.4 Charting the Threat Models of Security Cere-
monies
I designed the threat models considering three components: the principals, the actions
that each principal performs and the combination of principals and actions resulting in
scenarios. The charting that results from these three components will be a meta-model
to help security analysts to consider all the resulting threats within a security ceremony.
4.4.1 Principals
The principals that may participate in a security ceremony C are
• a number of technical systems,
• a number of humans and
• an attacking third party.
A technical system TechSystemi is one that can be programmed and works by
executing its program (using the terminology of security protocol analysis, these are
honest principals that behave according to the protocol specification). Depending on
the architectural level represented in the given ceremony, a technical system could
be either a piece of hardware, say a network node, or of software, say the program
executing on that node. I envisage zero or more technical systems participating in the
ceremony.
A human principal Humani may variously interact with other humans or with
the technical systems. For example, Human1 may interact directly with Human2 in
a face-to-face ceremony without technology, or respectively with technical systems
TechSystem1 and TechSystem2, which may in turn interact between themselves through
a security protocol. As with technical systems, zero or more humans could participate
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in the ceremony, and the case of zero humans would take us back to the realm of
security protocols.
I also consider an attacking third party ATP, which can be seen as a combination
of colluding attackers, in the style of the Dolev-Yao attacker. However, the ATP
is inherently socio-technical, namely it is capable of interacting both with a human
by engaging in human actions, and with a technical system by engaging in digital
communication with it. The ATP could thus be interpreted as the union of some
Humanx and some TechSystemy; the capabilities of the ATP will become clearer below.
More formally, the principals of a ceremony C can be formalised as follows:
Technicals(C) := {TechSystemi | i = 1, . . . , n}
Humans(C) := {Humanj | j = 1, . . . , m}
ATP(C) := {ATPk | k ≤ 1}
Principals(C) := Technicals(C) ∪
Humans(C) ∪
ATP(C)
where, as is standard, I assume that if n = 0, then C doesn’t contain any technical
system principal. Similarly, if m = 0, then C doesn’t contain any human principal, and
if k = 0, then there is no attacking third party.
Let’s consider the Italian Voting ceremony C in Section 3.7.1. The principals of
this ceremony are:
Principals(C) := Humans(C) := {user , polling station employee}
whereas, if I consider its “beautified” version C′, the principals are:
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Technicals(C′) := {system}
Humans(C′) := {user , polling station employee}
Principals(C′) := Technicals(C′) ∪
Humans(C′) ∪
4.4.2 Information and Actions
Principals of a security ceremony exchange information of various types, such as a
password that a human may type, a ticket on a smartphone that a human may show
to an inspector, a PDF that a technical system may display to a human, or a binary
message, which is typically exchanged between technical systems.
More formally, I express the heterogeneity of the information exchanged in the
given ceremony C by introducing a free type
Information(C) .
I don’t need to specify this type in more detail here, but I take it to cover objects
being used and exchanged in the ceremony (cards, PDFs, etc.) as well as data being
transmitted (URLs, binary messages, etc.). Of course, in some cases, Information(C)
may reduce to the standard type of abstract encrypted messages typically used in
security protocol analysis.
A ceremony C comes with a predefined set of actions to be performed by a principal
with another one, or many more principals, through the exchange of some information.
Actions include the sending of messages by technical systems, but also commands that
humans may give to technical systems.
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The most common sets of technical, human and attacking third party actions can




AC,H (Humans, Information, Principals)
ATPActions(C) :=
AC,ATP({ATP}, Information, Principals)




AC,H ({Humanj}, Information, Principals)
The relations may, however, also be binary (e.g., a principal broadcasting some
information to all other principals, who thus don’t need to be specified as the third
parameter) or quaternary (e.g., a principal sending a message to a principal through
another principal). So, in general, I define the set of actions of a ceremony as the union
of the set of actions of its principals:
Actions(C) := TechnicalActions(C) ∪
HumanActions(C) ∪
ATPActions(C)
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4.4.3 Action Labels
A key step of my method is the labelling of actions and the labelling of principals. I
introduce the former in this subsection, and the latter in the next subsection.
Each action of a TechSystemi of a given ceremony C can be labelled as follows:
• normal, to indicate actions that are prescribed by the ceremony, analysing a
received message and generating another one to send out;
• bug, to indicate an unwanted technical deviation from normal, hence occur-
ring without a specific goal and normally unexpectedly, such as Heartbleed or
Shellshock;
• malicious, to indicate a deliberate technical deviation from normal, hence im-
plemented with the deliberate goal of someone’s profit. Examples of malicious
actions are the execution of malware, such as a backdoor or a trojan, which
the producer inserted at production time, in which case the profit would be the
producer’s, or the execution of post-exploitation code injected by the ATP while
the technical system is in use, in which case the profit would be the ATP’s.
The second and third labels could be usefully equipped with parameters carrying out
the relevant details of the bug or of the malicious action. More formally, for each
ceremony, the following function can be defined:
technical_action_labelC :
TechnicalActions(C) → {normal, bug, malicious}
Each action of a Humanj of a given ceremony C can be labelled as follows:
• normal, to indicate actions that are prescribed by the given ceremony, such as
opening a website, launching an app or handing a paper receipt over to another
human;
4.4 Charting the Threat Models of Security Ceremonies 90
• error, to indicate an unwanted human deviation from normal, hence occurring
without a specific goal and normally unexpectedly, such as typing a wrong (i.e.,
different from the one the human wanted) password, making the wrong choice or
handing out a wrong item;
• choice, to indicate a deliberate human deviation from normal, hence occurring
with the deliberate goal of someone’s profit. Example choice actions include those
just given as errors, provided that they are reinterpreted towards profit. Other
example choices include attempts to attack a technical system, for example by
exploiting a vulnerability. Profit could be personal for the human making the
choice or it could be ATP’s profit if the human choice is due to deception.
Also in this case, the second and third labels could be usefully equipped with parameters
carrying out the relevant details of the error or of the choice. More formally, for each
ceremony, the following function can be defined:
human_action_labelC :
HumanActions(C) → {normal, error , choice}
Finally, the ATP either does nothing (i.e., is not present at all) or attacks the
ceremony. To do the latter, it may engage in the ceremony by performing technical
actions that are malicious or human actions of choice:
atp_action_labelC :
ATPActions(C) → {malicious, choice}
This is where one can see the difference between my ATP and the Dolev-Yao attacker.
The latter controls the network and can impersonate other principals by acting honestly
in a protocol run (but cannot break cryptography, yet computational extensions have
been proposed). By contrast, my ATP is an external principal and cannot be an insider
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of the ceremony — the attacks that can happen in that case are covered in my model
by appropriately labelled actions of the humans or technical systems participating in
the ceremony (in particular, labelled as choice, error, bug or malicious). Similarly, an
attacker that simply participates honestly in a ceremony can be expressed by humans
and technical systems executing the ceremony with an “empty” external attacking
third party. Collusion between an insider and an outsider can also be modelled that
way.
The charting represents a meta-model based on “intentions” of principals. In
particular, the ATP is a principal with dishonest intentions. It is not meant to be a
direct substitute of the Dolev-Yao attacker as it is not at the same level of granularity.
In fact, the ATP in the chart encompasses the Dolev-Yao attacker as one of the possible
cases (this special case can be captured by appropriately labelling the actions and the
principals of the ceremony, as I shall clarify below) and, indeed, in the Single Sign-On
ceremony in Chapter 5 the attacker used is the Dolev-Yao attacker as it covers the
“intentions” expressed by the chart. On the other hand, what the charting allows us
to do that we were not able to do before is, in fact, to reason without the Dolev-Yao
attacker as shown in the Danish Mobilpendlerkort ceremony considered later in this
chapter. In short, the charting provides a birds-eye view on which threat model can be
used in the different ceremonies considered, as illustrated, for example, by the Oyster
ceremony and Single Sign-On ceremony considered in Chapter 5 where I introduce
scenarios with and without the Dolev-Yao attacker.
4.4.4 Scenario Labels and Principal Labels
We have just seen how to label each action that the principals of a given ceremony C
may execute. The labelling system can be lifted at the level of principals. For example,
a principal is labelled as
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• normal if the principal is a technical system or a human and all actions of the
principal are labelled as normal; or as
• choice if the principal is a human and all actions of the principal are either
labelled as choice or as normal; and so on.
More precisely, I identify 11 relevant groups of action labels that a principal, (depending
on whether it is a technical system, a human or the ATP) may use, and define them as
a set of scenarios:
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scenario1(p) := p ∈ Technicals(C) and
∀a ∈ TechnicalActions(C, p) it is a = normal
scenario2(p) := p ∈ Humans(C) and
∀a ∈ HumanActions(C, p) it is a = normal
scenario3(p) := p ∈ Technicals(C) and
∀a ∈ TechnicalActions(C, p)
it is a = bug or a = normal
scenario4(p) := p ∈ Technicals(C) and
∀a ∈ TechnicalActions(C, p)
it is a = malicious or a = normal
scenario5(p) := p = ATP(C) and
∀a ∈ ATPActions(C, p) it is a = malicious
scenario6(p) := p ∈ Humans(C) and
∀a ∈ HumanActions(C, p)
it is a = error or a = normal
scenario7(p) := p ∈ Humans(C) and
∀a ∈ HumanActions(C, p)
it is a = choice or a = normal
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scenario8(p) := p = ATP(C) and
∀a ∈ ATPActions(C, p) it is a = choice
scenario9(p) := p ∈ Technicals(C) and
∀a ∈ TechnicalActions(C, p)
it is a = bug or a = malicious or a = normal
scenario10(p) := p ∈ Humans(C) and
∀a ∈ HumanActions(C, p)
it is a = error or a = choice or a = normal
scenario11(p) := p = ATP(C) and
∀a ∈ ATPActions(C, p)
it is a = malicious or a = choice
This list of scenarios emphasises all combinations of labels that I derive system-
atically and deem significant for the principals, namely bug + malicious for technical
systems, error + choice for humans and malicious + choice for the attacking third
party. The scenarios show that only technical systems and humans can take normal
actions, while only technical systems and the attacking third party can take malicious
actions, and only humans and the attacking third party can take choice actions. The
scenarios also confirm that the attacking third party is the only principal who can
combine both malicious and choice actions.
In order to express the scenarios a principal may follow, I introduce a function that
maps principals to sets of scenarios, intuitively yielding, for a given principal, the set
of scenarios that the principal may follow:
scenaC : Principals(C) → 2{scenario()k|k=1,...,11}
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with the obvious constraints that:
• if p ∈ Technicals(C) then scenaC(p) ∈
2{scenario1(p),scenario3(p),scenario4(p),scenario9(p)}
• if p ∈ Humans(C) then scenaC(p) ∈
2{scenario2(p),scenario6(p),scenario7(p),scenario10(p)}
• if p = ATP then scenaC(p) ∈
2{scenario5(p),scenario8(p),scenario11(p)}
This function is in general total because every principal will be associated to some
scenarios but not surjective; hence, some (sets of) scenarios may not have any principal
that is mapped into them in the given ceremony C. Intuitively, this means that no
principal acts according to those scenarios in the given ceremony. I then introduce the
scenario label function:
scenario_labelC : {scenariok() | k = 1, . . . , 11} →
{normal, bug, malicious, error , choice,
bug + malicious, error + choice,
malicious + choice}
This function is in general partial, which means that C may not allow us to define the
principal label on some scenarios, precisely on those that are not associated to any
principal by the function scenaC. For a given scenario s, the function is defined as:
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scenario_labelC(s) =
normal if s = scenario1() or
s = scenario2()
bug if s = scenario3()
malicious if s = scenario4() or
s = scenario5()
error if s = scenario6()
choice if s = scenario7() or
s = scenario8()
bug + malicious if s = scenario9()
error + choice if s = scenario10()
malicious + choice if s = scenario11()
The labels of a principal can be defined as the labels of the scenarios the principal
may follow according to function scenaC(p). More formally:
PLTechnicalsC(p) :=
{l | l = scenario_labelC(s) for s ∈ scenaC(p)}
PLHumansC(p) :=
{l | l = scenario_labelC(s) for s ∈ scenaC(p)}
PLATPC :=
{l | l = scenario_labelC(s) for s ∈ scenaC(p)}
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4.4.5 Building the Full Threat Model Chart
As mentioned in Section 2.2, a security ceremony expands a security protocol with
everything that is considered out-of-band to it, including, in particular, the mistakes that
human users might make when participating actively in the security ceremony. The Full
Threat Model Chart has been built systematically taking into account the important
aspects that characterize the security ceremonies (e.g., who is participating such as
technical systems, human participants, external attackers but also communication
channels between human participants and communication channels between technical
systems and human participants).
The chart, in fact, considers the three types of principals Technicals, Humans and
ATP. Furthermore, each of the principals comes with a set of actions that represents
the intentions of a specific principal in the security ceremony. Because of its generality,
the chart is able to capture principals’ “intentions” that span from social engineering
to guessing situations. At the end, the full chart of threat models for a given ceremony
C can be built by systematically combining the labels of all principals in Principals(C),
namely by building the set PLTechnicalsC(p) for each technical system p, the set
PLHumansC(p) for each human p and the set PLATPC and, finally, by composing
their elements exhaustively. For example, suppose that C features a human principal
and two technical systems that, respectively, use all possible action labels, while no
attacking third party is assumed to exist. It means that I have to build three sets of
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principal labels:
PLHumansC(Human) =
{normal, error , choice, error + choice}
PLTechnicalsC(TechSystem1) =
{normal, bug, malicious, bug + malicious}
PLTechnicalsC(TechSystem2) =
{normal, bug, malicious, bug + malicious}
Due to the cardinality of such sets, the full threat model chart for C has width
n(Principals(C)) = 3 and depth:
n(PLTechnicalsC(Human)) ×
n(PLHumansC(TechSystem1)) ×
n(PLHumansC(TechSystem2)) = 43 = 64.
It is given in Table 4.1.
As another example, consider a ceremony C′ that extends C with an attacking third
party that only interferes with the human principals in all scenarios, but not with the
technical systems. It means that:
PLATPC′ = {choice} .
As a consequence, the full threat model chart for C′ doubles (the height of) the chart
in Table 4.1, with the new half being the same as the first half but with an extra
column for the attacking third party repeating choice for 64 times.
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# Human TechSystem1 TechSystem2
1 normal normal normal
2 normal normal bug
3 normal normal malicious
4 normal normal bug+malicious
5 normal bug normal
6 normal bug bug
7 normal bug malicious
8 normal bug bug+malicious
9 normal malicious normal
10 normal malicious bug
11 normal malicious malicious
12 normal malicious bug+malicious
13 normal bug+malicious normal
14 normal bug+malicious bug
15 normal bug+malicious malicious
16 normal bug+malicious bug+malicious
17 error normal normal
18 error normal bug
19 error normal malicious
20 error normal bug+malicious
21 error bug normal
22 error bug bug
23 error bug malicious
24 error bug bug+malicious
25 error malicious normal
26 error malicious bug
27 error malicious malicious
28 error malicious bug+malicious
29 error bug+malicious normal
30 error bug+malicious bug
31 error bug+malicious malicious
32 error bug+malicious bug+malicious
Table 4.1 The full threat model chart for a ceremony with a human principal, two
technical systems and no attacking third party
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# Human TechSystem1 TechSystem2
33 choice normal normal
34 choice normal bug
35 choice normal malicious
36 choice normal bug+malicious
37 choice bug normal
38 choice bug bug
39 choice bug malicious
40 choice bug bug+malicious
41 choice malicious normal
42 choice malicious bug
43 choice malicious malicious
44 choice malicious bug+malicious
45 choice bug+malicious normal
46 choice bug+malicious bug
47 choice bug+malicious malicious
48 choice bug+malicious bug+malicious
49 error+choice normal normal
50 error+choice normal bug
51 error+choice normal malicious
52 error+choice normal bug+malicious
53 error+choice bug normal
54 error+choice bug bug
55 error+choice bug malicious
56 error+choice bug bug+malicious
57 error+choice malicious normal
58 error+choice malicious bug
59 error+choice malicious malicious
60 error+choice malicious bug+malicious
61 error+choice bug+malicious normal
62 error+choice bug+malicious bug
63 error+choice bug+malicious malicious
64 error+choice bug+malicious bug+malicious
Table 4.1 (Continued) The full threat model chart for a ceremony with a human
principal, two technical systems and no attacking third party
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4.5 Using the Full Threat Model Chart
In this section, I show how my method for the definition of a full threat model chart can
be usefully applied to existing ceremonies. Depending on the number of principals and
the scenarios they follow, my aim is to generate a chart in the style of that in Table 4.1
for each ceremony, and then use the chart to identify the relevant threat models for
the ceremony.
I discuss three example security ceremonies that have already been analysed to
some extent in the literature: MP-Auth [16, 99], Opera Mini [131] and Cash-point [133].
Once their respective full threat model chart is available, it can be used to address
which rows, namely which threat models have already been investigated. Additionally,
the chart can be used to pinpoint other relevant threat models that I suggest to consider
for further scrutiny of the ceremony, for example by formal analysis.
4.5.1 MP-Auth
The MP-Auth ceremony [16, 99] authenticates a human to a server using the human’s
platform and his personal device, to which the human has exclusive access. The main
idea of the ceremony is that the human never needs to enter his password on the
platform because this may be controlled by an attacker. The device has the public
key of the server preinstalled. In short, the ceremony proceeds as follows: the human
enters the name of the server he wants to communicate with on the platform, which
then initiates communication with the server. The server in turn communicates with
the device through the platform. The device displays the identity of the server to the
human, who checks if this corresponds to the server he wants to communicate with. If
it does, then he enters his password and identity on the device. Then, the device sends
the login information to the platform, which relays it to the server.
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According to my method, this ceremony encompasses one human principal and




I also allow for an attacking third party, so that the resulting principals are:
Principals(MP-Auth) := Humans(MP-Auth) ∪
Technicals(MP-Auth) ∪
ATP(MP-Auth)






Hence, the full threat model chart has 44 · 21 = 512 lines. The threat models considered
in previous work [16] can be reinterpreted in my chart as shown in Table 4.2.
Human Platform Device Server ATP
(a) error normal normal normal malicious
(b) choice normal normal normal malicious
Table 4.2 The two threat models already considered for the MP-Auth ceremony
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However, my chart also highlights at least three more relevant threat models that
haven’t been considered yet. These are summarised in Table 4.3.
Human Platform Device Server ATP
(c) error bug normal normal malicious
(d) error normal bug normal malicious
(e) choice malicious normal normal malicious
Table 4.3 Additional threat models relevant for the MP-Auth ceremony.
Threat model (c) considers a human that makes errors while interacting with a
buggy platform under the attack of an ATP ; (d) considers the interaction with a buggy
device; (e) considers a malicious platform and a malicious ATP as well as a human
agent who decides to misbehave. It is clear that my chart helped distil out relevant
threat models that have been neglected so far, and that a formal analysis is required to
detect potential vulnerabilities entailed by the new threat models. In fact, differently
from (a) and (b) in Table 4.2, the new cases in Table 4.3 add potential weak points
that might lead to new attacks.
4.5.2 Opera Mini
The Opera Mini ceremony [131] begins with the user of a smartphone typing the
address of his bank’s website into the Opera Mini web browser. HTTPS connections
are opened between the smartphone and Opera’s Server, and between Opera’s server
and the bank’s server. The request for the page is then passed through to the bank,
which replies with its customer login page. The Opera server renders this page and
sends the compressed output to the user’s smartphone device. On the smartphone,
Opera Mini then displays the webpage, including the padlock symbol. The user sees
the padlock symbol and, if he chooses to input his login information and password,
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then this is sent back to the bank’s server via the Opera encrypted channel, decrypted
at the Opera Server, and then re-encrypted and sent on to the bank’s server via the
HTTPS channel.
I don’t allow for an attacking third party here, so, according to my method, the
principals of the ceremony are:
Humans(Opera-Mini) := {Human}
Technicals(Opera-Mini) :=
{Device, Opera-Server , Bank-Server}
Principals(Opera-Mini) :=
Humans(Opera-Mini) ∪ Technicals(Opera-Mini)





Hence, the full threat model chart has 44 = 256 lines. The only threat model considered
in [131] can be reinterpreted in my chart as shown in Table 4.4.
Human Device Opera-Server Bank-Server
(a) normal bug normal normal
Table 4.4 The threat model already considered for the Opera Mini ceremony.
However, my chart also highlights at least three more relevant threat models that
haven’t been considered yet. These are summarised in Table 4.5.
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Human Device Opera-Server Bank-Server
(b) error normal normal normal
(c) error normal normal malicious
(d) choice normal normal normal
Table 4.5 Additional threat models for the Opera Mini ceremony.
The threat model (a) analysed in [131] considers just a buggy platform. I believe
that it would be interesting to consider also threat model (b), where the human simply
makes errors using the Opera Mini browser possibly, threat model (c), under the
presence of a malicious Bank-Server . Threat model (d), instead, presumes that the 3
technical systems don’t deviate from their specification but the human deliberately
does in order to seek an advantage.
4.5.3 Cash-point
The cash-point ceremony [133] supports a basic ATM service, providing balance infor-
mation and cash. Once a card is inserted, the machine checks its validity. If the card
is not valid, then it is retained and an appropriate message is displayed. If the card is
valid, then the machine asks the user to enter a PIN. Once this is done, the user can
select one of the two options: withdraw cash or check balance. If the balance option
is selected, then the machine releases the card and, once the card has been removed
and after some delay, prints a receipt with the balance information. If the withdraw
cash option is selected, then the user is asked to select the desired amount and (if the
amount is within the limits), after some delay, the machine releases the card and, once
it has been removed, outputs the cash.
According to my method, the principals of the ceremony are:
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Humans(Cash-Point) := {Human}
Technicals(Cash-Point) := {ATM}
I also allow for an attacking third party, so that the resulting principals are:
Principals(Cash-Point) := Humans(Cash-Point) ∪
Technicals(Cash-Point) ∪
ATP(Cash-Point)
The most general case in which every principal gets all possible labels sees:
n(PLHumansMP-Auth(Human)) = 4
n(PLTechnicalsMP-Auth(ATM )) = 4
n(PLATPMP-Auth) = 2
Hence, the full threat model chart has 42·21 = 32 lines. The threat models considered
in previous work [133] can be reinterpreted in my chart as shown in Table 4.6.
Human ATM ATP
(a) normal normal malicious
Table 4.6 A scenario for the Cash-point ceremony.
However, my chart also highlights at least three more relevant threat models that
haven’t been considered yet. These are summarised in Table 4.7.
Human ATM ATP
(b) error normal malicious
(c) choice normal normal
(d) error+choice bug normal
Table 4.7 Other interesting scenarios for the Cash-point ceremony.
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The threat model (a) analysed in [133] considers a human that behaves normally
while he is interacting with an ATM, also acting following the protocol. However, the
system is under attack of an ATP . I believe that it would be interesting to consider also
threat model (b), where the human simply makes mistakes, potentially facilitating the
ATP’s attack; threat model (c) in order to check what could be the repercussions for
the system when a human interacts freely, choosing some actions; and threat model (d),
where the human not only makes mistakes but decides to perform some actions, in
presence of a bugged ATM that potentially tries to get some personal profit, becoming
itself an attacker against the ATM system.
4.6 The Danish Mobilpendlerkort
As a more detailed example, let us consider the inspection ceremony for the mobile
transport ticket in Denmark, which is known to have two vulnerabilities [68]. The
Danish ticket inspection ceremony considers five principals, two of which are human
beings (ticket holder and ticket inspector). Despite the combinatorial explosion due to
the number of principals and actions, it is interesting to dissect some combinations,
especially those in which both human principals deviate from the prescribed ceremony.
4.6.1 Description
As a precondition, the human downloads on his phone a specific app, called Mo-
bilpendlerkort, which allows the human to buy a ticket using a credit card. The human
gives the phone his personal details and travelling preferences, which the phone then
forwards to the train company’s server. This server sends back to the phone a QR code
that encodes a signed version of the human’s travelling preferences. Upon request of
the ticket inspector, the human shows the phone with the QR code, and the inspector
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visually checks the authenticity of the ticket. Then, the inspector checks the validity
of the barcode via a ticket scanner, which has access to the verification key needed to
validate the signature on the QR code. Finally, the scanner emits a green light if the
verification succeeds, a red light otherwise. Additionally, the inspector may ask the
human to show a valid ID document to check the human’s identity.
I identify the following principals in the ceremony (where, for simplicity, I have
considered the phone and the ticketing app as a single technical system):
Humans(Danish-Mobil) := {Human, Inspector}
Technicals(Danish-Mobil) :=











I also assume the attacking third party to only misbehave as formalised by its two
labels, therefore:
n(PLATPDanish-Mobil) = 2
Hence, the full threat model chart has 45 · 21 = 2048 lines.
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Human Phone Scanner Server Inspector ATP
(a) choice malicious normal normal choice —
(b) choice malicious normal normal normal choice
Table 4.8 The two threat models already considered for the Danish-Mobil ceremony.
Human Phone Scanner Server Inspector ATP
(c) normal malicious normal normal normal malicious
Table 4.9 An additional threat model relevant for the Danish-Mobil ceremony.
4.6.2 Threat Models
I focus on three threat models derived from my chart. The threat models (a) and (b)
in Table 4.8 have been considered in [68] and shown to lead to vulnerabilities. The
additional threat model (c) in Table 4.9 provides new insights about a potential yet
realistic attack to the ceremony.
More in detail, threat model (a) considers a human who chooses to forge the
screen of the app that displays the ticket details. The human chooses not to use the
original app, but installs a fake app on his phone so as to mimic both watermark and
background of the original app. This threat model sees the inspector only choose to
visually check the ticket details and not to scan the signed QR code. This is routine
in Metro or local trains [68]. This vulnerability notably doesn’t require an attacking
third party because the human takes advance of an inspector who chooses to deviate
from the ceremony. The attack is possible because the ceremony is designed to let the
human (i.e., the ticket inspector I) decide whether a ticket is genuine or not.
Threat model (b) differs from the previous one as the inspector doesn’t deviate
from the protocol and there is an attacking third party. The latter plays the role
of a ticket holder who buys a valid ticket but then chooses to send the signed QR
code to the human. Then, the human uses a fake app as in (a) to mimic watermark
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and background of the original app and display the QR code sent by the attacking
third party. Notably, both the scanner and the inspector follow the ceremony. This
vulnerability, hence, enables a ticket holder to buy a valid ticket that can be shared
with other people to travel for free. More specifically, the attack is possible because the
QR code doesn’t include the personal details of the ticket holder. Thus, a valid QR
code can be reused by different people. The attacking third party is essential to signify
the attack and provides a way to reason about collusion among different principals in
a quite abstract and general manner.
Threat model (c) has all principals except the phone behave as normal and also
features an attacking third party active towards the phone, hence behaving as malicious.
This threat model represents a form of collusion of the attacking third party with the
human’s phone, for example with the phone running some malware on behalf of the
attacking party. As a consequence, the phone is enabled to steal a valid QR code from
a ticket bought by the human and send it back to the attacking party, who, in turn,
can redistribute tickets to colluding phones.
Threat model (c) has not been considered so far and arises here thanks to my
charting method. To demonstrate the relevance of the chart I analysed threat model
(c) using the formal and automated tool Tamarin although it is important to highlight
that my method can be used with any tool for the analysis of security protocols and
ceremonies.
4.6.3 Formal Analysis
As explained in Section 2.3, a Tamarin rule has a premise and a conclusion and operates
on a multiset of facts. Facts are predicates that store state information. Executing
a rule means that all facts in the premise are present in the current state and are
consumed in favour of the facts in the conclusion. Tamarin supports linear facts, which
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may be consumed by rules only once, and persistent facts, which may be consumed by
rules arbitrarily often.
A fundamental choice is to exclude Tamarin’s built-in attacker model (i.e., the
Dolev-Yao attacker) in favour of the threats provided by the line in my chart model.
More specifically, the communication among principals is modelled by non-persistent
private channel rules. Human, Scanner, Server, and Inspector are labelled as normal,
hence their Tamarin specifications are the ones prescribed by the ceremony. Phone
and ATP are labelled as malicious, hence they have deviating behaviours which are
captured by the Tamarin rules as shown in Listing 4.1. The full formal model is
available in Section A.2 and online here [146].
rule Pleaks:
[! Pstore($P ,’P_5 ’,<s1 , signed_qr >)]
--[ PleakstoATP (’ticket ’, signed_qr )]->
[Out_S($P , $ATP ,’leak_ticket ’, signed_qr )]
rule Pfw:
[In_S($ATP ,$P ,’fake_ticket ’, signed_qr_atp ),
!Pstore($P ,’P_5 ’,<s1 , signed_qr >)]
--[ Pgetsfake (’ticket ’,s1 , signed_qr_atp )]->
[Out_S($P , $H ,’fw_ticket ’,<s1 , signed_qr_atp >)]
rule ATPgets :
[In_S($P ,$ATP ,’leak_ticket ’, signed_qr )]
--[ ATPKnow ($P , signed_qr )]->
[! ATPK($P , signed_qr )]
4.6 The Danish Mobilpendlerkort 112
rule ATPsends :
[! ATPK($P , signed_qr )]
-->
[Out_S($ATP , $PP ,’fake_ticket ’, signed_qr )]
Listing 4.1 Rules of the Danish Mobilpendlerkort ceremony
The fact !Pstore formalises a phone storing the ticket purchased by the traveller,
while the fact !ATPK expresses the knowledge of the ATP, and is conveniently instan-
tiated to a signed QR code. Rules Pleaks and Pfw model behaviours of a malicious
phone that respectively leaks a signed QR code (signed_qr) to the ATP and forwards
another signed QR code sent by the ATP (signed_qr_atp) to the human. Rules
ATPgets and ATPsends model behaviours of a malicious ATP that respectively receives
a signed QR code from a malicious phone and forwards it to a different malicious
phone. I argue that these rules reflect very basic malicious behaviours for phone and
ATP. I check one of the main security properties for a ticketing ceremony, namely,
that two different human beings cannot ride with the same ticket. This is formalised
in Tamarin by the lemma in Listing 4.2:
lemma oneticketpertraveller :
"All h1 h2 s #i #j. OK(h1 ,s)@i &
OK(h2 ,s)@j & i<j ==> h1=h2"
Listing 4.2 Lemma ‘oneticketpertraveller’ for the Danish Mobilpendlerkort ceremony
The label OK(h,s) expresses a successful verification of a ticket with serial number
s and ticket holder h by a ticket inspector. Thus, the property says that two distinct
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verifications of a ticket with the same serial number should concern the same ticket
holder.
Figure 4.1 A snapshot of a portion of the attack graph provided by Tamarin. The
phone leaks part of the ticket to the ATP
Tamarin finds an attack that violates the stated property and provides a graph
that details the steps of the attack to break the property. I focus on two crucial steps.
The first step is outlined in Figure 4.1, in which the conclusion of rule P_5get is
consumed by the premises of rules Pleaks and ChanOut_S, thus creating two branches.
The former rule leaks the signed QR code to the ATP, while the latter forwards the
ticket to the human, who notably doesn’t detect that something bad is happening.
The other crucial step is outlined in Figure 4.2, which depicts a portion of what
follows in the branch due to the rule Pleaks. One of the premises of the rule Pfw is
satisfied by a signed QR code that was purchased by another traveller but is rerouted
by the ATP through the malicious phones. The other premise is satisfied by the
fact !Pstore, which stores the correct ticket details of the current traveller. The
malicious phone combines the correct ticket details with the signed QR code forwarded
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Figure 4.2 A snapshot of a portion of the attack graph provided by Tamarin. The
phone combines the details of the correct ticket with the signed QR code provided by
the ATP
by the ATP, and forwards the resulting fake ticket to the human. Later, during ticket
inspection, the fake ticket is successfully verified.
Although the attack mechanism is similar to the one described in the previous threat
model, the attacking party doesn’t need to create a fake ticket but just to redistribute
the signed QR code from one malicious phone to another. The consequences on the
ticket holder are more serious in this case. The holder is unaware that his ticket is
being reused by someone else. However, post-analysis techniques may reveal a misuse
of fake tickets, hence suggest a software update to the scanner so that the scanner
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would invalidate the fake ticket (further legal action against the ticket holder could
follow).
It is clear that the full threat model chart allows us to appreciate how the same
overarching attack mechanism may be used in different scenarios according to the
selected threat model. As we have seen, different consequences may arise, thus bringing
novel insights to a focus.
4.7 Conclusions
The method that I proposed allows one to build the chart of all threat models for a
given security ceremony upon the basis of the relevant principals (thus identifying the
columns of the table) and their capabilities (thus identifying the rows of the table).
As I remarked above, the chart helps a security analyst capture scenarios that would
not be captured by simply applying the standard Dolev-Yao attacker. The security
analyst can then relate the threat models that have already been considered, if any,
to those that haven’t and, in every case, address all possible threat models of interest
pragmatically.
The methodology has been successfully applied on four ceremonies, suggesting
some interesting threats that haven’t been investigated although they are well worth of
scrutiny. Also, I have demonstrated the relevance of the chart, modelling and analysing
one of the threat models discovered through this methodology, showing that I was
able to uncover, using model checking, a new security threat that affected one of the
security ceremonies considered.
Aspects of “beautification” from Chapter 3 are not considered here since they are
meant to be for security ceremonies and not for threat models.
I believe that my formalisation of the ceremony principals based on their actions
provides a semantics that is, in some sense, more operational than the one that is
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traditionally considered for security protocols. For example, notions such as imperson-
ation and collusion are neatly represented through my approach by endowing principals
with appropriate functioning or behaviour. Still, I am aware that the notions that
I have introduced in this work are quite coarse and in need of a more fine-grained
formalisation.
The research ahead of us is clearly defined: how to cope with the size and com-
plexities of the full threat model chart. One approach could be the description of
appropriate measures and weights to prioritise the different threat models so as to
create an ordered list. The given ceremony could then be verified, in turn, against each
item of the list.
Another approach could be the definition of methods to handle the full threat
model chart in one go, perhaps parameterising the findings upon the threat model.
Tamarin can be customised to dealing with a specific threat model extracted from the
chart, hence disposing with the traditional Dolev-Yao attacker model; however, it is
not yet clear whether and how Tamarin could scale up to the challenges identified
here. These challenges stretch out the requirements traditionally put on tool support,
because the formal analysis will have to identify not only an attack but also the threat




for the Formal Analysis
of Security Ceremonies
This chapter introduces a novel approach for the formal analysis of security ceremonies
that focuses on the vulnerabilities that result from the mistakes that human users might
make. This work has been published as: Sempreboni, D. and Viganò, L. (2020). X-
Men: A Mutation-Based Approach for the Formal Analysis of Security Ceremonies, In
Proceedings of the 5th IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy, EuroS&P,
IEEE. [151].
5.1 Motivation
As widely discussed in Chapter 2, security ceremony analysis, in contrast to security
protocol analysis, for which a plethora of mature approaches and tools exist, is a
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discipline that is still in its childhood, with no widely recognized methodologies or
comprehensive toolsets.
State-of-the-art approaches and tools for security protocol analysis (e.g., [5, 28,
61, 108, 124]) cannot be directly employed for security ceremonies as they take a
“black&white” view and formalise protocols by
• considering one or more attackers that can carry out whatever actions they are
able to in order to attack the protocol, but then
• modelling all other protocols actors (regardless of whether they are computers
or human users) as honest processes that behave according to the protocol
specification.
When considering security ceremonies, in which humans are first-class actors, it is
not enough to take this “black&white” view. It is not enough to model human users
as “honest processes” or as attackers, because they are neither. Modelling a person’s
behaviour is not simple and requires formalising the human “shades of grey” that such
approaches are not able to express nor reason about. It requires modelling the way
humans interact with the protocols, their behaviour and the mistakes they may make,
independent of attacks and, in fact, independent of the presence of an attacker.
Some preliminary approaches have been proposed for security ceremony analysis
(e.g., [15, 16, 20, 36, 50, 84, 104, 131, 130]), but they have barely skimmed the surface
of taking into account human behavioural and cognitive aspects in their relation with
“machine” security.
5.2 Contributions
In this chapter, I provide three main contributions.
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1. Formalization I define a formal approach that allows security analysts to model
possible mistakes by human users as mutations with respect to the behaviour that the
ceremony originally specified for such users. I focus on three main human mutations of
a ceremony,
• skipping one or more of the actions that the ceremony expects the human user to
carry out (such as sending or receiving a message),
• replacing a message with another one,
• adding an action,
and their combinations (but my approach is open to extensions with other mutations
as also shown in Chapter 6).
Human ceremony mutations will likely have an effect also on the other agents of
the ceremony, honest or malicious as they may be. There are two cases: (1) the other
agents are able to reply to a human mutation because the changes are not too relevant
or because the ceremony has somehow made provision for it (e.g., by an if-the-else that
captures both original and mutated human behaviour), or (2) the other agents are
not able to reply to a human mutation. To investigate whether this human mutation
may lead to an attack, I formalise algorithms for human mutations and algorithms
for matching mutations for the other agents, which allow us to create a complete
mutated ceremony specification that can be executed and analysed for vulnerabilities.
My algorithms allow for the analysis of the original ceremony specification and its
possible mutations, which may include the way in which the ceremony has actually
been implemented.1
1It is often the case that the implementation of a protocol or ceremony deviates from the original
specification. There are several possible reasons for this. For instance, the implementation might have
deviated from the specification in order to accommodate initially unforeseen behaviour by the human
users (and this might actually be one of the reasons for the issues in my first case study, the Oyster
ceremony) or simply because the implementers did some mistakes (as in my second case study, the
SAML-based Single Sign-on for Google Apps [7]).
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2. Tool I have developed a prototype tool called X-Men (the name was chosen to
suggest that it considers human mutations), which, as shown in Figure 5.1, creates
mutated models that can then be input to Tamarin [108], one of the most advanced
tools for the automatic unbounded verification of security protocols. X-Men can be used
with human mutations only (without matching) but this will often yield non-executable
specifications as the non-human roles simply won’t reply (thus thwarting attacks caused
by the human mutation). Matching mutations adjust non-human roles so that they can
be executed together with a mutated human role. They are implemented automatically
by X-Men, which generates the matching mutation from the protocol specification based
on the human mutation (it changes the non-human-role specification to receive/send
messages according to the human mutation) and propagates mutations to create an
executable trace that can be analysed in search for attacks. These attacks might be
real attacks on the ceremony’s (specification and) implementation, or be just the result
of the mutations and not be applicable on the actual implementation. In the spirit
of mutation testing [55, 83, 33, 51], the attacks discovered by X-Men could be used
to generate and apply test cases for the ceremony implementation, but I leave this
extension of X-Men for future work.
3. Proof-of-concept I have applied my approach to two real-life case studies, the
Oyster ceremony and the SAML-based Single Sign-on for Google Apps [7], uncovering a
number of concrete vulnerabilities, which had so far been discovered only by empirical
observation of the actual ceremony execution or by directly formalising alternative




In Section 5.4, I introduce my motivating and running example. In Section 5.5, I
describe the intuitions that underlie my approach. In Section 5.6, I describe how I
formally model security ceremonies and their mutations. In Section 5.8, I describe
X-Men and its proof-of-concept. In Section 5.9, I discuss related work. In Section 5.10,
I draw conclusions and discuss future work. All my formal models and the code of
X-Men are available online at [178]. The formal models are also available in Section A.3
and in Section A.4.
Figure 5.1 The workflow of the X-Men tool: from models to mutated models that are
input to Tamarin
5.4 An Example: The Oyster Card Ceremony
I will use the Oyster Card ceremony as a motivating and running example. The Oyster
Card (or just Oyster, for short) is a plastic credit-card-sized, rechargeable, stored-value,
contactless smart card used on public transport in Greater London in the United
Kingdom. The Oyster is a form of electronic ticket that can hold pay-as-you-go credit,
travel cards and passes for underground and overground trains, buses and trams. It
is promoted by Transport for London (TfL) and since its introduction in June 2003,
more than 86 million cards have been used [165]. Similar systems are in use in a large
number of other countries in almost all continents, such as France, Italy, Denmark,
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Finland, South Africa, Argentina, Chile, Australia and Japan, and, interestingly, most
of them suffer from problems similar to the ones of the Oyster that I will discuss in
the next sections.
As shown in Figure 5.2a, the Oyster is used by touching it on an electronic reader
when entering and leaving the transport system in order to validate it or deduct
funds. Actually, this touch-in/touch-out is part of the ceremony used on the London
underground (nicknamed the Tube) and trains, which is what I focus on in this chapter,
whereas on London buses passengers touch in their Oyster only when boarding (instead,
in Sydney, Australia, passengers are required also to touch out when they alight the
bus). Figure 5.2b shows an entrance/exit gate of the Tube.
(a) Touching the Oyster on an Electronic Card
Reader
(b) A Gate of the Tube
Figure 5.2 Using the Oyster Card in the Tube
Figure 5.3a gives a Message Sequence Chart (MSC) of the main Oyster Ceremony
for the Tube, which is carried out by 3 roles: the human passenger H , the entrance
gate GateIn and the exit gate GateOut.
1. The human passenger H touches their Oyster on the reader at the entrance gate,
which amounts to H sending the Oyster number oyster to GateIn.
2. The reader writes an identifier on the Oyster, which amounts to GateIn replying
with the message oyster , gin, where gin is the identifier of GateIn.




oyster , balance, gin
oyster , balance-fare, finish






(b) The Generalised Main Ceremony for the Tube
Figure 5.3 The Ceremonies for the Tube
3. At the end of the journey, the passenger touches the Oyster on the reader at
the exit gate, which amounts to H sending to GateOut the number oyster , the
current balance of the card and gin.
4. GateOut calculates the journey fare based on the distance travelled from GateIn,
subtracts the amount from the card’s balance, and sends to H the new balance
along with the card number and a finish flag.
5.4 An Example: The Oyster Card Ceremony 124
Some remarks are in order. First of all, note that I did not obtain this specification
from TfL, with whom I have not been in touch, but rather I modelled my own experience
of using the Oyster. This is fine as I do not need my example to be real but rather
realistic enough to showcase the main features of my approach; still, the vulnerabilities
that I identify are actual problems that the real Oyster system suffers from.
Second, even though the Oyster is based on the MiFare chip, which in its first
version (Mifare Classic family) used the proprietary encryption algorithm Crypto-1,
my specification does not use any kind of encryption for the messages. This does not
represent a lack of accuracy as I actually aim to model the ceremony in a way that
is independent of the low-level cryptographic details, thereby also keeping in mind
that my approach focuses on what is under direct influence and control of the human,
and cryptography most likely is not. However, it would not be difficult to include
encryption and decryption in my specifications, and in fact the language that I describe
below does contain cryptographic operators.2
Third, I focused only on the core message-passing of the ceremony and did not
include the information that is displayed on the screens that are placed above the
gate’s reader, which show, e.g., the credit on the card when entering and exiting and
the fare of the trip when exiting.
Fourth, the ceremony in Figure 5.3a is actually one of the possible ceremonies that
could be considered for the use of the Oyster and several variants could be modelled,
such as: a ceremony in which the reader at the exit gate does not immediately
synchronize with the system, a ceremony in which the passenger does not have enough
credit for the entrance gate to open (if the Oyster’s balance is too low, the gate would
display a message to the passenger asking them to top up the credit on the card), or a
ceremony in which the passenger changes from an overground train to an underground
2Note also that initial versions of the MiFare chip, and thus of the Oyster, suffered from a number
of attacks [66, 53, 46], but the current version of the Oyster does not suffer from these problems any
more since it is based on the new MiFare DESFire family that uses stronger encryption algorithms.
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train or vice versa, and thereby touches the Oyster at an intermediate gate to register
the change of train. Again, I aim to be realistic rather than real and, in fact, my
approach generalises to these variants quite straightforwardly.
Finally, passengers are nowadays able to pay not only with the Oyster but also with
a contactless credit or debit card (possibly associated with an Apple Pay or Google Pay
device). In that case, the ceremony is the same as the one in Figure 5.3a but without
the balance and replacing oyster with the number of the contactless credit/debit card
(the physical one used to touch in/out or the one associated with Apple or Google
Pay). To avoid having to distinguish the two cases, let me introduce a generalised
ceremony for the Tube, which passengers can carry out with either their Oyster or a
contactless card, as shown in Figure 5.3b. Here, I use a public unary function bal that
computes the current balance of an Oyster or simply sends a message “accept” in case
of a contactless card. This is what H sends in the third message, and then GateOut
replies in the final message by sending bal(card)′, which is the updated balance of the
Oyster or another “accept” message, respectively.
Before I continue with the discussion of how I formally model security ceremonies in
my approach, let us return to Figure 5.2a, where the sticker beside the reader reminds
passengers to always touch in and out. In fact, the London underground is quite full
of posters like the ones in Figure 5.4. The poster on the left of Figure 5.4 reminds
passengers that in order to pay the right fare, they need to touch in at the start and
touch out at the end of all journeys; if they do not, then TfL will not know where
the passenger has travelled, so they cannot charge the right fare for the journey. This
is called an incomplete journey and the passenger could be charged a maximum fare
ranging between £8.00 and £19.80 [164]. Passengers who do not touch in at the start
of a journey are also liable to pay a penalty fare (or could even be prosecuted).
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Figure 5.4 Warnings issued to the Tube passengers
The poster on the right of Figure 5.4 warns passengers that if they touch on a
reader their purse or wallet containing two or more cards (be they Oyster cards or
contactless payment cards), then they could experience card clash [163]. This means
that when the card reader detects two cards, it could take payment from a card that
the passenger did not intend to pay with, or, more dangerously, that the passenger
could be charged two fares for his journey or even two maximum fares for his journey
(this happens when a passenger mistakenly touches in with one card and touches out
with another card, resulting in two incomplete journeys).
It is interesting to observe that, in both these cases, security is “pushed” from the
system to the human user. But humans do mistakes and this might endanger their
security, which here means that they possibly have to pay considerably more than
they should. My approach allows us to show (in a formal and automated way) that
indeed if passengers forget to touch in or out, or touch with two or more cards at the
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same time, then they will be billed unfairly. Let me thus proceed by explaining how I
formally model and reason about security ceremonies.
5.5 My Approach in a Nutshell
The standard way to formally model and analyse a security protocol/ceremony is
to formalise how agents (attempt to) execute the roles of the protocol/ceremony to
achieve one or more security goals in the presence of an attacker. Roles are sequences
of events (sending or receiving messages, generating fresh values, etc.), which are
usually represented graphically by a structure generated by causal interaction such as
strands [63] or the vertical lines in MSCs and Alice&Bob notation [4], or less graphically
by a process in a process algebra such as in the applied pi calculus [1]. In Tamarin
(and thus in the X-Men tool), a role is formalised by a so-called role script, which is
basically the projection to an individual role of an extended Alice&Bob specification,
and corresponds to a strand or an applied pi calculus process.
I can represent this graphically by viewing the roles/strands of a ceremony as
separate lines of assembled jigsaw puzzle pieces that can be connected with each other
as shown in the example in Figure 5.5. When complete, the jigsaw puzzle produces a
complete picture: the run of the ceremony.
Now, we have all been there: you are trying to assemble one of those really difficult
jigsaw puzzles, you know, one of those where the resulting image is so complex that it
is difficult to understand which pieces you should actually interlock. You start from
the borders, trying to complete at least one line and proceed from there, but even that
is proving to be difficult as you do not understand which pieces do really fit together.
So, what do you do? You try. You try to interlock pieces that appear to fit together
even though this will turn out to be wrong as they will not allow you to produce the
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Figure 5.5 A simple ceremony between a User (left) and a System (right) depicted as a
jigsaw puzzle
desired image — but you do not know that yet. Or maybe you simply do a mistake
and append a piece that does not belong there.
This is illustrated by Figure 5.6: the human user could append a wrong piece
pictured in red as in Figure 5.6c, which raises the question of how the two remaining
pieces would fit (they are thus drawn with dotted lines), or the human could not know
how long the edge should be and terminate it by attaching the piece pictured in red as
in Figure 5.6b; or the human could add one more piece to the edge as in Figure 5.6d.
Returning to my running example, the human user might not fully understand the
ceremony role that he is supposed to carry out and
• skip some intermediate actions, e.g., touching out with an Oyster without hav-
ing touched in with any card, as illustrated in Figure 5.6b by the anticipated
termination of the role;
• replace an action with another, e.g., using a contactless credit card to touch out
instead of the Oyster he used to touch in, as illustrated in Figure 5.6c by the
different outgoing connector, which represents a different message being sent;
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(a) The role User as it was specified (b) The role User as carried out by a human who
connects a piece to terminate the role sooner
than specified
(c) The role User as carried out by a human who
connects a different piece than the one specified
(d) The role User as carried out by a human who
connects a piece to extend the length of the role
Figure 5.6 A human carrying out the role User... and mutating it, by mistake or lack
of understanding
• add some actions, e.g., touch in with two cards, as illustrated in Figure 5.6d by
the additional piece.
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Figure 5.7 The “add” mutation of the role User (as in Figure 5.6d) and the matching
mutation of the role System
In my approach, I represent these human “mistakes” as mutations with respect to the
role as specified originally — hence the name “X-Men” for my tool, which captures
the fact that I am considering mutations of the original human behaviour. Such a
mutation does not just have a local effect (for that event of the role) but will likely
have an effect on the subsequent events in the role, which I illustrated by drawing
the subsequent puzzle pieces with dotted lines. This is because the knowledge of the
human agent will likely change depending on what has really happened.
It is, however, not enough to simply allow the human to carry out these unforeseen
actions (add, skip or replace some parts of the role). In order to reason about what
would happen if the human carried out these mutations, I need to capture the fact
that a mutation of the human behaviour will likely have an effect also on the other
agents of the ceremony. More specifically, consider again, for simplicity, the ceremony
between User and System in Figure 5.5 and consider the scenario in which a human
playing the role User replaces an event of his role with a different one, i.e., sends a
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message m′ instead of the specified message m, as depicted in Figure 5.6c, which is a
mutation of Figure 5.6a. There are two cases.
In the first case, the System is able to reply to m′. This means that the System
can still receive (and “understand”) and reply to m′ because the changes with respect
to m are not too relevant. For instance, this might happen when the ceremony does
not provide the System with enough information to check the content of m′, e.g., when
the User sends a contactless card number instead of an Oyster card number but the
System does not have previous information that allows it to check whether it received
the correct card number, or when the message has been encrypted with a symmetric
key that the System does not (yet) possess. In this case, we can carry on with our
analysis of the ceremony to check whether either the original or the mutated User role
lead to an attack.
In the second case, the System is not able to reply to m′ as that mutation is
not envisioned by the System’s role as specified by the original ceremony. But what
about the ceremony’s implementation? Does the implementation really conform to the
specification? If it does, then the implementation of the System role will not reply
and we are fine as the run with the mutation m′ will not terminate. But what if
the ceremony’s developers, after they designed the specification and/or deployed the
implementation, realised that the User could indeed send a different message (or skip
some actions or add some) and made provisions for this case? For instance, they could
have introduced in the implementation an “if-then-else” that captures both m and m′,
i.e.: “if you receive m then reply with message n else if you receive an m′ ̸= m then
reply with message n′”.3 To reason about such a situation, we can use the mutation as
3Note that this does not mean that the User is fully aware of this. The User might just be aware
of (or have been instructed about) the “then branch” of the System’s role, which captures the User’s
normal behaviour; think of the Oyster User who follows the touch-in-touch-out ceremony as expected.
Hence, the User might, unknowingly and unwillingly, fall into the “else branch” of the System’s role
(e.g., by touching out with a contactless card instead of the Oyster card that was used for touch in)
and thus be billed much more than expected. The problem with these “else branches” is that they
often were not present in the original specification of the whole ceremony and were added to the
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a test case that is relevant for the ceremony’s implementation. We pair the mutation
of the User role with a matching mutation of the System role to generate an executable
trace of the ceremony. This is in line with mutation testing [55, 83, 33, 51], which is an
approach to design software tests where mutants are based on well-defined mutation
operators that either mimic typical programming errors (such as using the wrong
operator or variable name) or force the creation of valuable tests (such as dividing
each expression by zero). In my approach, mutants are based on mutation operators
that mimic typical human mistakes (add, skip or replace, as discussed in this section
and in Section 5.2) and force the creation of mutations in the other ceremony agents
to match the human mutation. For concreteness, for the ceremony between User
and System in Figure 5.5, my approach mutates the role of the System as shown
in Figure 5.7 to match the human User’s replace mutation of Figure 5.6c. The mutation
of the step of the System to match the mutated step of the human User possibly entails
a mutation of the subsequent steps of the System role, which I again illustrate with
dotted lines.
If these matching mutations lead to an attack, then I can check with the ceremony
designers whether the mutated specification makes sense and, in any case, use the
obtained attack trace to generate concrete tests cases to be applied to the ceremony’s
implementation. This will allow us to check whether the attack entailed by the
mutations is a false positive or a real attack.
The scenarios for the other human mutations and their matching mutations are
similar. So, summarising, my approach takes as input the specification of a ceremony
and the goal(s) it should achieve, and then generates both mutations of the human
implementation as an afterthought, after having observed the “wrong” behaviour of users, as was
likely the case for the Oyster ceremony. Warnings like the ones in Figure 5.4 are meant to alert the
users about the “else branch” of the ceremony. I believe that rather than adding the “else branch”,
it would have been better to change (the specification and) the implementation of the ceremony to
forbid these mistakes (e.g., by programming the gates to warn the users that they are touching with
the wrong card or with two cards), but I recognize that this might not always be possible, especially
if all the software and hardware components of the System have already been deployed and installed.
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agent’s role (allowing him to add, skip or replace actions) and the matching mutations
of the other roles of the ceremony. The resulting mutated ceremony specifications
are then fed into Tamarin to search for attacks. I leave the step of concretising the
attack traces found into test cases as future work (although I expect this to be not too
difficult by proceeding along the lines of [172, 127]).
5.6 Formal Modelling of Security Ceremonies
I adopt, adapt and extend notions that are used in most of the state-of-the-art ap-
proaches and tools for the formal analysis of security protocols. For concreteness,
my tool X-Men extends the Tamarin prover [16, 15, 108] to model and analyse secu-
rity ceremonies with mutations caused by human users, but my approach is general
and independent of Tamarin and could be applied similarly to other tools such as
ProVerif [28], Maude-NPA [61], AVANTSSAR [5] and its follow-up SPaCIoS [172].
I first summarize some basic notions (importing them from papers in which Tamarin
is presented and used) and then discuss the formal specification of ceremonies, the
execution model, the modelling of human agents, and the security goals.
5.6.1 Messages
The term algebra of messages is given by TΣ(V), where Σ is a signature and V is a
disjoint, countably infinite set of variables. A term m is ground when it contains no
variables. Fsym ⊂ Σ denotes a finite set of function symbols that contains function
symbols for: the pairing pair(m1, m2) of two messages m1 and m2, also denoted by
⟨m1, m2⟩, where, for brevity, I write, e.g., ⟨m1, m2, m3⟩ for ⟨m1, ⟨m2, m3⟩⟩; the first
projection π1(m) and second projection π2(m) of a pair m of terms; the hash h(m) of a
term m; the symmetric encryption senc(m, k) and the symmetric decryption sdec(m, k)
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of m with k; the asymmetric encryption aenc(m, k) and the asymmetric decryption
adec(m, k) of m with k; the signature sign(m, k) and the corresponding verification
verify(sign(m, k1), m, k2). The function pk(k) represents the public key corresponding
to the private key k.
Messages are composed and decomposed using the standard Dolev-Yao-style equa-
tional theory for these functions, based on the equations
• π1(⟨m1, m2⟩) = m1 and π2(⟨m1, m2⟩) = m2,
• sdec(senc(m1, m2), m2) = m1,
• adec(aenc(m1, pk(m2), m2) = m1,
• verify(sign(m, k), m, pk(k)) = true.
However, as I do for the Oyster ceremony, my approach allows me also not to
consider explicitly the presence of a (Dolev-Yao) attacker and focus on capturing the
way human agents might interact insecurely with the other ceremony agents. So, all my
agents behave honestly and follow the steps of the ceremony, but the human(s) might
make mistakes. In other cases, such as in the SSO ceremony (see Section 5.8.5), I add
an explicit attacker who intentionally tries to make the ceremony insecure.4 In all these
cases, my modelling of the human behaviour (through mutations to the specification
of the human(s) and of the agents the human(s) interact with) allows us to identify
attacks that a standard Dolev-Yao attacker would not immediately be able to find.
Σ also contains a countably infinite set Cfresh of fresh constants, modelling the
generation of nonces, and a countably infinite set Cpub of public constants, representing
agent names and other publicly known values. The sets Fsym, Cfresh and Cpub are pairwise
disjoint. I denote sequences with square brackets.
4I control the Dolev-Yao attacker by using (or not) appropriate channels. The messages used in
the Oyster ceremony are not encrypted, but there is no reason why they could not be. The SSO
ceremony, in contrast, includes explicit cryptographic operations.
5.6 Formal Modelling of Security Ceremonies 135
I say that m1 is a submessage of m2, in symbols m1 ∈ submsg(m2), iff m2 = m1;
m2 = ⟨m3, m4⟩ for some m3, m4 and m1 ∈ submsg(m3) or m1 ∈ submsg(m4); m2 =
h(m3) for some m3 and m1 ∈ submsg(m3); m2 = senc(m3, k) for some m3 and k and
m1 ∈ submsg(m3); m2 = aenc(m3, k) for some m3 and k and m1 ∈ submsg(m3); or
m2 = sign(m3, k) for some m3 and k and m1 ∈ submsg(m3).
The format f = format(m) of a message m is its top-level function symbol: if m
has no top-level function symbol, then f is the identity function; if m = ⟨m1, m2⟩ for
some m1, m2, then f = pair ; if m = h(m1) for some m1, then f = h; if m is ◦(m1, k)
for some m1 and k, with ◦ ∈ {senc, aenc, sign}, then f = ◦.
5.6.2 Ceremony Specification
Formally, a role script is a sequence of events e ∈ TΣ∪RoleActions(V), where RoleActions =
{Snd, Rcv, Start, Fresh} and each event e has exactly one function symbol that is in
RoleActions at the top-level. I will introduce other Tamarin actions in my specifications
(and simply write “actions” when there is no risk of confusion).
Send and receive events are of the form Snd(A, l, P, m) and Rcv(A, l, P, m), where
A is the role executing the event, l ∈ LinkProp = {ins, auth, conf , sec} indicates the
type of channel over which a message is sent, P ∈ Cpub is a role’s name, and m ∈ TΣ(V )
is a message. The channel types ins, auth, conf and sec denote insecure, authentic,
confidential, and secure channels and correspond in the obvious manner to the channel
symbols in the Alice&Bob notation (see [16] as well as [112, 113, 4] for a detailed
discussion of different types of channels, including pseudonymous channels).
In the Snd(A, l, P, m) event, P is the intended recipient of the message m, whereas
in Rcv(A, l, P, m) event, P is the apparent sender, as the attacker may have forged the
message, and m is the expected message pattern.
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Fresh(A, m) indicates that the role A generates a fresh message m (e.g., a nonce or
a new key) and Start(A, K) indicates the initial knowledge K of A. The start event is
the first event of a role script and occurs only once.
As shown in Figure 5.3b, the Generalised Main Ceremony for the Tube has 3 roles:
the human H and the entrance and exit gates GateIn and GateOut. I remarked above
that in this ceremony I do not consider cryptography (but I easily could) and, in fact,
I do not consider an explicit attacker. I represent this by specifying that all messages
are sent over secure channels. Thus, the role scripts for the roles of this ceremony are:
RoleScriptH =
[Start(H , ⟨⟨‘GateIn’, ‘GateOut’, ‘card’ ‘balance’⟩
⟨GateIn, GateOut, card, bal(card)⟩⟩),
Snd(H , sec, GateIn, ⟨‘card’, card⟩),
Rcv(H , sec, GateIn, ⟨⟨‘card’, ‘gin’⟩, ⟨card, gin⟩⟩),
Snd(H , sec, GateOut, ⟨⟨‘card’, ‘balance’, ‘gin’⟩,
⟨card, bal(card), gin⟩⟩),
Rcv(H , sec, GateOut, ⟨⟨‘card’, ‘balance’, ‘finish’⟩,
⟨card, bal(card)′, finish⟩⟩)]
RoleScriptGateIn =
[Start(GateIn, ⟨H , gin⟩),
Rcv(GateIn, sec, H , ⟨‘card’, card⟩),
Snd(GateIn, sec, H , ⟨⟨‘card’, ‘gin’⟩, ⟨card, gin⟩⟩)]
5.6 Formal Modelling of Security Ceremonies 137
RoleScriptGateOut =
[Start(GateOut, ⟨H , gout⟩),
Rcv(GateOut, sec, H , ⟨⟨‘card’, ‘balance’, ‘gin’⟩,
⟨card, bal(card), gin⟩⟩),
Snd(GateOut, sec, H , ⟨⟨‘card’, ‘balance’, ‘finish’⟩,
⟨card, bal(card)′, finish⟩⟩)]
I take advantage of constants in Tamarin to identify values received and sent during
a ceremony. In [16], constants are used to define “tags” in order to represent the
interpretation of the values in the knowledge of a human agent. I also make use of
constants but I use them to define a basic notion of types. I only consider types of
ground terms, such as the type ‘card’ for card or ‘balance’ for bal(oyster) as shown in
the role scripts above and in the agent rules in Figure 5.8.5 This allows us to restrict
what mutations can do, e.g., constants allow us to express that a payment card in a
message is replaced with another card (instead of with a generic value that is not of
type “card”).
Still, for readability,
from now I will often omit constants in role scripts and rules, so that when
you read m, please mentally replace it with the constant-message pair ⟨t, m⟩.
5.6.3 Execution Model
My approach is based on Tamarin’s execution model [108], which is defined by a multiset
term-rewriting system like in most other security protocol analysis tools. A system state
is a multiset of facts: linear facts model exhaustible resources and they can be added
to and removed from the system state, persistent facts model inexhaustible resources
5This is enough for all ceremonies that I have encountered so far, so I leave a more thorough
investigation of types to future work.
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[] Start(H ,⟨GateIn,GateOut,oyster ,balance⟩)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[AgSt(H , 1, ⟨GateIn, GateOut, oyster , balance⟩)] (H0)
[AgSt(H , 1, ⟨GateIn, GateOut, oyster , balance⟩)]
Snd(H ,sec,GateIn,⟨‘card’,oyster⟩)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[AgSt(H , 2, ⟨GateIn, GateOut, oyster , balance⟩),
Outsec(H , GateIn, ⟨‘card’, oyster⟩)] (H1)
[AgSt(H , 2, ⟨GateIn, GateOut, oyster , balance⟩),
Insec(GateIn, H , ⟨⟨‘card’, ‘gin’⟩, ⟨oyster , gin⟩⟩)]
Rcv(H ,sec,GateIn,⟨⟨‘card’,‘gin’⟩,⟨oyster ,gin⟩⟩)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[AgSt(H , 3, ⟨GateIn, GateOut, oyster , balance, gin⟩)] (H2)
[AgSt(H , 3, ⟨GateIn, GateOut, oyster , balance, gin⟩)]
Snd(H ,sec,GateOut,⟨⟨‘card’,‘balance’,‘gin’⟩,⟨oyster ,bal(oyster),gin⟩⟩)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[AgSt(H , 4, ⟨GateIn, GateOut, oyster , balance, gin⟩),
Outsec(H , GateOut, ⟨⟨‘card’, ‘balance’, ‘gin’⟩, ⟨oyster , bal(oyster), gin⟩⟩)] (H3)
[AgSt(H , 4, ⟨GateIn, GateOut, oyster , balance, gin⟩),
Insec(GateOut, H , ⟨⟨‘card’, ‘balance’, ‘finish’⟩, ⟨oyster , bal(oyster)′, finish⟩⟩)]
Rcv(H ,sec,GateOut,⟨⟨‘card’,‘balance’,‘finish’⟩,⟨oyster ,bal(oyster)′,finish⟩⟩),Hfin(H ,‘card’,oyster)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [] (H4)
Figure 5.8 The rules for the human agent in the Generalised Main Ceremony for the
Tube
and can only be added to the system state (persistent fact symbols are prefixed with
“!”). The initial system state is the empty multiset. A trace tr is a finite sequence of
multisets of actions a and is generated by the application of labelled state transition
rules of the form
prem a−→ conc .
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[] Start(GateIn,⟨H ,gin⟩)−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [AgSt(GateIn, 1, ⟨H , gin⟩)] (Gi0)
[AgSt(GateIn, 1, ⟨H , gin⟩), Insec(H , GateIn, ⟨‘card’, oyster⟩)]
Rcv(GateIn,sec,H ,⟨‘card’,oyster⟩)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [AgSt(GateIn, 2, ⟨H , gin, oyster⟩] (Gi1)
[AgSt(GateIn, 2, ⟨H , gin, oyster⟩]
Snd(GateIn,sec,H ,⟨⟨‘card’,‘gin’⟩⟨oyster ,gin⟩⟩),CommitGid(GateIn,H ,gin)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[Outsec(GateIn, H , ⟨⟨‘card’, ‘gin’⟩, ⟨oyster , gin⟩⟩)] (Gi2)
Figure 5.9 Agent rules for the GateIn in the Generalised Main Ceremony for the Tube
[] Start(GateOut,⟨H ,gout⟩)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [AgSt(GateOut, 1, ⟨H , gout⟩)] (Go0)
[AgSt(GateOut, 1, ⟨H , gout⟩),
Insec(H , GateOut, ⟨⟨‘card’, ‘balance’, ‘gin’⟩, ⟨oyster , bal(oyster), gin⟩⟩)]
Rcv(GateOut,sec,H ,⟨⟨‘card’,‘balance’,‘gin’⟩,⟨oyster ,bal(oyster),gin⟩⟩)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[AgSt(GateOut, 2, ⟨H , GateOut, oyster , bal(oyster), gin⟩] (Go1)
[AgSt(GateOut, 2, ⟨H , GateOut, oyster , bal(oyster), gin⟩]
Snd(GateOut,sec,H ,⟨⟨‘card’,‘balance’,‘finish’⟩
⟨oyster ,bal(oyster)′,‘finish’⟩⟩),Commit(GateOut,H ,‘finish’)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[Outsec(GateOut, H , ⟨⟨‘card’, ‘balance’, ‘finish’⟩,
⟨oyster , bal(oyster)′, ‘finish’⟩⟩)] (Go2)
Figure 5.10 Agent rules for the GateOut in the Generalised Main Ceremony for the
Tube
Such a rule is applicable when the current state contains facts matching the premise
prem, and the rule’s application removes the matching linear facts from the state,
adds instantiations of the facts in the conclusion conc to the state, and records the
instantiations of actions in a in the trace. The set of all traces of a set of rules R is
denoted by TR(R).
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For instance, the following denotes a trace of the actions of a human agent H
and possibly pairwise distinct agents A1, A2, A3, A4, . . . where each Σi represents a
possibly empty subtrace. When A1 = A2 = . . . = A, trace (5.1) reduces to a trace of a
ping-pong ceremony between H and a system A.
...Σ1
Rcv(H, l1, A1, m1)
Snd(H, l2, A2, m2)
Rcv(A2, l2, H, m2)
...Σ2
Rcv(H, l3, A3, m3)
Snd(H, l4, A4, m4)
Rcv(A4, l4, H, m4)
...Σ3
(5.1)
A protocol model consists of the agent rules, the fresh rule, channel rules and
attacker rules. The fresh rule [ ] → [Fr(x)] produces the fact Fr(x) where x ∈ Cfresh;
no two applications of the fresh rule pick the same element x ∈ Cfresh and this is the
only rule that can produce terms x ∈ Cfresh. Tamarin comes equipped with standard
Dolev-Yao attacker rules and with channel rules (introduced in [15]) to model the
sending and receiving of messages over authentic/confidential/secure channels, and
thus control the ability of the attacker (who, e.g., can not send, read or replay messages
on a secure channel, although he might still be able to interrupt the communication).
Agent rules specify the agents’ state transitions and communication. For instance,
the rules for the human agent in the Generalised Main Ceremony for the Tube are shown
in Figure 5.8 while the rules for the gatein agent in the Generalised Main Ceremony for
the Tube are shown in Figure 5.9 and the rules for the gateout agent in the Generalised
Main Ceremony for the Tube are shown in Figure 5.10. In general, for every event e in
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the script of a role A, we get a transition rule prem a−→ conc as follows: the label of the
rule contains the event, i.e., e ∈ a; prem contains an agent state fact AgSt(A, step, kn),
and conc contains the subsequent agent state fact AgSt(A, step, kn′), where step refers
to the role step the agent is in and kn is the agent’s knowledge at that step. If e ∈ a is:
Snd(A, l, P, m) then conc additionally contains an outgoing message fact Outl(A, P, m);
Rcv(A, l, P, m) then prem contains an incoming message fact Inl(P, A, m); Fresh(A, m)
then prem contains Fr(m); Start(A, m) then it is translated to a setup rule where conc
contains the initial agent state AgSt(A, 0, m).6
As usual, the knowledge of an agent increases monotonically during the execution
of the ceremony (as the agent receives messages or generates fresh terms).
5.6.4 Goals
Goals express the security properties that a ceremony is supposed to guarantee. How-
ever, many ceremonies, such as the Oyster ceremony as I discussed in Section 5.4,
“push” security from the system to the human agents. This is made evident by the
three goals that I define and analyse for the Oyster ceremony:
GO1 the human ends his journey touching in and out;
GO2 the human ends his journey using the same card to touch in and out;
GO3 the human does not touch two cards in and out.
These goals refer to a single journey, i.e., a single ceremony session. I formalise
this in my Tamarin models by including explicit restrictions (through the OnlyOnce
restriction [161] in the Setup phase; see my specifications in [178]) to force the human
to carry out a single journey in the ceremony; given this, I can then formalise the
6The translation of the different channels into Tamarin is quite natural, e.g., by means of rules such
as Outl(A, P, m) → Out(A, P, m) for l ∈ {ins, auth} and In(P, A, m) → Inl(P, A, m) for l ∈ {ins, conf }.
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goals as follows. Goal GO1 can be formalised by the lemma in Listing 5.1 which uses
Tamarin actions to express that if H completes the ceremony with an Oyster card
(action Hfin(H , ‘card’, oyster)) at time j, then there is a previous time instant i such
that a GateIn commits the gin to H (action CommitGid(GateIn, H, gin)).
lemma complete journey : all -traces
"All H oyster #j. Hfin(H,’card ’,oyster)@j ==>
(Ex GateIn gin #i. CommitGid (GateIn ,H,gin) @i & i<j)"
Listing 5.1 Lemma for the security goal GO1
The other goals make use of other actions. For instance, a Snd(A, l, P, m) event
corresponds to the Tamarin action Send(A, ⟨t, m⟩), which I abbreviate to Send(A, m)
following my readability assumption, whereas a Rcv(A, l, P, m) event corresponds to
the action Receive(A, P, m) (note the absence of the tag t).
Goal GO2 can be formalised by the lemma in Listing 5.2 which expresses that if H
completes the ceremony with an Oyster card (Hfin(H , ‘card’, oyster)) at time j, then
H did not touch in another card.
lemma same card: all -traces
"All H oyster #j. Hfin(H,’card ’,oyster)@j
==> (Ex #t. Send(H,’card ’,oyster)@t & t<j)
& not (Ex ccard #c. Send(H,’card ’,ccard)@c
& not (ccard = oyster ))"
Listing 5.2 Lemma for the security goal GO2
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Goal GO3 can be formalised by the lemma in Listing 5.3 which expresses that if
GateOut receives oyster from H (Receive(GateOut, H , oyster)) and commits the end
of the journey (Commit(GateOut, H , ‘finish’)) at time j, and a GateIn, which is not
instantiated by the same agent as GateOut, receives oyster from H and commits a gin
(CommitGid(GateIn, H , gin)) to the same H at a previous t, then there does not exist
another card ccard such that the GateOut and the GateIn execute the same transitions
receiving that ccard.
lemma Card_Clash_Out : all -traces
"All H GateIn GateOut oyster gin #j #t.
Receive (GateOut ,H,oyster)@j
& Commit(GateOut ,H,’finish ’)@j
& Receive (GateIn ,H,oyster)@t
& CommitGid (GateIn ,H,gin)@t & t<j
& not (GateIn = GateOut )
==> not (Ex ccard #i #k. Receive (GateOut ,H,ccard)@i
& Commit(GateOut ,H,’finish ’)@i
& Receive (GateIn ,H,ccard)@k
& CommitGid (GateIn ,H,gin)@k & k<i
& not oyster = ccard )"
Listing 5.3 Lemma for the security goal GO3
5.6.5 Threat Models
Oyster Using the approach formalised in Chapter 4, it is possible to highlight the
following principals for the Oyster ceremony:
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Humans(Oyster) := {H}
Technicals(Oyster) := {GateIn, GateOut}
Principals(Oyster) := Humans(Oyster) ∪ Technicals(Oyster)
The most general case in which every principal gets all possible labels (cf. Sec-
tion 4.4.4) sees:
n(PLHumansOyster(H )) = 4
n(PLTechnicalsOyster(GateIn)) = 4
n(PLTechnicalsOyster(GateOut)) = 4
Hence, the full threat model chart has 43 = 64 lines.
As highlighted in the motivation of this research, I have focussed on modelling the
way humans make mistakes. This scenario is included as a result of one of the lines in
the full threat model chart, as shown in Table 5.1.
H GateIn GateOut
(a) error normal normal
Table 5.1 The threat model considered in the Oyster ceremony
Some additional interesting cases can be found here. Scenarios where H acts
choosing (choice in the charting) to do some actions are similar, in spirit, to what I
envisaged (cf. Table 5.1) and are the motivations for this research (e.g., H can skip
some actions to become an attacker and take advantage of the system). It would
also be interesting to consider the scenario in Table 5.2, which captures an additional
behavioural pattern where H faces a situation in which the gates are not working
properly (e.g., H decides to call assistance, H decides to jump over, H waits, etc.)
which I plan to investigate in future work.
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H GateIn GateOut
(b) choice bug bug
Table 5.2 Additional threat model relevant for the Oyster ceremony
Single Sign-On For the Single Sign-On ceremony, it is possible to highlight the
following principals:
Humans(SSO) := {IdP}
Technicals(SSO) := {C , SP}
I also allow for an attacking third party, so that the resulting principals are:
Principals(SSO) := Humans(SSO) ∪
Technicals(SSO) ∪
ATP(SSO)
The most general case in which every principal gets all possible labels (cf. Sec-
tion 4.4.4) sees:
n(PLHumansSSO(IdP)) = 4
n(PLTechnicalsSSO(C )) = 4
n(PLTechnicalsSSO(SP)) = 4
n(PLATPSSO) = 2
Hence, the full threat model chart has 43 · 21 = 128 lines.
The charting here considers 128 lines, which result in many threat models. The
well-known attack described in [7] was obtained by formalising Google’s specific
implementation (rather than the original specification) of the ceremony; instead, here I
discover the attack by considering what would happen if SP is played by the attacker
and IdP is played by a human who mistakenly sends a wrong message. This scenario
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is included as a result of one of the lines in the full threat model chart, as shown
in Table 5.3.
C IdP SP ATP
(a) normal error normal malicious
Table 5.3 The threat model considered in the Single Sign-On ceremony
However, my chart also highlights at least two more relevant threat models that
haven’t been considered yet and that are shown in Table 5.4.
C IdP SP ATP
(b) error normal normal —
(c) normal normal bug malicious
Table 5.4 Additional threat model relevant for the Single Sign-On ceremony
I believe that it will be interesting to consider also the threat models (b) and (c) as
the threat model (b) suggests a scenario where C makes some mistakes, whereas the
threat model (c) represents a relevant case, under C ’s point of view, in which SP is
bugged and the system is under the attack of an ATP.
5.7 Modelling Human Mutations of the Ceremony
The mutations that humans carry out when executing a ceremony have repercussions
also on other agents and thus on the whole ceremony. I thus need to define not only
the human mutations, which modify a ceremony trace by mutating the subtrace of the
human agent, but also the mutations on the subtrace(s) of the other agent(s) that are
likely (albeit not necessarily) required to “match” the mutations of the human; for
instance, to receive the new or modified message sent by the human or to skip some
actions mirroring the skip of the human. The result will be a fully mutated ceremony
5.7 Modelling Human Mutations of the Ceremony 147
trace, which my tool feeds into Tamarin, first to check if it is executable and then to
analyse it with respect to the corresponding goal(s).
Definition 1. A generic human mutation is a function
µH : tr → tr ′
that takes as input a trace tr and gives as output a new trace tr ′ = JtrKµH obtained
by mutating H’s subtrace as a consequence of the human H “deviating” from the
original role script by skipping one or more actions, replacing a message with another
one, adding a new action, or carrying out a human action that results in the removal
of one or more Tamarin actions.
A matching mutation for a human mutation is a mutation µm that mutates the
subtraces of the other ceremony agents to match and propagate the human mutation.
The combination µH ◦ µm : tr → tr ′ of the two mutations takes as input a trace
tr and gives as output a new trace tr ′ = JtrKµH◦µm in which the human mutation is
matched and propagated.
Note that in this part of the research, only “deviations” from the original role script
by skipping one or more actions, replacing a message with another one and adding a
new action are considered. A “deviation” that concerns a human action that results in
the removal of one or more Tamarin actions will be taken into account in Chapter 6.
In the following subsections, I will instantiate these generic definitions to define the
three human mutations skip, replace and add both formally and algorithmically, giving
also the algorithmic definitions of the corresponding matching mutations. Slightly
abusing notation, I will write [a0, . . . , ai, . . . , an]H with 0 < i ⩽ n to denote the subtrace
of a human agent H in a ceremony execution, and let J_Kµ apply not just to traces. In
fact, I consider mutations that apply generically to traces so that they apply indirectly
also to role scripts and to Tamarin actions. For readability, and to make a clearer point,
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in the following descriptions and algorithms, I will sometimes depart from the tight
corset of Tamarin’s notation and consider transitions and their pre and postconditions.
More specifically, in the style of multiset rewriting as in [143], I consider an abstract
“merged” transition rule in which prem contains the receipt of a message and conc the
sending of the reply:7
AgSt(H, i, kni), Prei, Rcv(H, l1, A1, m1) −→
AgSt(H, i + 1, kni+1), Posti+1, Snd(H, l2, A2, m2) ,
where Prei is a set of precondition facts (e.g., fresh facts) at state i, Posti+1 is a set
of postcondition facts at state i + 1, and kni+1 is obtained by extending kni with m1
and with whatever is generated fresh in Pre1. As usual, kni+1 is such that A can send
the message m2 (after closing the knowledge under the standard rules for message
generation and analysis). It is not difficult to translate this transition to the two
corresponding transition rules in Tamarin’s notation (with In, Out, the Tamarin actions
and the constants) and vice versa, and to carry out the corresponding translations in
the following descriptions and algorithms.
Then, the subtrace in (5.1) can be rewritten as follows, where I now embed A2’s
receipt of m2 in Σ2 and A4’s receipt of m4 in Σ3 as I wish to focus on H’s actions.
7This is in the spirit of the step compression technique that is adopted in several security protocol
analysis tools, such as [5]. The idea is that some actions can be safely lumped together. For instance,
I can safely assume that if a role is supposed to reply to a message it received, then I can compress
the receive and send actions into a single transition.
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...Σ1
AgSt(H, i, kni), Prei, Rcv(H, l1, A1, m1) −→
AgSt(H, i + 1, kni+1), Posti+1, Snd(H, l2, A2, m2)
...Σ2
AgSt(H, j, knj), Prej, Rcv(H, l3, A3, m3) −→
AgSt(H, j + 1, knj+1), Postj+1, Snd(H, l4, A4, m4)
...Σ3
(5.2)
5.7.1 The skip mutation
Definition 2. A skip mutation
µHskip : tr → tr ′
is a human mutation of tr ’s human subtrace [a0, . . . , ai, . . . , an]H such that tr ′
includes the new human subtrace [a0, . . . , ai−1, Jai+kKµ, . . . , JanKµ], where ai+k with k ≥ 1
is the action that H executes immediately after the execution of ai and Jai+kKµ, . . . , JanKµ
are the mutations of these actions obtained by H skipping the actions ai, . . . , ai+k−1
and by matching and propagating this mutation.
For example, Figure 5.11 shows a human subtrace in which H skips the Snd(H , sec,
GateIn, card) action in the Oyster ceremony (omitting constants as discussed), which
corresponds to not touching in. But this is not the only possible skip: H could skip
also the receipt of the reply by GateIn and jump to his next send to GateOut, which
would actually make sense as one could argue that if GateIn does not receive a message
from H then it will not reply either; or H could skip both the receipt of a message
and the sending of the reply; and so on.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5.11 Examples of mutations in the case of the Oyster ceremony
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I have identified five different skip mutations, depending on which send (S) and
receive (R) actions are skipped: µHskip(S), µHskip(SR), µHskip(R), µHskip(RS) and µHskip(RSR). More
cases could be considered, but these five cover the most interesting scenarios, which
can combined to skip bigger “chunks” of the ceremony execution.
I describe the five skip mutations by showing their effect on the subtrace (5.2).
The skip mutation µHskip(S)
In this case, H, having arrived at state i + 1, skips the sending of m2 and any other
action that he would carry out in Σ2 and continues the trace with the transition
j ≥ i + 1, which I call the landing transition (i.e., the transition where H lands after
the “jump” he has made):8
...Σ1
AgSt(H, i, kni), Prei, Rcv(H, l1, A1, m1) −→
AgSt(H, i + 1, kni+1), Posti+1, Snd(H, l2, A2, m2)
...JΣ2Kµ
AgSt(H, j, JknjKµ), Prej, Rcv(H, l3, A3, Jm3Kµ) −→
AgSt(H, j + 1, Jknj+1Kµ), Postj+1, Snd(H, l4, A4, Jm4Kµ)
...JΣ3Kµ
where µ denotes the mutation composed of µHskip(S) and the matching and propagation
entailed by µHskip(S) (mutations of constant-message pairs are explained later).
8For simplicity but w.l.o.g., in the following I assume that the (fresh and “other”) facts in Prej
never refer to messages received during the execution of a ceremony, but only to long-term keys, public
keys and the like; this entails that JPrejKµ = Prej . This assumption allows me to avoid considering
mutations of Prej induced by the situation in which a message is not received in JΣ2Kµ. This is indeed
the case in the Oyster and SSO examples. Extending my approach to capturing such mutations is
cumbersome notationally but not difficult technically: I can define the mutation of the preconditions
(and of the postconditions, if needed) in a way similar to the mutation of the knowledge when one or
more messages are not received.
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This allows me to illustrate the need for matching and propagation on a concrete
example. I namely need to consider if and how the mutated trace can be completed,
for instance when H receives from A3 an m3 that is different from the expected one
as a consequence of H’s skipping the sending of m2 to A2. This immediately raises a
number of questions. For instance, for Rcv(H, l3, A3, Jm3Kµ) to be possible, it must be
the case that JΣ2Kµ contains Snd(A3, l3, H, Jm3Kµ), but there is no guarantee that this
holds:
• if A3 is able to send m3 even when H does not send m2 to A2, then H can receive
m3, but
• if A3 needs first A2 (which is possibly but not necessarily equal to A3) to receive
m2 to then be able to send m3, then A3 does not send m3 in the mutated trace
or sends a mutation of m3 built from its current knowledge.
My tool implements these options as described in the pseudo-code in Algorithm 1
and Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 1 µHskip(S): skip Snd(H , l2, A2, m2) in transition i, with landing
transition j as in (5.2)
1: if JknjKµ = knj = kni+1 then
2: if JΣ2Kµ still contains a transition with Snd(A3, l3, H , m3) in its conclusions
then
3: transition j is the same as the original one in trace tr , i.e.
4: AgSt(H, j, knj), Prej, Rcv(H, l3, A3, m3) −→
AgSt(H, j + 1, knj+1), Postj+1, Snd(H, l4, A4, m4)
5: else ▷ JΣ2Kµ does not contain a transition with Snd(A3, l3, H , m3) in its
conclusions
6: build all transitions j for all mutations Jm3Kµ = {(format(m3))(m) |
m ∈ submsg(m3)} of m3 and for each of these, set Jknj+1Kµ = knj ∪ {Jm3Kµ} ∪
Prej and build all Jm4Kµ = {(format(m4))(m) | m ∈ submsg(m4)} that can be
generated by Jknj+1Kµ, i.e.
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7: AgSt(H, j, knj), Prej, Rcv(H, l3, A3, Jm3Kµ) −→
AgSt(H, j + 1, Jknj+1Kµ), Postj+1, Snd(H, l4, A4, Jm4Kµ)
8: else ▷ this case is when knj = kni+1 ∪ X for some set X = {Mx1 , ..., Mxn} of
messages all different from m3 and received by H in Σ2
9: if JΣ2Kµ still contains a transition with Snd(A3, l3, H , m3) in its conclusions
then
10: H skipped all transitions of Σ2 in which he received Mx1 , ..., Mxn ,
11: JknjKµ = knj = kni+1,
12: Jknj+1Kµ = knj ∪ {m3} ∪ Prej,
13: build all Jm4Kµ = {(format(m4))(m) | m ∈ submsg(m4)} that can be
generated by Jknj+1Kµ, i.e.
14: AgSt(H, j, JknjKµ), Prej, Rcv(H, l3, A3, m3) −→
AgSt(H, j + 1, Jknj+1Kµ), Postj+1, Snd(H, l4, A4, Jm4Kµ)
15: else ▷ JΣ2Kµ does not contain a transition with Snd(A3, l3, H , m3) in its
conclusions
16: H skipped all transitions of Σ2 in which he received Mx1 , ..., Mxn and
cannot receive m3 in its original form but only in its mutated form Jm3Kµ
17: JknjKµ = knj = kni+1,
18: go to 6
The pseudo-code is hopefully quite explanatory, also thanks to the comments in the
algorithms (whose start is denoted by ▷), but there are a couple of steps that deserve
clarification. First of all, what does it mean that A3 sends a mutation of m3 built from
its current knowledge? If I apply the message generation and analysis rules freely, this
is an infinite set of possible messages. I could consider that as there is no guarantee
of termination in my approach anyway, but instead I proceed in a more controlled
way that mimics human users making mistakes when sending the messages or human
programmers making mistakes when implementing a specification:
I consider only mutations of a message m that preserve the format of m.
So, for example, in line 6 of Algorithm 1 I define Jm3Kµ = {(format(m3))(m) | m ∈
submsg(m3)} of m3, and then, for each of these mutations, I build all the corresponding
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transitions j (similarly, I build controlled mutations of m4 in lines 6 and 13). Note
also that I write knl ∪ Prel to mean the extension of knl with all messages generated
freshly in Prel.
Algorithm 2 Matching mutation for µHskip(S)
1: Consider the transition next(i) that immediately follows the mutated human
transition i
2: AgSt(A2, x, knx), Prex, Rcv(A2, l2, H , m2) −→
AgSt(A2, x + 1, knx+1), Postx+1, Snd(A2, lp, As, mp) where As is one of the
other agents and lp and mp are some channel and message as specified in
Σ2.
3: remove Rcv(A2, l2, H , m2) from next(i)
4: JknxKµ = knx−1
5: Jknx+1Kµ = knx ∪ Prex
6: build all JmpKµ = {(format(mp))(m) | m ∈ submsg(mp)} that can be generated
by Jknx+1Kµ i.e.
7: AgSt(A2, x, JknxKµ), Prex −→
AgSt(A2, x + 1, Jknx+1Kµ), Postx+1, Snd(A2, lp, As, JmpKµ)
8: Let h ::= next(i)
9: if ∃ next(h) i.e.
10: AgSt(As, s, kns), Prey, Rcv(As, lp, As−1, mp) −→
AgSt(As, s + 1, kns+1), Posts+1, Snd(As, lp, As+1, mp+1) then
11: JknsKµ = kns−1
12: mp = JmpKµ
13: Jkns+1Kµ = JknsKµ ∪ Pres ∪ JmpKµ
14: build all Jmp+1Kµ = {(format(mp+1))(m) | m ∈ submsg(mp+1)} that can
be generated by Jkns+1Kµ i.e.
15: AgSt(As, s, JknsKµ), Pres, Rcv(As, lp, As−1, JmpKµ) −→
AgSt(As, s + 1, Jkns+1Kµ), Posts+1,
Snd(As, lp, As+1, Jmp+1Kµ)
16: go to 9 with h ::= next(h)
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The skip mutation µHskip(SR)
In this case, H skips Snd(H, l2, A2, m2) in transition i and Rcv(H, l3, A3, m3) in transi-
tion j:
...Σ1
AgSt(H, i, kni), Prei, Rcv(H, l1, A1, m1) −→
AgSt(H, i + 1, kni+1), Posti+1, Snd(H, l2, A2, m2)
...JΣ2Kµ
AgSt(H, j, JknjKµ), Prej, Rcv(H, l3, A3, m3) −→
AgSt(H, j + 1, Jknj+1Kµ), Postj+1, Snd(H, l4, A4, Jm4Kµ)
...JΣ3Kµ
The pseudo-code for this case is in Algorithm 3 and in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 3 µHskip(SR): skip Snd(H , l2, A2, m2) in i and Rcv(H, l3, A3, m3) in j
1: if JknjKµ = knj = kni+1 then
2: Jknj+1Kµ = knj ∪ Prej,
3: build all Jm4Kµ = {(format(m4))(m) | m ∈ submsg(m4)} that can be
generated by Jknj+1Kµ, i.e.
4: AgSt(H, j, JknjKµ), Prej, −→
AgSt(H, j + 1, Jknj+1Kµ), Postj+1, Snd(H, l4, A4, Jm4Kµ)
5: else ▷ this case is when knj = kni+1 ∪ X for some set X = {Mx1 , ..., Mxn} of
messages all different from m3 and received by H in Σ2
6: H skipped all transitions of Σ2 in which he received Mx1 , ..., Mxn ,
7: JknjKµ = knj = kni+1,
8: go to 1
Algorithm 4 Matching mutation for µHskip(SR)
1: Consider the transition next(i) that immediately follows the mutated human
transition i
2: AgSt(A2, x, knx), Prex, Rcv(A2, l2, H , m2) −→
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AgSt(A2, x + 1, knx+1), Postx+1, Snd(A2, lp, As, mp) where As is one of the
other agents and lp and mp are some channel and message as specified in
Σ2.
3: remove Rcv(A2, l2, H , m2) from next(i)
4: JknxKµ = knx−1
5: Jknx+1Kµ = knx ∪ Prex
6: build all JmpKµ = {(format(mp))(m) | m ∈ submsg(mp)} that can be generated
by Jknx+1Kµ i.e.
7: AgSt(A2, x, JknxKµ), Prex −→
AgSt(A2, x + 1, Jknx+1Kµ), Postx+1, Snd(A2, lp, As, JmpKµ)
8: Let h ::= next(i)
9: if ∃ next(h) i.e.
10: AgSt(As, s, kns), Prey, Rcv(As, lp, As−1, mp) −→
AgSt(As, s + 1, kns+1), Posts+1, Snd(As, lp, As+1, mp+1) then
11: if s is different than j then
12: JknsKµ = kns−1
13: mp = JmpKµ
14: Jkns+1Kµ = JknsKµ ∪ Pres ∪ JmpKµ
15: build all Jmp+1Kµ = {(format(mp+1))(m) | m ∈ submsg(mp+1)} that
can be generated by Jkns+1Kµ i.e.
16: AgSt(As, s, JknsKµ), Pres, Rcv(As, lp, As−1, JmpKµ) −→
AgSt(As, s + 1, Jkns+1Kµ), Posts+1,
Snd(As, lp, As+1, Jmp+1Kµ)
17: go to 9 with h ::= next(h)
18: else ▷ s is equal to j, so this is the transition j in which I have to remove
the Rcv
19: remove Rcv(As, lp, As−1, mp) from transition j
20: AgSt(As, s, kns), Prey, −→
AgSt(As, s + 1, kns+1), Posts+1, Snd(As, lp, As+1, mp+1) is in the form
21: AgSt(H, j, JknjKµ), Prej, −→
AgSt(H, j + 1, Jknj+1Kµ), Postj+1, Snd(H, l4, A4, Jm4Kµ)
22: Let h ::= next(j)
23: if ∃ next(h) i.e.
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24: AgSt(As, s, kns), Prey, Rcv(As, lp, As−1, mp) −→
AgSt(As, s + 1, kns+1), Posts+1,
Snd(As, lp, As+1, mp+1)
then
25: JknsKµ = kns−1
26: mp = JmpKµ
27: Jkns+1Kµ = JknsKµ ∪ Pres ∪ JmpKµ
28: build all Jmp+1Kµ = {(format(mp+1))(m) | m ∈ submsg(mp+1)} that
can be generated by Jkns+1Kµ i.e.
29: AgSt(As, s, JknsKµ), Pres, Rcv(As, lp, As−1, JmpKµ) −→
AgSt(As, s + 1, Jkns+1Kµ), Posts+1,
Snd(As, lp, As+1, Jmp+1Kµ)
30: go to 23 with h ::= next(h)
The skip mutation µHskip(R)
H skips Rcv(H, l1, A1, m1) in transition i:
...Σ1
AgSt(H, i, kni), Prei, Rcv(H, l1, A1, m1) −→
AgSt(H, i + 1, Jkni+1Kµ), Posti+1, Snd(H, l2, A2, Jm2Kµ)
...JΣ2Kµ
AgSt(H, j, JknjKµ), Prej, Rcv(H, l3, A3, m3) −→
AgSt(H, j + 1, Jknj+1Kµ), Postj+1, Snd(H, l4, A4, Jm4Kµ)
...JΣ3Kµ
The pseudo-code for this case is in Algorithm 5 and in Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 5 µHskip(R): skip Rcv(H , l1, A1, m1) in transition i
1: if Jkni+1Kµ = kni+1 = kni ∪ Prej then
2: transition i is the same as the original one in trace t, without the
Rcv(H , l1, A1, m1), i.e.
3: AgSt(H, i, kni), Prei −→
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AgSt(H, i + 1, kni+1), Posti+1, Snd(H , l2, A2, m2)
4: else ▷ this case is when kni+1 = kni ∪ X ∪ Prei, that means that m1 has new
knowledge
5: Jkni+1Kµ = kni ∪ Prei,
6: build all Jm2Kµ = {(format(m2))(m) | m ∈ submsg(m2)} that can be
generated by Jkni+1Kµ, i.e.
7: AgSt(H, i, kni), Prei −→
AgSt(A, i + 1, Jkni+1Kµ), Posti+1, Snd(H, l2, A2, Jm2Kµ)
Algorithm 6 Matching mutation for µHskip(R)
1: Consider the transition next(i) that immediately follows the mutated human
transition i
2: AgSt(A2, x, knx), Prex, Rcv(A2, l2, H , m2) −→
AgSt(A2, x + 1, knx+1), Postx+1, Snd(A2, lp, As, mp) where As is one of the
other agents and lp and mp are some channel and message as specified in
Σ2.
3: if m2 in Snd(H , l2, A2, m2) in transition i is sent without modification then
4: AgSt(A2, x, knx), Prex, Rcv(A2, l2, H , m2) −→
AgSt(A2, x + 1, knx+1), Postx+1, Snd(A2, lp, As, mp)
5: Let h ::= next(i)
6: if ∃ next(h) i.e.
7: AgSt(As, s, kns), Prey, Rcv(As, lp, As−1, mp) −→
AgSt(As, s + 1, kns+1), Posts+1, Snd(As, lp, As+1, mp+1) then ▷ no
modification are necessary to the next transition
8: AgSt(As, s, kns), Prey, Rcv(As, lp, As−1, mp) −→
AgSt(As, s + 1, kns+1), Posts+1, Snd(As, lp, As+1, mp+1)
9: go to 6 with h ::= next(h)
10: else ▷ this case is when Jm2Kµ is sent (modifications have been applied)
11: AgSt(A2, x, knx), Prex, Rcv(A2, l2, H , Jm2Kµ) −→
AgSt(A2, x + 1, Jknx+1Kµ), Postx+1, Snd(A2, lp, As, JmpKµ)
12: Let h ::= next(i)
13: if ∃ next(h) i.e.
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14: AgSt(As, s, kns), Prey, Rcv(As, lp, As−1, mp) −→
AgSt(As, s + 1, kns+1), Posts+1, Snd(As, lp, As+1, mp+1) then
15: JknsKµ = kns−1
16: mp = JmpKµ
17: Jkns+1Kµ = JknsKµ ∪ Pres ∪ JmpKµ
18: build all Jmp+1Kµ = {(format(mp+1))(m) | m ∈ submsg(mp+1)} that
can be generated by Jkns+1Kµ i.e.
19: AgSt(As, s, JknsKµ), Pres, Rcv(As, lp, As−1, JmpKµ) −→
AgSt(As, s + 1, Jkns+1Kµ), Posts+1,
Snd(As, lp, As+1, Jmp+1Kµ)
20: go to 13 with h ::= next(h)
The skip mutation µHskip(RS)
H skips both Rcv(H, l1, A1, m1) and Snd(H, l2, A2, m2) in transition i:
...Σ1
AgSt(H, i, kni), Prei, Rcv(H, l1, A1, m1) −→
AgSt(H, i + 1, Jkni+1Kµ), Posti+1, Snd(H, l2, A2, Jm2Kµ)
...JΣ2Kµ
AgSt(H, j, JknjKµ), Prej, Rcv(H, l3, A3, m3) −→
AgSt(H, j + 1, Jknj+1Kµ), Postj+1, Snd(H, l4, A4, Jm4Kµ)
...JΣ3Kµ
The pseudo-code for this case is in Algorithm 7 and in Algorithm 8.
Algorithm 7 µHskip(RS): skip Rcv(H , l1, A1, m1) and Snd(H , A2, l2, m2) in
transition i, with landing transition j
1: if JknjKµ = knj = kni then
2: if JΣ2Kµ still contains a transition with Snd(A3, l3, H , m3) in its RHS then
3: transition j is the same as the original one in trace t, i.e.
4: AgSt(H, j, knj), Prej, Rcv(H, l3, A3, m3) −→
AgSt(H, j + 1, knj+1), Postj+1, Snd(H , l4, A4, m4)
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5: else ▷ JΣ2Kµ does not contain a transition with Snd(A3, l3, H , m3) in its
RHS
6: build all transitions j for all mutations Jm3Kµ = {(format(m3))(m) |
m ∈ submsg(m3)} of m3 and for each of these, set Jknj+1Kµ = knj ∪ {Jm3Kµ} ∪
Prej and build all Jm4Kµ = {(format(m4))(m) | m ∈ submsg(m4)} that can be
generated by Jknj+1Kµ, i.e.
7: Jknj+1Kµ = knj ∪ {Jm3Kµ} ∪ Prej,
8: build all Jm4Kµ = {(format(m4))(m) | m ∈ submsg(m4)} that can be
generated by Jknj+1Kµ, i.e.
9: AgSt(H , j, knj), Prej, Rcv(H , l3, A3, Jm3Kµ) −→
AgSt(H , j + 1, Jknj+1Kµ), Postj+1, Snd(H , l4, A4, Jm4Kµ)
10: else▷ this case is when knj = kni ∪ X for some set X of messages all different
from m3 and received by H in Σ2 with X = {Mx1 , ..., Mxn}
11: if JΣ2Kµ still contains a transition with Snd(A3, l3, H , m3) in its RHS then
12: H skipped all transitions of Σ2 in which he received Mx1 , ..., Mxn ,
13: JknjKµ = knj = kni,
14: Jknj+1Kµ = knj ∪ {m3} ∪ Prej,
15: build all Jm4Kµ = {(format(m4))(m) | m ∈ submsg(m4)} that can be
generated by J[knj+1Kµ, i.e.
16: AgSt(H , j, JknjKµ), Prej, Rcv(H , l3, A3, m3) −→
AgSt(H, j + 1, Jknj+1Kµ), Postj+1, Snd(H, l4, A4, Jm4Kµ)
17: else ▷ JΣ2Kµ does not contain a transition with Snd(A3, l3, H , m3) in its
RHS
18: H skipped all transitions of Σ2 in which he received Mx1 , ..., Mxn and he
cannot receive m3 in its original form but only in its mutation Jm3Kµ
19: JknjKµ = knj = kni,
20: go to 6
Algorithm 8 Matching mutation for µHskip(RS)
1: Consider the transition next(i) that immediately follows the mutated human
transition i
2: AgSt(A2, x, knx), Prex, Rcv(A2, l2, H , m2) −→
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AgSt(A2, x + 1, knx+1), Postx+1, Snd(A2, lp, As, mp) where As is one of the
other agents and lp and mp are some channel and message as specified in
Σ2.
3: remove Rcv(A2, l2, H , m2) from next(i)
4: JknxKµ = knx−1
5: Jknx+1Kµ = knx ∪ Prex
6: build all JmpKµ = {(format(mp))(m) | m ∈ submsg(mp)} that can be generated
by Jknx+1Kµ i.e.
7: AgSt(A2, x, JknxKµ), Prex −→
AgSt(A2, x + 1, Jknx+1Kµ), Postx+1, Snd(A2, lp, As, JmpKµ)
8: Let h ::= next(i)
9: if ∃ next(h) i.e.
10: AgSt(As, s, kns), Prey, Rcv(As, lp, As−1, mp) −→
AgSt(As, s + 1, kns+1), Posts+1, Snd(As, lp, As+1, mp+1) then
11: JknsKµ = kns−1
12: mp = JmpKµ
13: Jkns+1Kµ = JknsKµ ∪ Pres ∪ JmpKµ
14: build all Jmp+1Kµ = {(format(mp+1))(m) | m ∈ submsg(mp+1)} that can
be generated by Jkns+1Kµ i.e.
15: AgSt(As, s, JknsKµ), Pres, Rcv(As, lp, As−1, JmpKµ) −→
AgSt(As, s + 1, Jkns+1Kµ), Posts+1,
Snd(As, lp, As+1, Jmp+1Kµ)
16: go to 9 with h ::= next(h)
The skip mutation µHskip(RSR)
H skips both Rcv(H, l1, A1, m1) and Snd(H, l2, A2, m2) in transition i and Rcv(H, l3, A3, m3)
in transition j:
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...Σ1
AgSt(H, i, kni), Prei, Rcv(H, l1, A1, m1) −→
AgSt(H, i + 1, Jkni+1Kµ), Posti+1, Snd(H, l2, A2, Jm2Kµ)
...JΣ2Kµ
AgSt(H, j, JknjKµ), Prej, Rcv(H, l3, A3, m3) −→
AgSt(H, j + 1, Jknj+1Kµ), Postj+1, Snd(H, l4, A4, Jm4Kµ)
...JΣ3Kµ
The pseudo-code for this case is in Algorithm 9 and in Algorithm 10.
Algorithm 9 µHskip(RSR): skip Rcv(H , l1, A1, m1) and Snd(H , A2, l2, m2) in i and
Rcv(H , l3, A3, m3) in j
1: if JknjKµ = knj = kni then
2: Jknj+1Kµ = knj ∪ Prej,
3: build all Jm4Kµ = {(format(m4))(m) | m ∈ submsg(m4)} that can be
generated by Jknj+1Kµ, i.e.
4: AgSt(H, j, JknjKµ), Prej −→
AgSt(H, j + 1, Jknj+1Kµ), Postj+1, Snd(H, l4, A4, Jm4Kµ)
5: else▷ this case is when knj = kni ∪ X for some set X of messages all different
from m3 and received by H in Σ2 with X = {mx1 , ..., mxn}
6: H skipped all transitions of Σ2 in which he received mx1 , ..., mxn,
7: JknjKµ = knj = kni,
8: go to 1
Algorithm 10 Matching mutation for µHskip(RSR)
1: Consider the transition next(i) that immediately follows the mutated human
transition i
2: AgSt(A2, x, knx), Prex, Rcv(A2, l2, H , m2) −→
AgSt(A2, x + 1, knx+1), Postx+1, Snd(A2, lp, As, mp) where As is one of the
other agents and lp and mp are some channel and message as specified in
Σ2.
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3: remove Rcv(A2, l2, H , m2) from next(i)
4: JknxKµ = knx−1
5: Jknx+1Kµ = knx ∪ Prex
6: build all JmpKµ = {(format(mp))(m) | m ∈ submsg(mp)} that can be generated
by Jknx+1Kµ i.e.
7: AgSt(A2, x, JknxKµ), Prex −→
AgSt(A2, x + 1, Jknx+1Kµ), Postx+1, Snd(A2, lp, As, JmpKµ)
8: Let h ::= next(i)
9: if ∃ next(h) i.e.
10: AgSt(As, s, kns), Prey, Rcv(As, lp, As−1, mp) −→
AgSt(As, s + 1, kns+1), Posts+1, Snd(As, lp, As+1, mp+1) then
11: if s is different than j then
12: JknsKµ = kns−1
13: mp = JmpKµ
14: Jkns+1Kµ = JknsKµ ∪ Pres ∪ JmpKµ
15: build all Jmp+1Kµ = {(format(mp+1))(m) | m ∈ submsg(mp+1)} that
can be generated by Jkns+1Kµ i.e.
16: AgSt(As, s, JknsKµ), Pres, Rcv(As, lp, As−1, JmpKµ) −→
AgSt(As, s + 1, Jkns+1Kµ), Posts+1,
Snd(As, lp, As+1, Jmp+1Kµ)
17: go to 9 with h ::= next(h)
18: else ▷ s is equal to j, so this is the transition j in which I have to remove
the Rcv
19: remove Rcv(As, lp, As−1, mp) from transition j
20: AgSt(As, s, kns), Prey, −→
21: AgSt(As, s + 1, kns+1), Posts+1, Snd(As, lp, As+1, mp+1) is in the form
22: AgSt(H, j, JknjKµ), Prej, −→
AgSt(H, j + 1, Jknj+1Kµ), Postj+1, Snd(H, l4, A4, Jm4Kµ)
23: Let h ::= next(j)
24: if ∃ next(h) i.e.
25: AgSt(As, s, kns), Prey, Rcv(As, lp, As−1, mp) −→
AgSt(As, s + 1, kns+1), Posts+1,
Snd(As, lp, As+1, mp+1)
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26: then
27: JknsKµ = kns−1
28: mp = JmpKµ
29: Jkns+1Kµ = JknsKµ ∪ Pres ∪ JmpKµ
30: build all Jmp+1Kµ = {(format(mp+1))(m) | m ∈ submsg(mp+1)} that
can be generated by Jkns+1Kµ i.e.
31: AgSt(As, s, JknsKµ), Pres, Rcv(As, lp, As−1, JmpKµ) −→
AgSt(As, s + 1, Jkns+1Kµ), Posts+1,
Snd(As, lp, As+1, Jmp+1Kµ)
32: go to 24 with h ::= next(h)
5.7.2 The replace mutation
This mutation captures the fact that a human user may send a message in place of
another one (the case in which H replaces an action of a ceremony with another one is
obtained by combining a skip and an add mutation).
If I was to allow the human to replace a message to send with any message that he
can build out of his current knowledge, then I would have to deal with an infinite set
of options (even if the human knows only one thing, such as his name, the message
generation and analysis rules will allow him to generate an infinite set of messages); I
will have the same problem with the add mutation that I consider next. In security
protocol analysis, the ability of the attacker to generate infinitely many actors is a
cause of non-termination of the analysis, which is controlled by considering only the
messages that honest agents will actually respond to (and by introducing symbolic
techniques, such as the “lazy intruder” [113], to manage the remaining infinite set of
“answerable” messages). I cannot do that as my approach generates mutations in the
behaviour of the other agents to match the human mutations, so the other agents will
be able to respond to any human message. Similar to [16], I thus restrict my attention
to the messages that are already in the human’s current knowledge kn (rather than in
the knowledge’s closure under the generation and analysis rules). More specifically, I
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consider P(kn) \ ∅, the powerset of kn, i.e., the finite set of all subsets of kn including
kn but excluding the empty set as it does not make sense to send an empty message.
Moreover, to simplify further, I restrict my attention to messages of the same type.
I leave the investigation of other controlled notions of “sendable” messages to future
work.
Definition 3. A replace mutation
µHreplace : tr → tr ′
is a human mutation of tr ’s human subtrace [a0, . . . , ai, . . . , an]H such that tr ′
includes the new human subtrace [a0, . . . , JaiKµ, Jai+1Kµ, . . . , JanKµ], where ai is a send
action Snd(H, l, A, m) and JaiKµ is its mutation obtained by replacing the message m
either with a sub-message (but preserving the format) or with a message contained
in the powerset P(kni) \ ∅ of H’s current knowledge (but preserving types as specified
by the corresponding constants); Jai+1Kµ, . . . , JanKµ are the mutations of the actions
ai+1, . . . , an obtained by matching and propagating this mutation.
Again, I show the effect of the µHreplace mutation by showing its effect on the subtrace
(5.2):
...Σ1
AgSt(H, i, kni), Prei, Rcv(H, l1, A1, m1) −→
AgSt(H, i + 1, kni+1), Posti+1, Snd(H, l2, A2, Jm2Kµ)
...JΣ2Kµ
AgSt(H, i + 1, Jkni+1Kµ), Prei+1, Rcv(H, l3, A3, Jm3Kµ) −→
AgSt(H, i + 2, Jkni+2Kµ), Posti+2, Snd(H, l4, A4, Jm4Kµ)
...JΣ3Kµ
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where µ, which denotes the mutation composed of µHreplace and the matching and
propagation entailed by µHreplace, replaces m2 either with Jm2Kµ = {(format(m2))(m) |
m ∈ submsg(m2)} or with a message m that has the same constant as m2 and is obtained
from H’s current knowledge as shown in Algorithm 11 along with Algorithm 12 for the
matching mutation.9
For example, H could start the Oyster ceremony with one card card1 and complete
it with another card card2, thus giving rise to two “incomplete journeys”, as shown
in Figure 5.11 and discussed in Section 5.8.4. For another example, see the SSO
ceremony in Section 5.8.5.
Algorithm 11 replace mutation µHreplace
1: build all transitions i obtained by replacing m2 either with each Jm2Kµ =
{(format(m2))(m) | m ∈ submsg(m2)} or with each Jm2Kµ that is in the
powerset of H’s current knowledge kni+1 preserving types as specified by the
corresponding constants, i.e.
2: AgSt(H , i, kni), Prei, Rcv(H , l1, A1, m1) −→
AgSt(H , i + 1, kni+1), Posti+1, Snd(H , l2, A2, Jm2Kµ) ▷ Σ2 does not contain
other transitions by H
3: if JΣ2Kµ still contains a transition with Snd(A3, l3, H , m3) in its conclusions
then ▷ the new message Jm2Kµ has no influence on m3
4: AgSt(H , i + 1, kni+1), Prei+1, Rcv(H , l3, A3, m3) −→
AgSt(H , i + 2, kni+2), Posti+2, Snd(H , l4, A4, m4)
5: else
6: if JΣ2Kµ contains a transition with Snd(A3, l3, H , Jm3Kµ) in its conclusions
then ▷ the new message Jm2Kµ has some influence on m3
7: Jkni+2Kµ = kni+1 ∪ Jm3Kµ ∪ Prei+1,
8: build all Jm4Kµ = {(format(m4))(m) | m ∈ submsg(m4)} that can be
generated by Jkni+2Kµ, as defined in 1 i.e.
9: AgSt(H , i + 1, kni+1), Prei+1, Rcv(H , l3, A3, Jm3Kµ) −→
9I give only one algorithm for µHreplace since, differently from the cases of the skip mutations, the
two subcases of µHreplace proceed in the same way after the replacement of m2.
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AgSt(H , i + 2, Jkni+2Kµ), Posti+2, Snd(H , l4, A4, Jm4Kµ)
10: else ▷ JΣ2Kµ does not contain a transition with Snd(A3, l3, H , m3)
or Snd(A3, l3, H , Jm3Kµ) in its conclusions (the new message Jm2Kµ blocks the
sending of m3)
11: Jkni+2Kµ = kni+1 ∪ Prei+1,
12: build all Jm4Kµ = {(format(m4))(m) | m ∈ submsg(m4)} that can be
generated by Jkni+2Kµ, as defined in 1 i.e.
13: AgSt(H , i + 1, kni+1), Prei+1 −→
AgSt(H , i + 2, Jkni+2Kµ), Posti+2, Snd(H , l4, A4, Jm4Kµ)
Algorithm 12 Matching mutation for µHreplace
1: Consider the transition next(i) that immediately follows the mutated human
transition i
2: AgSt(A2, x, knx), Prex, Rcv(A2, l2, H , m2) −→
AgSt(A2, x + 1, knx+1), Postx+1, Snd(A2, lp, As, mp) where m2 could be either
Jm2Kµ = {(format(m2))(m) | m ∈ submsg(m2)} or Jm2Kµ that is in the pow-
erset of H’s current knowledge kni+1 preserving types as specified by the
corresponding constants, As is one of the other agents and lp and mp are some
channel and message as specified in Σ2.
3: if Jm2Kµ = {(format(m2))(m) | m ∈ submsg(m2)} then
4: Jknx+1Kµ = knx ∪ Prex ∪ Jm2Kµ
5: JmpKµ = mp after removing all the messages that are not in Jknx+1Kµ.
6: else ▷ Jm2Kµ is in the powerset of H’s current knowledge kni+1 preserving
types as specified by the corresponding constants
7: JmpKµ = mp after changing all the messages preserving types as specified
by the corresponding constants.
8: Let h ::= next(i)
9: if ∃ next(h) i.e.
10: AgSt(As, s, kns), Prey, Rcv(As, lp, As−1, mp) −→
AgSt(As, s + 1, kns+1), Posts+1, Snd(As, lp, As+1, mp+1) then
11: JknsKµ = kns−1
12: mp = JmpKµ
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13: Jkns+1Kµ = JknsKµ ∪ Pres ∪ JmpKµ
14: if JmpKµ = {(format(mp−1))(m) | m ∈ submsg(mp−1)} then
15: Jmp+1Kµ = mp+1 after removing all the messages that are not in Jkns+1Kµ.
16: else ▷ JmpKµ is generated using H’s current knowledge knp−1
17: Jmp+1Kµ = mp+1 after changing all the messages preserving types as
specified by the corresponding constants.
18: go to 9 with h ::= next(h)
5.7.3 The add mutation
There are two different cases for this mutation: the human could
• send at any time any message that is in the powerset of the messages that are in
his current knowledge, or
• duplicate a send action.10
Definition 4. An add mutation is a mutation
µHadd : tr → tr × tr ′
such that the original trace tr = [a0, . . . , ai−1, ai, ai+1, . . . , an] is run in parallel
with the new, mutated trace tr ′ = [a0, . . . , ai−1, JaiKµ, Jai+1Kµ, . . . , JanKµ], where ai is a
send action and JaiKµ is its possible mutation obtained either by duplicating ai or by
adding an action Snd(H, l, A, m) at state i for some l with A, m ∈ P(kni) \ ∅, and
Jai+1Kµ, . . . , JanKµ are the mutations of the actions ai, . . . , ai+k−1 obtained by matching
and propagating this mutation.
Consider the beginning of the subtrace (5.2). µHadd mutates this to either
10Note that I only consider mutations initiated by a human agent; as a consequence, I do not
consider the situation in which the human agent initiates a mutation of the ceremony by adding a
receive action as that would require another agent (human or not) to have added the corresponding
send action first.
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...Σ1
AgSt(H, i, kni), Prei, Rcv(H, l1, A1, M1) −→
AgSt(H, i + 1, kni+1), Posti+1, Snd(H, l2, A2, M2)
AgSt(H, i, kni), Prei, Rcv(H, l1, A1, M1) −→




AgSt(H, i, kni), Prei, Rcv(H, l1, A1, M1) −→
AgSt(H, i + 1, kni+1), Posti+1, Snd(H, l2, A2, M2)
AgSt(H, i, kni), Prei, Rcv(H, l1, A1, M1) −→
AgSt(H, i + 1, kni+1), Snd(H, l2, A2, JM2Kµ)
...JΣ2Kµ
The add mutation is best exemplified when combined with the other mutations,
e.g.,
• sending at any time any message that he knows can be combined with a skip
mutation (e.g., to skip some steps of a ceremony and instead send an arbitrary
message before continuing with the rest of the ceremony),
• duplicating a send action can be combined with a replace mutation (as I do in
my case studies).
For example, H could start the Oyster ceremony touching in with one card card1
and then, by mistake, touch out with two cards; this can be represented by adding a
second touch-out send message where the first card is replaced with the second, thus
obtaining the two traces shown in Figure 5.11.
5.7 Modelling Human Mutations of the Ceremony 170
My tool implements this mutation as described in the pseudo-code in Algorithm 13
along with Algorithm 14 for the matching mutation.
Algorithm 13 add mutation µHadd
1: Add a transition at state i built by either
2: adding a Snd(H , l, A, m) for some l, A and m ∈ P(kni) \ ∅ preserving types
as specified by the corresponding constants, where Prei contains only fresh
facts (namely those fresh messages needed to built m; hence Prei could be
empty), keeping the premises fixed as the same as the state i, i.e.
3: AgSt(H, i, kni), Prei, Rcv(H , l1, A1, m1) −→
AgSt(H , i + 1, kni+1), Snd(H , l, A, m)
4: or duplicating an existing Snd(H , l, A, m2) action, keeping the premises fixed
as the same as the state i, i.e.
5: AgSt(H, i, kni), Prei, Rcv(H , l1, A1, m1) −→
AgSt(H , i + 1, kni+1), Snd(H , l, A, m2)
Algorithm 14 Matching mutation for µHadd
1: Consider the new mutated human transition i
2: AgSt(H, i, kni), Prei, Rcv(H , l1, A1, m1) −→
AgSt(H , i+1, kni+1), Snd(H , l, As, m), where As is one of the other agents
and l and m are some channel and message as specified in Algorithm 13.
3: Considering the receiver As, take its next(i) transition that immediately follows
the mutated human transition i.
4: Create a copy next(i) of the next(i) transition and in next(i) remove the Snd()
event (if any) and replace the values in the Rcv() event with l, m and As
5: AgSt(As, s, kns), Pres, Rcv(As, l, H , m) −→
AgSt(As, s + 1, kns+1)
6: For all transitions x after the transition next(i)
7: AgSt(A, x, knx) . . . −→ AgSt(H , x + 1, knx+1) . . .
8: increment the state increasing the role step the agent is in but keeping the rest
of the transitions intact.
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5.8 X-Men: a Tool for the Generation of Mutated
Models based on Human Behaviours
In this section, I show how my formalisation can be used effectively for discovering
attacks that are due to the behaviour of human agents in security ceremonies. As proof-
of-concept, I have applied my tool X-Men to two case studies, the Oyster ceremony
and the Single Sign-On ceremony. As explained in more detail in the following, X-
Men generated a large number of mutated models for these ceremonies, which I have
analysed using Tamarin.
The framework works in three phases as shown in Figure 5.1:
• A preprocessing phase executed by a Python script;
• The core phase executed by X-Men;
• The analysis phase executed by Tamarin.
5.8.1 Tamarin Model of a Ceremony
Ceremony models follow the Tamarin syntax. However, the X-Men framework needs
to take as input model files that follow some extra expedients.
.spthy file
A Tamarin specification (a specification file in the .spthy format, where .spthy stands
for security protocol theory) is constituted by the construct described in Section 2.3.
Tamarin uses C-style comments, so everything between /* and */ or the line following
// is a comment. I take advantage of comments in the X-Men framework to divide the









/* Protocol / Ceremony Rules */
/**** ENDOFRULES ****/
/* Restrictions and Lemmas */
end
/**** ENDOFMODEL ****/
Listing 5.4 Structure of the Tamarin models for the X-Men framework
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The comments /****MODEL****/ and /****ENDOFMODEL****/ set the boundaries
of the entire file. Within these boundaries, there are:
• an inner bound (from /****MODEL****/ to /****RULES****/) where the channel
rules are defined;
• an inner bound (from /****RULES****/ to /****ENDOFRULES****/) where func-
tions and the ceremony rules are defined;
• an inner bound (from /****ENDOFRULES****/ to /****ENDOFMODEL****/) where
the restrictions and the lemmas are defined.
Channel Rules
Channel rules need to be specified as follows: the fact names for outgoing and incoming
message fact have to initiate with the string Snd and Rcv (e.g., SndS() for a secure
outbound communication, RcvS() for a secure incoming communication, SndDY() for an
insecure outbound communication, RcvDY() for an insecure incoming communication).
The X-Men tool is able to parse channel rules as specified in Section 5.6.3, where the
rules can have three or four parameters based on the presence of “types” as shown
in Listing 5.5 (the full channel rules used in the ceremonies are in the Oyster model
in Section A.3 and in the Single Sign-On model in Section A.4).
rule ChanSndS :
[SndS($A ,$B ,xn ,x)]
--[ ChanSndS ($A ,$B ,xn ,x)]->
[! Sec($A ,$B ,xn ,x)]
rule ChanRcvS :
[! Sec($A ,$B ,xn ,x)]
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--[ ChanRcvS ($A ,$B ,xn ,x)]->
[RcvS($A ,$B ,xn ,x)]
Listing 5.5 Example of channel rules defined in Tamarin for the Oyster Ceremony
Human Agents
The rules executed by an human agent can be identified using the fact H() as first fact







In order to process the the roles inside a ceremony, X-Men needs them to be specified
inside the actions of a rule named Setup. In protocol and ceremony analysis, we can
usually take advantage of a setup rule to define the initial states of each role, however,
in this case, the tool requires that a fact Roles(...) is instantiated. The arguments
of this fact should be the agent names of the roles used in the protocol or ceremony as
shown for the Oyster ceremony in Listing 5.6, where Human, GateIn and GateOut are










Listing 5.6 Example of the Setup rule for the Oyster Ceremony
Additionally, if “types” are required, a rule named humansetup needs to be defined,
containing persistent facts of the form !Type(...) in its postconditions. As shown
in Listing 5.7, the syntax of a !Type(...) rule has:
• the agent name as first parameter;
• the type as second parameter;





!Type($Human ,’card ’, $oyster )
, !Type($Human ,’card ’,$ccard)
, !Type($Human ,’balance ’,bal( $oyster ))
, !Type($Human ,’balance ’,bal($ccard ))
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, !Type($GateIn ,’gid ’,~gid)
, !Type($GateIn ,’goid ’,~ goid)
...
]
Listing 5.7 Example of the humansetup rule for the Oyster Ceremony
Rules
Except for the Setup, the humansetup and the channel rules, the rules have to be
defined (and written) in the specification following their actual execution in the proto-
col/ceremony. Considering the Generalised Main Ceremony for the Tube in Figure 5.3,
the order of the rules should be as in Listing 5.8 (cf. the Oyster rules in Section A.3,
the Single Sign-On rules in Section A.4 and the rules Section A.5 used in Chapter 6
follow the same criteria).
rule H_1:
[...] - -[...] - >[...]
rule GateIn_1 :
[...] - -[...] - >[...]
rule H_3:
[...] - -[...] - >[...]
rule GateOut_1 :
[...] - -[...] - >[...]
rule H_5:
[...] - -[...] - >[...]
Listing 5.8 The order of the rules defined for the Oyster Ceremony
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5.8.2 The Python Script: Wolverine
Wolverine is the Python script that deals with splitting a ceremony model, written
in Tamarin, in three parts. It takes as input a model of the security ceremony
filename.spthy with the boundaries described above and creates as output three new
files:
(i) a new file that contains channel rules, named filename_pre.spthy,
(ii) a new file that contains the functions and all the ceremony agent rules, named
filename.spthy,
(iii) a new file that contains restrictions and lemmas, named filename_post.spthy.
In addition to these files, another file named filename.spthy_tmp is created to
preserve the original model file with a backup copy. Once the single-file model has been
divided, Wolverine invokes the X-Men tool opening its GUI and waiting, in background,
for the next interaction with the framework.
5.8.3 X-Men: the Core of the X-Men Framework
Under the Hood of X-Men
X-Men is a prototype tool written in Java. The tool follows the Model–view–controller
(MVC) paradigm dividing the related program logic into the three interconnected
elements of the model, a view (or GUI) and the controller which interconnects the
model and the view. X-Men model includes two key components represented by an
ANTLR grammar [123], essential to make the tool read the syntax of the files, and
by a parser that elaborates the file based on the ANTLR grammar in order to create
a structure easy to manipulate. The grammar is written following the syntax of the
Tamarin grammar in [161].
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Using X-Men
The security analyst, once the files have been created, should see the X-Men GUI as
in Figure 5.12.
Figure 5.12 The GUI of X-Men
The security analyst employing X-Men then selects the desired mutation as shown
in Figure 5.13. The analyst can choose the three mutations I have defined here or their
combinations (once the single mutations are selected, the related combinations are
shown in the GUI in the designate area) and any other mutation that will be defined
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in X-Men’s library of behavioural patterns in the future, to mutate the agent and the
other rules.
Once X-Men has finished the generation of the mutations, then Wolverine merges
the mutated agent and the other rules with the original channel rules and goals to
produce the many different mutated models that can be input to Tamarin.
Figure 5.13 The mutations implemented in X-Men
X-Men generated a large number of mutated models for my two case studies, as
shown in Table 5.5.
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These mutated models were then analysed individually by Tamarin, activating the
attacker rules when necessary (i.e., for the SSO case study but not for the Oyster one).
Let me now summarize the results of the analysis.
Mutation Attacker Case Study
Oyster SSO
skip S - 2 -
SR - 3 -
R - 2 -
RS - 1 -
RSR - 1 -
replace submessage ✓ - 232
type - 2 -
add - 92
add&replace submessage ✓ - 232
type - 2 -
Table 5.5 Mutated models generated by X-Men
5.8.4 Analysis of the Oyster Ceremony
Table 5.6 shows some of the attacks found with the models obtained using the mutations
applied to the Oyster ceremony. The table does not show the results pertaining to the
92 models generated by the add mutation. These results can be safely omitted here
as they represent cases in which the human agent systematically tries all the possible
combinations of parameters, without following the logic behind the ceremony. In these
cases, in fact, the security analyst needs to analyse each file excluding those who do


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.6 Some of the attacks found on the models obtained using the mutations
applied to the Oyster ceremony
(✓ indicates that an attack has been found, × indicates that no attack was found, •
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.6 (Continued) Some of the attacks found on the models obtained using the
mutations applied to the Oyster ceremony
(✓ indicates that an attack has been found, × indicates that no attack was found, •
indicates that the functional goal is verified)
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“Mutated model” lists the file identifier of the generated file (as used at [178])
and the table also provides mutation details as well as a brief explanation of the
human agent’s behaviour for each model. In addition to the three goals discussed in
Section 5.6.4, I have used Tamarin to check the functional goal (a.k.a. executable goal)
that the mutations did not create models in which the legitimate execution trace of
the ceremony is not valid any more. All the models considered in the table passed this
check.
I describe three interesting attacks that Tamarin has been able to discover out of
the many mutations generated.
Attack #1 The MSC of the attack (Figure 5.14) shows how the human agent H
may execute the Oyster ceremony without touching-in at the entrance (as shown by the
dotted arrows representing the human agent who is not touching-in). H touches-out the
oyster and GateOut reads the information saved on the card, which does not specify
where H entered as GateIn was not able to write its identifier gin on the card. The
security goal GO1 is not verified, entailing what TfL calls an incomplete journey as
mentioned in Section 5.4, and the system charges a penalty fare as it is not able to
calculate the journey of the passenger.
This is a real scenario that occurs when the passenger forgets to touch-in, e.g., when
the station has no proper gates but only card readers at the station entrance, when the
gates are already open (TfL sometimes opens the gates to speed up entry/exit during
rush hour or when there are a large number of passengers), or when the reader is not
working properly and does not read/write the Oyster card.
Attack #2 H may use two different cards in a single journey, touching-in with the
first and touching-out with the second, so that GO2 fails with two incomplete journeys.




oyster , balance-fare, finish
Figure 5.14 Attack that represents the Incomplete journey scenario for the Oyster
ceremony
suffered from this problem. For instance, the passenger might have two Oyster cards
in their pockets and confuse them, or the passenger might use Apple/Google pay
(cf. Section 5.4) but using two different devices (say smartphone and smartwatch),
which will cause two incomplete journeys because the Device Account Number is unique
for each device and is used by TfL as the identifier for a single journey.
Attack #3 The MSC in Figure 5.15 shows how H may use two cards (e.g., Oyster and
a contactless card), simultaneously touching them both in/out when entering/exiting
(as shown by the dotted arrows representing a parallel second execution of the Oyster
ceremony), so that GO3 fails due to a card clash (cf. Section 5.4). This occurs, e.g.,
when a passenger touches with a wallet that holds all the passenger’s cards that the
system considers to be valid payment cards.
The attacks on the Oyster ceremony were discovered using the mutations generated
by X-Men as shown in Table 5.6. The analysis did not require the activation of a
Dolev-Yao attacker as the system, through the matching mutations, replied and billed







oyster , balance, gin
card, balance, gin
oyster , balance-fare, finish
card, balance-fare, finish
Figure 5.15 Attack that represents the Card clash scenario for the Oyster ceremony
known to TfL (cf. their warnings in Figure 5.4) and can be gathered empirically by
observing the concrete behaviour of the Tube passengers, it is important to stress that
X-Men allows us to discover them automatically. Other attacks might be discovered
by considering other goals or other mutations. Moreover, in the style of model-based
testing (see the end of Section 5.5), it is possible to use the attack traces to generate
concrete test cases to be executed on the code of the ceremony (if that is available).
To provide an example of the analysis in the presence of an attacker, I have
considered the SSO ceremony.
5.8.5 Analysis of the SSO Ceremony
The SAML-based Single Sign-on for Google Apps protocol suffered from a well-know
man-in-the-middle attack [7] as shown in Figure 5.16. The protocol relies on the use of
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an authentication assertion AuthAssert(ID, C , IdP, SP) signed by the identity provider
IdP , where ID is an identifier and SP is the provider of a service that a client C wishes
to use. In a nutshell (see [7] for the full details), the attack was due to the fact that the
implementation had simplified AuthAssert(ID, C , IdP, SP) into AuthAssert(C , SP) to
speed up the digital signature. A malicious SP can use this assertion to pose as C in
another run of the protocol.
Figure 5.16 The man-in-the-middle attack on the Single Sign-On protocol
I have specified SSO as a ceremony in X-Men, considering what would happen
if SP is played by the attacker and IdP is played by a human, who may mistakenly
generate and sign a wrong authentication assertion. Indeed, the replace (submessage)
mutation generates AuthAssert(C , SP) among other mutations. I have formalised the
goal “IdP authenticates only the agent who requires to be authenticated” as a standard




"All actor peer params #i.
Commit(actor , peer , params)@ i
==>
(Ex #j. Running (actor , peer , params)@ j & j < i
& not(Ex actor2 peer2 #i2.
Commit(actor2 , peer2 , params)@ i2
& not (#i = #i2 )))
| (Ex #r. RevLtk(actor) @ r)
| (Ex #r. RevLtk(peer) @ r)"
Listing 5.9 Lemma for the security goal of SSO
This shows that my approach is able to find an attack that was not present
in the original specification of SAML-based Single Sign-on but was introduced in
Google’s implementation [7]. My mutations, among other things, capture such possible
specification-implementation deviances.
5.8.6 The X-Men Framework - Reusability
As said in Section 5.6, X-Men extends the Tamarin prover, but my approach is general
and independent of Tamarin and could be applied similarly to other tools. To consider
the use of other tools rather than the Tamarin prover, it is necessary to adapt some
parts of the X-Men framework.
In Tamarin (and thus in the X-Men tool), a role is formalised by a so-called
role script, which is basically the projection to an individual role of an extended
Alice&Bob specification, and corresponds to a strand or an applied pi calculus process.
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The ceremony specification is expressed using role scripts. Adapting the ceremony
specification to a new tool is straightforward if the tool is using strands of applied pi
calculus processes.
As Tamarin’s execution model is defined by a multiset term-rewriting system like in
most other security protocol analysis tools, it should require minor changes in case the
new tool uses the same execution model (e.g., AVANTSSAR [5] uses the ASLan++
language which is defined by a multiset term-rewriting system as well).
Security goals are expressed using lemmas as LTL formulas. Changes to adapt
the syntax of LTL operators are required to adapt the goals from one tool to another.
In particular, it is necessary to exclude, in some scenarios, the Dolev-Yao attacker,
allowing the goals to be analyzed even without it. This would potentially require an
in-depth modification of the model checker code in order to exclude the attacker rules.
As described in Section 5.8.3, X-Men works using the MVC paradigm. Inside the
model, there are two key components, which are an ANTLR grammar and a parser that
elaborates the file based on the ANTLR grammar. The ANTLR grammar is based on
the Tamarin syntax, which allows X-Men to read the .spthy files. So, to make X-Men
able to read new syntax, it would be necessary to import a new grammar expressed
using ANTLR, generating the parser and connecting it to the main components of the
X-Men controller which, indipendently from the language, create the structure easy to
manipulate in order to generate the mutations.
5.9 Related Work
In [124], Paulson introduced the Oops rule to model mistakes done by agents when
executing a security protocol, such as the loss (by any means) of a session key. However,
the notion of security ceremony and the explicit investigation of the consequences
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of explicitly considering human agents and their mistakes was introduced by Ellison
in [58], one of the pioneers of socio-technical security.
One of the first formal approaches to investigate security ceremonies is the concertina
model introduced in [20], which spans over a number of socio-technical layers, focusing
in particular on the socio-technical protocol between a user persona and a computer
interface, but without explicitly considering human mistakes nor accounting for an
explicit attacker. Similarly, the approaches in [103, 36] provide a formal model to
reason about how a Dolev-Yao-style attacker can attack the communication between
humans and computers, including storing of human knowledge, but without explicitly
considering human mistakes.
In contrast, Basin et al. [16] provide a formal model for reasoning about some errors
that humans involved in security protocols may make. They specify rules formalising
different types of humans (untrained, infallible or fallible humans), modelling a human
who can send and receive any messages, resulting in attacks because a human discloses
information, but also in attacks because the human just enters the same information
on the wrong device or accepts a received message he should not. They successfully
applied their model to analyse some authentication protocols. Although their approach
is similar in spirit to mine, there are some fundamental differences along with some
affinities. The two main differences are the following ones. First, they only consider
scenarios in which the Dolev-Yao attacker actively attacks the protocol, whereas my
approach works also when the attacker is not present thanks to the matching mutations.
Second, similar to what I do, they also consider an add rule that allows humans to
send “controlled” messages that are in their current knowledge, but my mutations
allow us to capture a different, and to some extent wider, set of human deviations from
the original ceremony.
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Similar to [16], Curzon et al. [50] propose a formal human model that includes
a specific attacker able to exploit the errors against the human user. The errors
considered are those caused by the humans’ interpretation of the system and by the
design of the interfaces, but not those entailed by human choices or mistakes as I do.
Moreover, they do not consider communication channels.
Johansen and Jøsang [84] define probabilistic processes to model the actions of
a human agent, separating the model of the human and that of the user interface.
They introduce a “compilation” operation in order to capture the interaction of the
human agent and the user interface. Their probabilistic model for the human agent is
an extension of the persona model [145]. Their approach provides only a preliminary
formalisation without a security analysis.
Beckert and Beuster [18] provide a formal semantics for GOMS models augmented
with formal models of the application and the user’s assumptions about the application,
but they do not consider human mistakes in detail.
Pavlovic and Meadows [125] employ actor-networks as a formal model of computa-
tion and communication in networks of computers, humans and their devices, but they
too do not consider human mistakes in detail.
Radke and Boyd [130] introduce the notion of human-followable security wherein
a human user can understand the process and logic behind authentication protocols.
They focus on showing how to transform existing authentication protocols into protocols
with human-followable security.
While my approach is quite radically different from the research in [50, 18, 84, 125,
130], I believe that there might be interesting synergies between my mutations and the
way in which they model the assumptions and perceptions of the human users, which I
plan to investigate in future work.
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5.10 Conclusions
My approach allows security analysts to consider human “shades of gray” in the analysis
of security ceremonies. I have already mentioned a number of directions for future
work. I believe that the most interesting ones are: extend the current mutations by
weakening some of the constraints (e.g., on the types and formats of the messages, say
to consider other controlled notions of “sendable” message or the case in which the
right message is composed in a wrong format); consider other abilities of the attacker
(e.g., as in [9]); extend X-Men’s library of behavioural patterns with other mutations;
formalise combinations of mutations and prove compositionality results; improve the
efficiency of my approach by reducing the number of generated mutated models (e.g.,
by identifying isomorphic models) and by automatically checking whether attacks are
real or not; link my formal analysis to mutation testing by generating test cases out of
the attack traces; and, finally, consider other, even more complex, case studies.
Chapter 6
A Socio-Technical Approach
for Free Travel: How to Exploit
Human Ticket Inspection
in Coach Services
In this chapter, I introduce a socio-technical study that I carried out considering coach
services operating in different countries. This work has not been published yet, but a
paper is in preparation.
6.1 Motivation
People come and go from and to airports thanks to several transportation services:
underground, trains, taxis, coaches and buses. These public transportation services
require the customer to buy a ticket in order to use the service (or to pay a bill in
case of a taxi, which I will not consider here). Many transportation companies operate
using a similar ticketing system. They accept tickets either in their physical version
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or in their electronic version, to allow customers to have continuity with the most
common “paper versions” but also to take advantage of technology for more convenient
and easy-to-use alternatives. Introducing new types of ticket (e.g., e-tickets, smart
cards, etc.) goes hand in hand with designing the corresponding process to check the
validity of a ticket. Because of the multitude of physical and electronic versions, as
well as the variety of transportation services all over the world, a ticket inspection
ceremony should be tailored to the type of ticket used for the particular service.
Forging represents a serious problem for transportation services. For instance,
reporters of the BBC [17] were able to buy forged train tickets on the dark web and
use these tickets, even though the “technological part” of the tickets (i.e., the magnetic
strip) was not valid, to convince the train inspector to allow them to travel. So, driven
by this significant issue, I have used my formal approaches described in Chapter 4
and Chapter 5 to analyse the security of a ticket inspection ceremony used in coach
services.
6.2 Contributions
In this chapter, I investigate a security ceremony that defines the inspection of tickets
in coach services to check whether the ceremony is secure against forging attacks (which
it is not). More specifically, I provide four main contributions.
1. Hands-on observations I considered and observed a number of coach services,
gathering insights on (i) the design of their tickets, (ii) how they perform their
inspection ceremony, (iii) the conditions in which the ticket inspection is carried out.
2. Practical methodology of attack I have devised a practical methodology
to exploit the inspection ceremony, showing how an attacker can forge tickets for
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travelling for free. The methodology allows one to forge e-tickets for coach services in
a very simple way, which can be easily replicated, even by laypersons, as it does not
require particular technical competence but at most some familiarity with photo-editing
software such as Adobe Photoshop or Gimp.
3. Formalization I have defined the attacker model based on the charting technique
as shown in Chapter 4, and I then formalised the security ceremony that represents
the inspection procedure carried out by the inspector (e.g., the driver) extending the
approach described in Chapter 5 with a new human mutation.
4. Security analysis I have defined a security property that models the correct
execution of an inspection ceremony and highlighted possible security failures in a
preliminary security analysis. I have carried out a security analysis using Tamarin,
discovering a potential threat on the ticket inspection ceremony. This has led me to
the identification of a series of empirical principles that can improve the security of the
ceremony I considered.
For concreteness, I focused my attention on one of the most convenient and reliable
coach services (which I will keep anonymous for ethical reasons) that counts millions
of passenger journeys every year. However, my analysis is general and independent of
that service and could be applied similarly to other services (other coach services but
also ticket inspections for cinemas, theatres, concerts, events) that likely suffer from
similar problems.
6.3 Outline
The coach service ecosystem is defined in Section 6.4, where I explain the different
types of tickets, provide a description of the ticket inspection ceremony I have identified,
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and then formalise the ticket inspection ceremony using, and extending, the formal
methodology developed in Chapter 5. The formalisation and the new human mutation
are in Section 6.5. In Section 6.6, I explain how to carry out the two phases of the
attack, describing how to forge an e-ticket and showing, to prove my insights, the
results of the formal verification on the ticketing inspection ceremony. Taking stock
of what I have observed, I discuss, in Section 6.7, some key factors of the design of
the ticket inspection ceremony I analysed, and then I identify two principles that can
improve the design of new inspection ceremonies. In Section 6.9, I discuss related work.
In Section 6.10, I draw conclusions and discuss future work.
6.4 The Coach Service Ecosystem
In this section, I define the ecosystem of coach services. I begin by explaining the
different types of tickets considered, then present the ticket inspection ceremony that I
have derived empirically by carrying out a number of journeys, and finally discuss the
security property that pertains to the authenticity of the tickets.
6.4.1 The Tickets
The majority of coach services offer essentially two types of tickets: paper tickets and
electronic tickets, or e-tickets for short — I do not consider smart-card tickets because
they would require a different kind of attack and, anyway, smart-card solutions are not
widely adopted.
Customers can buy fixed-price paper tickets (e.g., similar to the tickets in Figure 6.1)
physically in shops at the airports, in coach stations or directly from the coach driver
on the day of travel.
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Figure 6.1 Example of paper tickets of a coach service
Alternatively, they can buy e-tickets online on the website of the coach service. The
procedure to buy an e-ticket requires the customer to choose the journey specifying the
date of travel (or dates in case of a return ticket, unless it is an “open” return ticket,
which has a flexible validity), insert the customer’s details and pay for the ticket. Once
the payment is concluded, the customer receives a confirmation email for the payment,
which also acts as the e-ticket for the journey.
Different coach services offer e-tickets that share many similarities in terms of
information present on the ticket itself. I considered these similarities to define a
standalone e-ticket as shown in Figure 6.2, which is designed based on the information
the different tickets of the different coach services have in common. This is fine as it is
realistic enough to showcase the main features of my approach.
A standalone e-ticket has the following fields: customer name, ticket number,
departure date, return date (if it is a return ticket), departure time, arrival time (or an
estimate arrival range time), from (which specifies where the journey starts), to (which
specifies where the journey ends) and the price of the ticket. In case the e-ticket is
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Figure 6.2 The standalone e-ticket based on the e-tickets similarities of a number of
coach services analysed
a return ticket, there are additionally fields for the return departure time and return
arrival time, from/to.
A number of coach services (as well as other services that offer e-tickets) enrich
the e-ticket with some visual field like a barcode or a QR code: these aim to simplify
and speed up the ticket inspection process. To that end, the driver is equipped with a
device capable of recognising the information within the codes so that such information
does not have to be controlled manually.
The e-ticket may also contain other useful information and the terms of condition,
which I have omitted here as they are not relevant for the description nor for the
attack.
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paper ticket e-ticket forging
Date × ×
Must be
modifiedDeparture time × ×
Arrival time × ×
From × ×





Visual field/s × Cannot be modified
(require a much more
complicated attack)Ticket number × ×
Table 6.1 Fields of a generic paper ticket and of a standalone e-ticket
Table 6.1 show the fields of a generic paper ticket compared with the fields of an
e-ticket (the last column will be discussed later).
6.4.2 The Ticket Inspection Ceremony
There is no available generic and public specification for the inspection ceremony of
coach services. Thus, I derived the steps that form a plausible ceremony empirically.
I analysed the type of tickets available and their fields, highlighting similarities and
differences. In parallel, I conducted real observations travelling for a total of 40 times
using real tickets and a number of different coach services in order to understand
the various ticket inspection ceremonies and whether there are substantial differences
between them. Once I collected enough experience and data on the different ceremonies,
I synthesized them into a single plausible inspection ceremony, which comprises two
sub-ceremonies: one for paper tickets and one for e-tickets.
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Observations data
Before I explain the two sub-ceremonies, let me discuss the data collection process.
I have travelled for a total of 40 times with a number of different coach services
between April 2017 and December 2019 as in Table 6.2 (dates are reported in mm/d-
d/yyyy format). The journeys were carried out at different hours of the day and
different months and years in order to guarantee heterogeneity of the conditions of the
traffic, the drivers and the coach services in general. This allowed me to get a broad
view of possible variations of the ticket inspection ceremony carried out in order to
include these variations, if relevant, in my analysis.
The Paper Ticket Sub-Ceremony
The paper ticket sub-ceremony is shown in Figure 6.3. The driver receives the paper
ticket from the customer and then checks the ticket by checking information such as
from/to, the departure time, and eventually the coach number. If this information is
correct, then the driver admits the customer on the coach. Note that there is no check
on the genuineness of the ticket.
The E-Ticket Sub-Ceremony
The e-ticket sub-ceremony, which is shown in Figure 6.4, keeps the same spirit of the
paper ticket ceremony, but delegating some of the checks to technology (or so one would
expect). Here too, upon request of the driver, the customer shows the e-ticket that
comes as the confirmation email of the payment for the journey. The driver performs a
preliminary analysis of the e-ticket to understand the type of the e-ticket checking also
the presence of possible visual fields. Based on the presence of visual fields, the driver
can make two different choices in order to validate a ticket:


























Table 6.2 The log of my journey with coach services. The log is reduced at minimal
considering possible ethical issues.
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Start
The driver receives the
physical ticket from the customer
The driver checks the journey








Figure 6.3 The paper ticket inspection sub-ceremony
• check if unique details printed on the ticket (e.g., ticket number) are present on
a list of allowed tickets for that journey;
• use the visual fields reading them with an electronic reader.
If the driver decides to check the unique details in the ticket manually, he performs
visual inspection, looking for a match of any of the unique details (e.g., ticket number,
journey references, service numbers, travel route references, etc.) with a list in his
possession (e.g., electronic list using a pad, a printed list). Once he finds a match,
the driver validates the ticket and admits the customer. In one of my observations,
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Start
The driver receives the
e-ticket from the customer
The driver scans
the QR code







Figure 6.4 The e-ticket inspection sub-ceremony
the driver first identified the ticket number on the e-ticket, and then checked whether
the ticket number matched a list of allowed ticket numbers for that journey on an
electronic pad (that synchronizes regularly with the main system); once found the
match, the driver validated the ticket number to make it unavailable for the future
and admitted the customer.
If the driver decides to use the visual fields, he needs to scan them, or a selection
of them (e.g., QR code, barcode, etc.), with a device: once the device confirms that
the ticket is valid, the driver admits the customer.
6.4 The Coach Service Ecosystem 203
6.4.3 Preliminary Security Analysis
A preliminary security analysis of the tickets and of the ticketing inspection ceremony
is beneficial to understand possible vulnerabilities. In particular, I looked at flaws that
could allow an attacker to travel for free using forged tickets bypassing the ceremony’s
security measures.
Let’s consider the paper tickets, such as the ticket shown in Figure 6.1. Typically,
coach services can rely on the difficulty of physically forging accurate copies of paper
tickets. Forging a physical ticket would require specific equipment such as the proper
paper, a printing machine, the identical layout the coach service is using on a digital
file, etc., which are not easy to obtain. This case is similar, in spirit, to how forgers
print counterfeit money. These difficulties are reflected in less controls that the sub-
ceremony is putting in place as shown in Figure 6.3, where it is possible to see that
no specific visual checks are performed, in particular, no checks of unique fields (e.g.,
ticket number). The checks are limited to the plausibility of the information only.
E-tickets, on the other hand, represent a different scenario. Coach services rely (or
should rely, although I proved that it is not the case) on the difficulty of obtaining unique
information displayed on the e-ticket to discourage forging. This unique information
can also be used by the coach service companies to generate visual fields that might be
printed on the tickets.
However, during my analysis, I encountered some visual fields that, even though
they could have potentially stored relevant information for the ceremony, they did
not contain any information but were just used as graphical means to corroborate the
structure of the e-tickets. These visual fields, in fact, were never checked during all my
observations. This is a potential attack vector: a coach service that offers customers
to choose between different types of e-tickets such as QR code or barcode with no
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information (e.g., in case of specific ticket such as discount tickets) can be exploited to
execute a successful forging attack.
In the case of e-tickets, the precision with which the checks are carried out is
crucial. The inspector (e.g., the driver) has to perform proper checks on the unique
fields displayed on the ticket. However, as I have observed, drivers apply the paper
ticket inspection sub-ceremony also for e-tickets. From my analysis, the paper ticket
sub-ceremony is not designed to be secure against forged tickets if this sub-ceremony
is applied in case of e-tickets. As explained above, the paper ticket sub-ceremony does
not consider checks on visual fields and relies on the complicated procedure to forge
paper tickets. However, the same “security” that is given by the difficult procedure
for forging paper tickets cannot be applied in case of e-tickets. I explain how easy it
is to forge a coach e-ticket in Section 6.6.2. In fact, assuming a situation where the
driver applies the paper ticket inspection sub-ceremony to an e-ticket accurately forged,
the attacker sees his forged e-ticket accepted by the driver and is thus able to use the
service for free.
6.5 Formalization of the Ticket Inspection Cere-
mony
To prove my insights, I adopted and extended the formal specification of ceremonies
that I gave in Section 5.6 introducing a new mutation that captures a new behavioural
pattern.
Let’s consider the ceremony described above and shown in Figure 6.5 as a running
example. The ceremony has three roles: the Customer , the Driver and the online
website WebServer of the coach service.
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Customer WebServer Driver
date, dtime, from, to
date, dtime, from, to, price
price, ‘ok’
{Customer , tknumber , price,
date, dtime, from, to},
{Customer , tknumber , price,
date, dtime, from, to}kS
{Customer , tknumber , price,
date, dtime, from, to},
{Customer , tknumber , price,




tknumber , ‘ack′, ‘valid′
Figure 6.5 The Ticket Inspection Ceremony
1. The Customer interrogates the online website WebServer in order to get a list
of coaches operating on a specific date date at a specific time dtime, departing
from a specific location from and arriving to a specific destination to.
2. The WebServer returns the available solution, indicating the price price.
3. The Customer clicks on the selected option, paying the price of the ticket.
4. The WebServer sends to the Customer the e-ticket with the related information,
encrypting them using a shared key kS between the WebServer and the Driver .
Encrypting the fields represents the characteristic of the e-ticket of being recog-
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[] Start(Customer ,⟨WebServer ,Driver⟩)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [AgSt(Customer , 1, ⟨WebServer , Driver⟩)] (H0)
[AgSt(Customer , 1, ⟨WebServer , Driver⟩)]
Snd(Customer ,sec,WebServer ,⟨date,dtime,from,to⟩)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[AgSt(Customer , 2, ⟨WebServer , Driver , date, dtime, from, to⟩),
Outsec(Customer , WebServer , ⟨date, dtime, from, to⟩)] (H1)
[AgSt(Customer , 2, ⟨WebServer , Driver , date, dtime, from, to⟩),
Insec(WebServer , Customer , ⟨date, dtime, from, to, price⟩)]
Rcv(Customer ,sec,WebServer ,⟨date,dtime,from,to,price⟩)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[AgSt(Customer , 3, ⟨WebServer , Driver , date, dtime, from, to, price⟩)] (H2)
[AgSt(Customer , 3, ⟨WebServer , Driver , date, dtime, from, to, price⟩)]
Snd(Customer ,sec,WebServer ,⟨price,‘ok’⟩)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
AgSt(Customer , 4, ⟨WebServer , Driver , date, dtime, from, to, price⟩),
Outsec(Customer , WebServer , ⟨price, ‘ok’⟩)] (H3)
Figure 6.6 The rules for the Customer in the ticket inspection ceremony
nised valid from the Driver . This could be seen as applying a watermarking on
the e-ticket.
5. The Customer , at the time of travel, shows the e-ticket to the Driver .
6. The Driver performs a ticket inspection and, if successful, admits the Customer
to the coach.
I use Agent rules to specify agents’ state transitions and communications. The
rules for the Customer in the ticket inspection ceremony are shown in Figure 6.6, the
rules for the WebServer are shown in Figure 6.7 and the rules for the Driver are shown
in Figure 6.8.
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[AgSt(Customer , 4, ⟨WebServer , Driver , date, dtime, from, to, price⟩),
Insec(WebServer , Customer , ⟨⟨Customer , tknumber , price, date, dtime, from, to⟩,
senc(⟨Customer , tknumber , price, date, dtime, from, to⟩, kS)⟩)]
Rcv(Customer ,sec,WebServer ,⟨⟨Customer ,tknumber ,price,date,dtime,from,to⟩,
senc(⟨Customer ,tknumber ,price,date,dtime,from,to⟩,kS)⟩)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[AgSt(Customer , 5,
⟨WebServer , Driver , date, dtime, from, to, price, tknumber⟩)] (H4)
[AgSt(Customer , 5, ⟨WebServer , Driver , date, dtime, from, to, price, tknumber⟩)]
Snd(Customer ,sec,Driver ,⟨⟨Customer ,tknumber ,date,dtime,from,to⟩,
senc(⟨Customer ,tknumber ,date,dtime,from,to⟩,kS)⟩)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[AgSt(Customer , 6,
⟨WebServer , Driver , date, dtime, from, to, price, tknumber⟩),
Outsec(Customer , Driver , ⟨⟨Customer , tknumber , date, dtime, from, to⟩,
senc(⟨Customer , tknumber , date, dtime, from, to⟩, kS)⟩)] (H5)
[AgSt(Customer , 6, ⟨WebServer , Driver , date, dtime, from, to, price, tknumber⟩),
Insec(Driver , Customer , ⟨Customer , tknumber , date, ‘ack’, ‘valid’⟩)]
Rcv(Customer ,sec,Driver ,⟨tknumber ,date,‘ack’,‘valid’⟩),End(Customer ,‘ack’,‘valid’,tknumber ,date)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [] (H6)
Figure 6.6 The rules for the Customer in the ticket inspection ceremony
In the rule (D2) in Figure 6.8, Tamarin actions are used to model the inspection
the Driver carries out during the ticket inspection ceremony. This check represents a
verification of the genuineness of the data encrypted (e.g., using the function Eq to
check that the fields Customer , tknumber , price, date, dtime, from, to, match to their
respective encrypted fields of the encrypted e-ticket) during the phase of releasing the
ticket by the WebServer . Practically, it could consist in checking a watermark on a
ticket, or leaving the check to a device that is connected with the WebServer itself. To
avoid misconceptions, signed fields of the tickets are renamed by affixing kS at the end
of the fields.
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[] Start(WebServer ,⟨kS ,Driver⟩)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [AgSt(WebServer , 1, ⟨kS , Driver⟩)] (WS0)
[AgSt(WebServer , 1, ⟨kS , Driver⟩),
Insec(Customer , WebServer , ⟨date, dtime, from, to⟩)]
Rcv(WebServer ,sec,Customer ,⟨date,dtime,from,to⟩)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[AgSt(WebServer , 2, ⟨kS , Driver , date, dtime, from, to⟩] (WS1)
[AgSt(WebServer , 2, ⟨kS , Driver , date, dtime, from, to⟩]
Snd(WebServer ,sec,Customer ,⟨date,dtime,from,to,price⟩)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[AgSt(WebServer , 3, ⟨kS , Driver , date, dtime, from, to, price⟩),
Outsec(WebServer , Customer , ⟨date, dtime, from, to, price⟩)] (WS2)
[AgSt(WebServer , 3, ⟨kS , Driver , date, dtime, from, to, price⟩,
Insec(Customer , WebServer , ⟨price, ‘ok’⟩)]
Rcv(WebServer ,sec,Customer ,⟨price,‘ok’⟩)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[AgSt(WebServer , 4, ⟨kS , Driver , date, dtime, from, to, price⟩] (WS3)
[AgSt(WebServer , 4, ⟨kS , Driver , date, dtime, from, to, price⟩)]
Snd(WebServer ,sec,Customer ,⟨⟨Customer ,tknumber ,price,date,dtime,from,to⟩,
senc(⟨Customer ,tknumber ,price,date,dtime,from,to⟩,kS)),
ValidTicket(WebServer ,Customer ,‘tn’,tknumber ,date)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[AgSt(WebServer , 5, ⟨kS , Driver , date, dtime, from, to, price, tknumber⟩,
Outsec(WebServer , Customer , ⟨⟨Customer , tknumber , price, date, dtime,
from, to⟩, senc(⟨Customer , tknumber , price, date, dtime, from, to⟩, kS)⟩)] (WS4)
Figure 6.7 The rules for the WebServer in the ticket inspection ceremony
As I advocated above, one can consider a scenario where a Customer can actually
forge e-tickets in a way that, if some of the forged fields are checked, then they won’t be
accepted. The part in which these checks are being carried out in the formalisation is
represented by the Tamarin actions. The possibility for a driver to forget to check these
fields or check them in a wrong way is already captured bys Definition 1 in Chapter 5.
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[] Start(Driver ,⟨kS⟩)−−−−−−−−−−→ [AgSt(Driver , 1, ⟨kS⟩)] (D0)
[AgSt(Driver , 1, ⟨kS⟩),
Insec(Customer , Driver , ⟨⟨Customer , tknumber , price, date, dtime, from, to⟩,
senc(⟨CustomerkS , tknumberkS , pricekS , datekS , dtimekS , fromkS , tokS⟩, kS)⟩)]
Rcv(Driver ,sec,Customer ,⟨⟨Customer ,tknumber ,price,date,dtime,from,to⟩,
senc(⟨CustomerkS ,tknumberkS ,pricekS ,datekS ,dtimekS ,fromkS ,tokS⟩,kS)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[AgSt(Driver , 2, ⟨kS , Customer , tknumber , date, dtime, from, to⟩] (D1)
[AgSt(Driver , 2, ⟨kS , Customer , tknumber , date, dtime, from, to⟩)]
Snd(Driver ,sec,Customer ,⟨tknumber ,date,‘ack’,‘valid’⟩)
Eq(tknumber ,tknumberkS),Eq(Customer ,CustomerkS),Eq(price,pricekS),Eq(date,datekS),
Eq(dtime,dtimekS),Eq(from,fromkS),Eq(to,tokS)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[AgSt(Driver , 3, ⟨kS , Customer , tknumber , date, dtime, from, to⟩),
Outsec(Driver , Customer , ⟨Customer , tknumber , date, ‘ack’, ‘valid’⟩)] (D2)
Figure 6.8 The rules for the Driver in the ticket inspection ceremony
In this mutation, in which one or more Tamarin actions are removed, the mutation
is neither matched nor propagated. To clarify this, let us consider the possible cases:
• since we defined a strong correlation between some of the events in Tamarin and
some facts1, the human mutation is not allowed to remove the Tamarin actions
that correspond to these facts because otherwise the resulting rule won’t be well-
formed (moreover, the removal or modification of Outl(A, P, m) and Inl(P, A, m)
facts are already covered by the other mutations);
1Recall from Section 5.6.3 that, for every event e in the script of a role A, we get a transition
rule prem a−→ conc as follows: the label of the rule contains the event, i.e., e ∈ a; prem contains an
agent state fact AgSt(A, step, kn), and conc contains the subsequent agent state fact AgSt(A, step, kn′),
where step refers to the role step the agent is in and kn is the agent’s knowledge at that step. If
e ∈ a is: Snd(A, l, P, m) then conc additionally contains an outgoing message fact Outl(A, P, m);
Rcv(A, l, P, m) then prem contains an incoming message fact Inl(P, A, m); Fresh(A, m) then prem
contains Fr(m); Start(A, m) then it is translated to a setup rule where conc contains the initial agent
state AgSt(A, 0, m).
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• the human mutation is also not allowed to remove a Tamarin action that is
necessary for a security goal, since otherwise we would obtain a ceremony that is
not executable;2
• if the human mutation removes one or more Tamarin actions that entail some
restriction on the set of traces (e.g., an equality check Eq(date, datekS) like in
the ticketing example considered here, cf. Figure 6.8), then the actual Tamarin
restriction is still valid as it is a generic property of the operator (e.g., of the
equality operator Eq) but it simply will not be applied (as Eq(date, datekS) is
not present anymore) and the X-Men tool will thus analyse more traces, possibly
including some traces that contain an attack based on the mutation;
• in the role scripts of the other agents there is nothing that corresponds to the
events of another agent (so the other agents will not notice if one or more Tamarin
actions of the human are removed).
In the following subsection, I will instantiate the generic Definition 1 to define this
new human mutation both formally and practically.
6.5.1 The Tamarin Action Mutation
This mutation captures the fact that a human user may not adhere to one or more
high-level behaviours expected by the ceremony (e.g., the case in which the Driver
does not execute a check on a particular field on a ticket during the ticket inspection
ceremony). This is defined by the mutation as the removal of one of more Tamarin
actions.
2Another possibility would be to leave the mutation dealing with the removal of the Tamarin
actions necessary for a security goal. I leave the investigation of this further aspect to future work.
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Definition 5. A Tamarin action mutation
µHaction : tr → tr ′
is a human mutation of tr ’s human subtrace [a0, . . . , ai, . . . , an]H such that tr ′ includes
the new human subtrace [a0, . . . , ai−1, JaiKµ, Jai+1Kµ, . . . , JakKµ, ak+1, . . . , an], where {ai,
ai+1, . . . , ak} = a are the Tamarin actions in the human transition rule prem a−→ conc
that has been mutated by the human into prem JaK
µ
−−→ conc .
In the specific case that I am considering in this chapter, the mutation of a Tamarin
action in a transition rules prem a−→ conc means either removing it from a or leaving it
unchanged, but, in general, it could mean also modifying it by changing some of its
parameters.
In Section 5.7, I show the results of the mutations on the rules using abstract
“merged” transition rules, in the style of multiset rewriting. This representation
highlights only prem and conc of the rules, which is not suitable for showing the results
of this new mutation. So, in order to show the new mutation, I need to consider the
full Agent rules specified in Figure 6.8. In particular, let’s consider the rule (D2), which
is modified according to the mutation as in Figure 6.9.
This mutation reflects a mistake of the Driver who forgets to control that the date
printed on the e-ticket shown by the Customer is, in fact, the original date of the
journey for which it was bought. The removal of this Tamarin action will entail that
all the possible traces where this check is not valid are considered during the analysis
of the security goal (whereas these traces would have been excluded in presence of the
check, thus preventing the forging attack that I discuss here).
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...
[AgSt(Driver , 2, ⟨kS , Customer , tknumber , date, dtime, from, to⟩]








[AgSt(Driver , 3, ⟨kS , Customer , tknumber , date, dtime, from, to⟩,
Outsec(Driver , Customer , ⟨Customer , tknumber , date, ‘ack’, ‘valid’⟩)]
...
Figure 6.9 Example of the Tamarin action mutation for the ticket inspection ceremony
6.5.2 Security Properties
I consider one security property: authenticity of the ticket. Other properties could of
course be considered (e.g., ensuring that customers are billed properly or the other
security properties for the London underground billing system considered in Chapter 5),
but they will be modelled and analysed similarly.
The goal can be formalised by the lemma in Listing 6.1.
lemma auth: all -traces
"All Customer tknumber date #i.
End(Customer ,’ack ’,’valid ’,tknumber ,date)@i
==> Ex Driver #j.
ValidTicket (Driver ,Customer ,’tknumber ’,
tknumber ,date)@j & j<i"
Listing 6.1 Lemma for the authenticity of the ticket
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A ticket inspection ceremony verifies the lemma auth if, considering a Customer who
completes the ceremony with a specific ticket tknumber valid for a specific date, recog-
nised as ‘valid’ (action End(Customer,’ack’,’valid’,tknumber,date) at time i),
then there is a previous time instant j such that the specific ticket tknumber was issued
by the WebServer (action ValidTicket(Driver,Customer,’tknumber’,tknumber
,date) for the specific date and Customer. This goal refers to a single ticket inspection
ceremony, i.e., a single ceremony session, that comprises also the purchase phase in
which that specific ticket has been bought.
6.5.3 Threat Models
As discussed in Section 6.1, forging represents a serious problem for transportation
services. Companies have to deal with dishonest passengers who try to exploit different
vulnerabilities in order to travel for free. Reasoning on the principals that play a key
role in the ceremony is then necessary, allowing for the identification of other scenarios.
Using the approach formalised in Chapter 4, I can also prove that the assumptions I
did in Section 6.4.3 are legit. In the ceremony, I identify the following principals:









6.6 The attack in a Nutshell 214
Hence, the full threat model chart has 43 = 64 lines.
I focus on one threat model derived from my chart. The thread model (a) in Table 6.3
considers a human Customer who chooses to forge an e-ticket to travel for free. This
threat model also sees the human Driver mistakenly check the ticket using the paper
inspection sub-ceremony, so avoiding any check on unique fields. Alternatively, this
scenario could be seen as the human Driver deciding to only perform a visual check on
the ticket and not to scan the QR code. Like the Danish Mobilpendlerkort described
in Section 4.6, this vulnerability does not require an attacking third party because the
human Customer takes advance of an inspector who applies the wrong sub-ceremony.
Human Driver WebServer
(a) choice error normal
Table 6.3 The threat model considered in the ticketing inspection ceremony.
6.6 The attack in a Nutshell
This section describes an attack that exploits the security weaknesses of the ticket
inspection ceremony. I have discovered this attack by following, manually, the ap-
proach of X-Men; one of the main reasons for this choice is that, in addition to the
implementation aspects, this preliminary analysis should be complemented by field
experiments interacting with the coach services to carry out the attack for real, but
this will require both ethical approval by all stakeholders and the time to carry out
the experiments.
6.6.1 The Two Phases of the Attack
The attack to the inspection ceremony is carried out in two phases as shown in Fig-
ure 6.10. The first phase, which proceeds as I explain below in Section 6.6.2, requires
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Figure 6.10 The phases of the attack
the creation of a forged e-ticket. I discuss how to forge e-tickets considering the coach
services I analysed, but, in principle, the same or a similar approach can be applied
for any coach service that uses the same or a similar inspection ceremony. In fact,
this approach can potentially be applied to all services that operate using electronic
ticketing.
The second phase uses the forged e-ticket as a valid e-ticket for the planned journey,
exploiting vulnerabilities on the ticket inspection ceremony. As proof-of-concept, as
described in Section 6.6.3, I have used Tamarin to formally and automatically discover
the attack on the ceremony.
6.6.2 Forging an E-Ticket
As I highlighted in Section 6.4.3, forging paper tickets is not easy. It requires one
to be able to use the same paper type and format, and to print on the ticket the
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required information. Still, it can of course be done, as described, for instance, by BBC
reporters [17]. Forging e-tickets, on the other hand, is considerably easier and does
not require much expertise or technical knowledge. Using a raster graphics editor such
as Adobe Photoshop (but the same can be done using simpler editors like GIMP) or
directly with an email client, I was able to forge e-tickets ready to be used in a ticket
inspection ceremony. But let’s proceed step-by-step.
After having purchased an e-ticket, a confirmation email is sent to the customer’s
email address. This email also works as ticket, which can be also be saved/exported as
PDF file since most of the email clients allow to do it.
There are two ways in which an attacker can modify an existing, old ticket into
a forged one for another journey. The most accurate way to forge an e-ticket is by
modifying an existing one after having exported, or received, it in PDF format, which
provides high-quality graphic details even after a modification. Both Adobe Photoshop
or Gimp work.
Alternatively, a less elaborated method to forge e-tickets is for the attacker to
modify the confirmation email using the email client and to forward the new email to
the attacker’s own address.
Regardless of which of the two ways the attacker uses (using PDFs or directly
modifying the email by forwarding it), in order to modify an existing, old ticket into
a forged one for another journey it is necessary to change fields according to the
new journey. Let’s consider Table 6.1 again. The last column shows the fields, or
combination of fields, that must be modified, can be modified and cannot be modified
(without executing a more complex attack such as an attack that creates a new QR
code or forges an e-ticket from scratch after obtaining the necessary fields).
The minimal modification that needs to be carried out on an existing e-ticket is to
modify the date of travel and/or the departure and arrival time. All the other fields
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could in principle be left unchanged, but an attacker may have to modify some of them
according to the specific journey that they wish to carry out. The ticket fields that may
have to be modified are: from/to, the coach service and the price. For instance, if an
attacker wishes to modify an existing ticket from A to B, they will need to modify the
date of travel and/or the departure and arrival time, but they will not need to modify
the fields from/to, the coach service and the price. If the attacker instead wishes to
travel from C to D, then they will have to modify also these other fields accordingly
(including the price, which might vary).
There are also some fields that I decided to label as “cannot be modified” as they
can only be modified through the execution of a considerably more complicated attack.
Ultimately, a skilled attacker could create a forged e-ticket from scratch, but here I am
interested in showing that even a completely unskilled attacker can forge an e-ticket
by modifying and forwarding the email they received and that a slightly more skilled
attacker could use photo-editing software to modify a PDF file. The fields that are
labelled as “cannot be modified” are the QR code (if present) and the ticket number
and possibly any other field that is generated using some private information such as
coach services private keys or unique codes. For instance, in one of my observations,
two fields show journey references generated freshly and stored in the system when
an online ticket purchase is made. The QR code is also generated freshly using those
fields and other ones (the ticket number, a hexadecimal sequence, etc.).
So, without considering an attacker able also to hack the system in order to get this
additional information, an e-ticket forged from an old one is an e-ticket that contains
some fields that belonged to the old e-ticket but are not valid any more, and some fields
that the forger was capable of obtaining because they are public. The vulnerability of
the inspection ceremony relies on the driver who does not always properly check the
old fields.
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This public information can be easily obtained by simulating the purchase of an
e-ticket, i.e., by starting a purchase but without completing it. In fact, the online
booking system guides the user through a purchase and asks the user to enter the
departure location and the destination, the date of travel and the preferred time. The
system then finds the more appropriate alternatives showing the departure time, the
arrival time, the coach service and the price for each of the solutions suggested. With
this information, the attacker is now able to forge an old e-ticket into an e-ticket for
that specific journey.
As a concrete example, let us consider the e-ticket in Figure 6.2 for a journey from
Gatwick Airport to London Liverpool Street on April 2020.
In this e-ticket, all the fields that have to be considered for possible modification are
highlighted with red circles. Now, assume that the attacker wishes to use this ticket to
forge one for the same journey but at a different time on a day in May 2020, resulting
in the e-ticket shown in Figure 6.11. In this case, the attacker needs to modify the date
of travel and the departure and arrival time, retrieving the information through the
online booking system, as described above. As explained in Table 6.1, fields such as
the price, from, to, could be modified (but not in this case since the price for the same
journey has remained the same in the two months that have passed and from/to fields
do not need a modification since the journey starts and stops from the same locations),
fields such as the ticket number and visual fields like the QR code cannot be modified
because they would require a more complicated attack (they require us to hack the
booking system in order to generate fresh values for them).
This e-ticket has been modified using Adobe Photoshop after having exported
the confirmation email (and so the e-ticket) in PDF. However, as I said, the same
modification that I did could have been done directly using an email client. I do not
show how to forge an e-ticket by modifying an old one using the email client as the
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Figure 6.11 The e-ticket after the forging process
approach I have discussed is ultimately independent of how the modification is carried
out (raster graphics editor or email client) and the discussion below can be easily
adapted to the case in which the email client is used.
At the end, the attacker sends to the attacker’s own email address the forged
e-ticket as an attachment of a confirmation email copying also the original subject
of the email received as subject of the new email. In case of a forged e-ticket made
directly modifying it through the email client, the attacker needs to forward the new
email to himself.
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6.6.3 Formal Verification of the Ticket Inspection Ceremony
I wrote a formal model of the ticket inspection ceremony described in Figure 6.5. The
specification of the ceremony, which is given in full in Section A.5, includes:
• a phase in which the customer buys a genuine e-ticket (this phase is needed to
obtain a first e-ticket that will be modified later, for other journeys) and
• a ticket inspection performed by a driver of a coach service.
I introduce, following the X-Men framework approach, a replace human mutation
for the Customer agent which consists in replacing the field date on the genuine e-ticket
(i.e., as in the scenario described above where the date has been changed from April to
May 2020.). The introduction of the new mutated rule for the Customer agent makes
him malicious since he is trying to perform a step of the ticket inspection ceremony
using a ticket with an invalid field. Moreover, I introduce the human mutation on the
Tamarin actions for the Driver , generating a new mutated rule in which the check of
the genuineness of the fields is compromised (e.g., the check of the date). The Driver ,
as also shown in Table 6.3, behaves honestly but makes a mistake. The mutation of
the Customer rule has a side effect on the Driver rule since the latter won’t check the
changes made by in the Customer rule. This is different, however, from the idea of
matching mutation defined in Section 5.7.
The Customer rule before and after the replace mutation is shown in Figure 6.12.
Note that, even though the ~newdate is generated as fresh value, as if the Customer
thinks immediately before showing the e-ticket to the Driver , it is possible to adopt the
same approach used in Chapter 5, where “types” can be defined modelling a situation in
which the new journey was already planned (the new data field can be in the knowledge
of the Customer with the appropriate type).
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The new Tamarin action mutation is applied to the Driver human agent in play.
The Driver rule before and after the replace mutation is shown in Figure 6.13.
Here, as anticipated in Figure 6.9, the Tamarin action Eq(date, datekS) is removed.
The consequence is that the restriction defined in the ceremony that restricts the traces
to be checked by Tamarin only to those that respect the Equality check (cf. Section 2.3
and Section A.5), relaxes the constraints, which entails that Tamarin will consider
traces that were not considered before.
I fed my specification into Tamarin, which proved the existence of the attack in
which the forged e-ticket can be accepted as valid by the Driver and the Customer
is admitted to use the coach service. In fact, Tamarin is able to find the attack
to the security goal authenticity of the ticket defined in Section 6.5.2 as also shown
in Figure 6.14.
As shown in Figure 6.14, the mutated rules H_3_M, which is generated by the replace
mutation, and D_1_M, which is generated by the Tamarin action mutation, contribute
to the attack trace.
6.7 Lessons Learned
As I demonstrated, e-tickets for the coach service ecosystem (such as the many cases I
observed) can be forged and the detection is not always happening due to factors that
influence this ecosystem.
Humans tend to make mistakes, are clumsy and could be subjected to deceptive
behaviours. Using the paper ticket inspection sub-ceremony instead of the proper
e-ticket inspection sub-ceremony is an error dictated by old habits: even though a new
sub-ceremony is available because of the introduction of e-tickets, the driver that is in
charge of inspecting the tickets may apply old habits in a different context.
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Figure 6.14 The full attack trace found in the Ticket Inspection Ceremony
Moreover, the ticket inspection ceremony has not been simplified over time, removing
or merging some checks on tickets. In fact, initially the ticketing inspection ceremony
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included only the paper ticket inspection sub-ceremony and when the e-tickets were
introduced later on, the ceremony was extended with the e-ticket inspection sub-
ceremony, which requires the driver to behave differently. As a consequence, the driver
has to know and work through a ceremony that comprises of two different procedures
(the one for the paper ticket and the other for the e-ticket and thus might easily confuse
the steps of the paper ticket sub-ceremony with the steps of the e-ticket sub-ceremony.
Another factor that plays a role in the weakness of the inspection ceremony is
timing, which entails two kinds of problems that may cause vulnerabilities.
The first problem is that most of the coach services offer a 24/7 service and drivers
who work the night shift might be more vulnerable to be deceived or more inclined
to make mistakes. The second problem, which is even more serious, is that coach
services operate on strict timetables that must be respected as much as possible; this
is especially the case for those services that connect an airport to the city centre. Such
coaches are often full (I have seen passengers required to wait for the next bus as the
current one was full), which means that the driver must inspect many tickets. The time
used to perform the ticket inspection ceremony affects the service and the timetable,
so it is in the interest of the driver to spend as little time as possible in checking
the tickets. The two sub-ceremonies are different in terms of effort: the paper ticket
inspection sub-ceremony does not require any device to set up, and is thus faster than
the e-ticket inspection sub-ceremony. This provides an explanation for the fact that a
driver under time pressure wrongly applies the paper ticket inspection sub-ceremony to
e-tickets. This visual inspection of e-tickets should be secure against forged e-tickets,
but it is not because it is designed for another type of ticket (which is much more
difficult to forge).
I can thus summarize the lessons learned by identifying the following two principles:
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Principle 1. If the ticket inspection ceremony allows the driver to decide which sub-
ceremony to perform, the overall security of the entire ticket inspection ceremony
should not depend on the choice of the driver.
The inspector (i.e., the driver) of a ticket inspection ceremony has to check the
validity of tickets and it is up to them how to do it. The final goal is to verify if a ticket
is valid or not and provide the service, no matter how. Since the two sub-ceremonies
share the same goal but they require different efforts, the inspector may be tempted
to apply the quicker/simpler one. Making the two sub-ceremonies unique, in order to
avoid that one can confuse the steps of one with the steps of the other, would force the
inspector to apply the right sub-ceremony based on the type of the ticket. This principle
is similar to one of the design principles proposed by Abadi and Needham in order to
reduce the errors in cryptographic protocols [2]. It is also similar to what happens
with the composition of security protocols, where part of the messages of one protocol
are also used by the other protocol, giving rise to attacks [73, 45, 72, 114, 77, 3].
Principle 2. In presence of text and visual fields (e.g., barcode or QR code), the
information within the visual field has to be redundant.
By redundant in this case I mean that the visual field contains the information
present in the text fields within the ticket. I observed the presence of visual fields
(e.g., a barcode) that do not contain any information. Similarly to QR codes, barcodes
can, in fact, contain information such as ticket number that can be used to validate
tickets in the same way as it can be done with QR codes. To respect this principle,
the barcode should be made to contain information regarding the ticket.
If the driver decides to carry out the paper ticket inspection sub-ceremony on an
e-ticket, the visual field instils a “fake” sense of security on the validity of the e-ticket,
the same sense of security a paper ticket gives to the driver when the paper ticket
inspection ceremony is carried out.
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6.8 Ethics
Socio-technical studies face ethical questions and the research I carried out in this
chapter is not far behind. During my observations, I had to take into account the
collection of data regarding my journeys and how these data would have been a problem
if I used them as proof of my methodology. Reporting my journey log in full would
have exposed the drivers to be potentially recognised by the coach service company,
especially if I had decided not to anonymise the name of the company.
Another ethical issue would have been to test my insights, especially without the
collaboration of the coach services companies. The attack I am describing here requires
that the drivers are not aware of checking forged tickets, otherwise this would jeopardise
the entire research. However, withouth any agreement with the coach services, this
would be considered as fraud, and I could incur into legal problems.
For these reasons, as a first step, I carried out only observations of coach services,
carrying out a more in-depth analysis with field experiments once I have established
a formal collaboration with the companies. It should be noted that I reached out
repeatedly to two coach companies, and even though I managed to speak with one of
the CSOs, they stopped the preliminary discussion due to lack of their time. This,
however, does not change the importance of my research and the strenght of my
methodology showed so far, as I have also proved with a formal verification of my
insights. Fields experiments will just confirm what I speculated here, showing that it
is possible to exploit these kind of inspection ceremonies.
6.9 Related work
Bella and Coles-Kemp [20] proposed a framework in support of the socio-technical
analysis of ceremonies called the ceremony concertina. Our analysis considers Layer
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III Human-Computer Interaction, giving also some insights on Layer IV Personal and
Layer V Communal.
In [66], Garcia et al. carried out a related but different security analysis on
ticketing in the UK by considering the MIFARE Classic card, the contactless smart
card more commonly known in London with the name of Oyster card. Their analysis is
fundamentally different from mine as they reverse-engineered the security mechanisms
of the chip discovering two attacks that allowed an intruder to get the secret key of a
card in order to clone it. Furthermore, the analysis they carried out is also different
from the analysis I carried out in Chapter 5 as I investigated the human component of
the Oyster ceremony.
The work that is closest to mine is that of Giustolisi [68], who applied a socio-
technical approach to analyse an inspection ceremony for ticketing in Denmark, high-
lighting how improper generation of mobile transport tickets can lead to forgery attacks.
Differently from me, Giustolisi carried out an analysis on the mobile application used
in Denmark combining forging techniques on ticketing screens in order to exploit the
ceremony. My approach would, of course, not work with a mobile application, but is
general enough to be applied to any kind of service that uses the “manual” e-ticket
inspection ceremony that I described. Giustolisi identified four principles that helped
him to propose solutions to the weaknesses of the ceremony considered, with possible
applications to other ceremonies:
Giustolisi’s principle 1: The security design of paper tickets should not influence
the security design of electronic tickets.
Giustolisi’s principle 2: Computer inspection should be prioritised over visual in-
spection.
Giustolisi’s principle 3: The inspection ceremony should enable the verification of
ticket key information either electronically or manually.
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Giustolisi’s principle 4: Security should be preferred over usability in the design of
visual inspection of an electronic ticket.
Principle 1 is very valuable, but, as discussed, there are fundamental differences
between the spirit with a ticket inspection ceremony is performed in case of paper
ticket and in case of e-ticket. The security here is moved from the design of the tickets
to the design of the ceremony.
Principle 2 points out the importance of prioritizing a computer inspection and
Principle 4 reinforces this view by suggesting that e-tickets should undergo computer
inspection instead of visual inspection. These principles are crucial and they should
be taught during the training of ticket inspectors (I guess they are, but drivers are
under a lot of pressure as I discussed). However, as I showed, old habits have a much
stronger bond that makes attacks possible.
Principle 3 suggests a possibility to check tickets also manually, but in my case
this has led to the attack, so the ceremony should be spelled out clearly, which is the
reason why I encourage a ceremony that relies as little as possible on the human.
My Principle 1 is complementary to the four principles of Giustolisi and can thus
contribute to improving the security of a ticket inspection ceremony. My Principle 2
reinforces the position held by Giustolisi’s Principle 3 that says that “the inspection
ceremony should enable the verification of ticket key information either electronically or
manually” by imposing the presence of visual fields that can be controlled electronically
(and to allow it, the visual fields must contain the information within the text fields).
6.10 Conclusions
Ticket inspection ceremonies often rely on humans to spot attempts of using forged
tickets, and the ticket inspection ceremony of coach services that I considered here,
in which the driver checks paper tickets and e-tickets and admits customers on the
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coach, is no different. My approach discovered a vulnerability on the ticket inspection
ceremony caused by human users. No matter what security experts do to protect a
system from attacks, it takes just one user to “ruin everything”, and in this case it is
the ticket inspector.
As future work, I plan to carry out field experiments to identify the coach services
that can be exploited using forged e-tickets, extending the analysis that I carried out
and the principles I identified to other security properties. This approach can also
be extended to other forms of transportation services and to case studies in other
areas where human-based inspection can play a crucial role, such as payment, voting
or mobile applications. To that end, I plan to implement the new mutation into my
X-Men, which will likely be non-trivial since it will require considering also situations
in which the removal of Tamarin actions affects the security goals.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
This final chapter provides concluding remarks for the work presented in this thesis
(Section 7.1) and points to some interesting directions for future work (Section 7.2).
7.1 Conclusions
This thesis has investigated how to include the human in several aspects related to
security protocols. Lately, these scenarios have been referred to as security ceremonies.
The recurring narrative has blamed human users as the weakest link in cybersecurity:
no matter what security experts do to protect a system from attack, it takes just one
user to “ruin everything”. While there is no doubt that a human user can make a
system insecure, security experts are often too quick to blame humans rather than the
protocols or systems that the engineers have developed. On the other hand, engineers
are pushing more and more the checkpoint where unexpected behaviours caused by
humans should be managed. This checkpoint nowadays is, often, in the hands of the
end-user, the human. The ultimate goal of this thesis was to bring this checkpoint
back to where it should be: at the design and analysis phases.
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Carrying out user studies through questionnaires was necessary to unveil the
psychological and socio-technical aspects that are driving the behavioural choices
within security systems (e.g., voting, choosing passwords or not using them at all and
how, and accessing procedures). These user studies, strengthened by a semi-formal
methodology, successfully helped me in the creation of guidelines to bend the user’s
perception of cumbersome ceremonies.
However, orienting the design of security ceremonies and gathering insights from
end users is not enough. As we know, when considering security ceremonies, in which
humans are first-class actors, it is not enough to take this “black&white” view. It is
not enough to model human users as “honest processes” or as attackers, because they
are neither. Modelling a person’s behaviour is not simple and requires formalising the
human “shades of grey” that such approaches are not able to express nor reason about.
So, in order to increase the “spectrum”, I carried out an investigation on what are,
and how to define with more granularity, the threat models for security ceremonies. A
systematic methodology enriched by a labelling system provided me the appropriate
tool to capture the multitude of shades that can be hidden behind a security ceremony.
The charting methodology allows security analysts to approach security ceremony
analysis in a systematic way. To enable such an analysis, tool support is called
for. The first step in that direction is the definition of a formal language expressive
enough to model the wide spectrum of security ceremonies. Besides allowing me to
enable reusability of models and results when moving from one case study to another,
the formal language I created allowed me to model four human behaviours never
considered before in such a detailed way. All these characteristics and the mutations
were implemented in a prototype tool X-Men, which I have used to analyse the security
of old and novel ceremonies.
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In conclusion, much effort has been devoted to the technical analysis of the security
of ICT systems, and there has also been considerable research on the behaviour of users
of technology. However, both the technical analysis and the research on the behaviour
of users of technology have, so far, been substantially led by two disciplines (computer
science and software engineering, and social sciences and psychology) that have been
interacting very rarely in the case of the security of ICT systems, and often don’t even
speak the same language. I believe that my thesis contributes not only to the concrete
socio-technical analysis of security ceremonies but also to bringing these two disciplines
closer.
7.2 Future Work
This section makes suggestions on future research directions on the topics covered by
this thesis. Let’s start by saying that nowadays a variety of real-world ceremonies
already exist.
Some of them are “ugly” because designers and developers forgot about end-users.
These ceremonies would benefit from being subjected to a refined beautification process
based on guidelines such as those proposed in this thesis. However, I am aware that
beautifying existing ceremonies may sometimes lead to simplifying them, bringing us to
debate about how far we can go into the beautification process without compromising
the security. To investigate this aspect, combinations of empirical, analytical and formal
approaches need to be developed to help ensure that when the new paradigm is applied
to a ceremony, possibly simplifying it, it remains secure. I have already begun working
in this direction by extending the work described in [25]. In particular, I have been
defining degrees of ceremony attractiveness for humans in a formal, logico-mathematical
way, in order to then be able to reason about the interplay of beautification and security,
ultimately ensuring that the beauty of a ceremony does not come at the expense of its
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security but instead provably reinforces its security. My ambition is to define criteria
that formalise when beautification preserves or even reinforces security.
Some of them are insecure and the full threat model chart can help us to discover
the potential threats. However, a more fine-grained formalisation would be beneficial
for this approach, especially to cope with the size and complexities of the full threat
model chart. One approach could be the description of appropriate measures and
weights to prioritise the different threat models so as to create an ordered list. The
given ceremony could then be verified, in turn, against each item of the list. Another
approach could be the definition of methods to handle the full threat model chart in
one go, perhaps parameterising the findings upon the threat model.
Some of them are insecure and my tool X-Men is able to consider human “shades
of grey” in the analysis of security ceremonies. The tool, but also the methodology, can
be improved by extending the current mutations by weakening some of the constraints,
considering other abilities of the attacker (e.g., as in [9]), extending X-Men’s library
of behavioural patterns with other mutations, formalising combinations of mutations
and proving compositionality results; improving the efficiency of the approach by
reducing the number of generated mutated models; automatically checking whether
attacks are real or not (meaning that they can be applied concretely on the ceremony’s
implementation); and, last but not least, linking our formal analysis to mutation testing
by generating test cases out of the attack traces.
Of course, all the above future works will need to be complemented with run-time
testing to check the ceremonies’ security while they are being executed, and they will
need to be coupled with more detailed user studies and the identification of behaviour
change techniques to investigate the interaction and behaviour of the users with the
ceremonies. These studies will improve the formal models, which in turn will improve
the ceremonies and thus ultimately the user studies themselves. I believe that this
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thesis provides a stepping stone and identifies a roadmap for the full-fledged conjugation
of user studies, formal analysis, run-time testing and behaviour change techniques in
order to establish the security of ICT systems socio-technically.
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A.1 The Needham-Schroeder Public Key Protocol
Here the Tamarin code for the Needham-Schroeder Public Key Protocol. The model




builtins : asymmetric - encryption
/*
Protocol : The classic three message version of the
flawed Needham - Schroeder Public Key
Protocol
Modeler : Simon Meier
Date: September 2012
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*/
// Public key infrastructure
rule Register_pk :
[ Fr(~ ltkA) ]
-->
[ !Ltk($A , ~ltkA), !Pk($A , pk(~ ltkA )), Out(pk(~ ltkA )) ]
rule Reveal_ltk :
[ !Ltk(A, ltkA) ] --[ RevLtk(A) ]-> [ Out(ltkA) ]
protocol NSPK3 {
1. I -> R: {’1’,ni ,I}pk(R)
2. I <- R: {’2’,ni ,nr}pk(I)




let m1 = aenc{’1’, ~ni , $I}pkR
in
[ Fr(~ni)




A.1 The Needham-Schroeder Public Key Protocol 253
[ Out( m1 )
, St_I_1($I , $R , ~ni)
]
rule R_1:
let m1 = aenc{’1’, ni , I}pk(ltkR)
m2 = aenc{’2’, ni , ~nr}pkI
in
[ !Ltk($R , ltkR)




--[ IN_R_1_ni ( ni , m1 )
, OUT_R_1 ( m2 )
, Running (I, $R , <’init ’,ni ,~nr >)
]->
[ Out( m2 )
, St_R_1($R , I, ni , ~nr)
]
rule I_2:
let m2 = aenc{’2’, ni , nr}pk(ltkI)
m3 = aenc{’3’, nr}pkR
in
[ St_I_1(I, R, ni)
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, !Ltk(I, ltkI)
, In( m2 )
, !Pk(R, pkR)
]
--[ IN_I_2_nr ( nr , m2)
, Commit (I, R, <’init ’,ni ,nr >)
, Running (R, I, <’resp ’,ni ,nr >)
]->





[ St_R_1(R, I, ni , nr)
, !Ltk(R, ltkR)
, In( aenc{’3’, nr}pk(ltkR) )
]






[ Secret(A, B, m) ] --[ Secret(A, B, m) ]-> []
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lemma types [ sources ]:
" (All ni m1 #i.
IN_R_1_ni ( ni , m1) @ i
==>
( (Ex #j. KU(ni) @ j & j < i)
| (Ex #j. OUT_I_1 ( m1 ) @ j)
)
)
& (All nr m2 #i.
IN_I_2_nr ( nr , m2) @ i
==>
( (Ex #j. KU(nr) @ j & j < i)




/* Nonce secrecy from the perspective of both
the initiator and the responder .*/
lemma nonce_secrecy :
" /* It cannot be that */
not(
Ex A B s #i.
/* somebody claims to have setup a shared
secret ,*/
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Secret(A, B, s) @ i
/* but the adversary knows it */
& (Ex #j. K(s) @ j)
/* without having performed a long -term key
reveal .*/
& not (Ex #r. RevLtk(A) @ r)
& not (Ex #r. RevLtk(B) @ r)
)"
// Injective agreement from the perspective of both the
initiator and the responder .
lemma injective_agree :
" /* Whenever somebody commits to running a session ,
then */
All actor peer params #i.
Commit(actor , peer , params) @ i
==>
/* there is somebody running a session
with the same parameters */
(Ex #j. Running (actor , peer , params) @ j & j < i
/* and there is no other commit on
the same parameters */
& not(Ex actor2 peer2 #i2.
Commit(actor2 , peer2 , params) @ i2
& not (#i = #i2)
)
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)
/* or the adversary perform a long -term key reveal
on actor or peer */
| (Ex #r. RevLtk(actor) @ r)
| (Ex #r. RevLtk(peer) @ r)
"
/* Consistency check: ensure that secrets can be shared
between honest agents .*/
lemma session_key_setup_possible :
exists -trace
" /* It is possible that */
Ex A B s #i.
/* somebody claims to have setup a shared secret , */
Secret(A, B, s) @ i
/* without the adversary having performed a
long -term key reveal. */
& not (Ex #r. RevLtk(A) @ r)
& not (Ex #r. RevLtk(B) @ r)
"
end
Listing A.1 The classic version of the Needham-Schroeder Public Key Protocol
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A.2 The Danish Mobilpendlerkort
Here the Tamarin code for the Danish Mobilpendlerkort Ceremony. This code is








P holder ’s phone/app
S inspector ’s scanner
Z DSB server
ATP attacking third party
Protocol in Alice&Bob notation :
A0. H : knows(creditcard , phone)
A1. I : knows(watermark , background )
A2. I : knows (current_zone , current_date )
A3. S&Z : know ( ver_key ) the QR code scanner stores the
correct verification key
1. H -> P : details :phone_number , H, travelling_dates
,travel_zones , credit_card
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2. P -> Z : details //Z creates s1:watermark ,
background , font , SN , H, travelling dates
,travel_zone ; and sign_qr :sign(sn ,
travelling_dates , travel_zones )
3. Z -> S : sn
4. Z -> P : s1 , sign_qr
5. P -> H : s1 , sign_qr
6. H -> I : s1 , sign_qr
*I vchecks that watermark , background , and font on S1
match ??, I vchecks that the travel zones contain
the current zone , I vchecks that starting date < current
date <ending date
7. I -> S : sign_qr
*S checks signature and travelling_dates , and valid sn
8. S -> I : OK
*/
/* built -ins */
builtins : signing
/* secure channel (i.e. confindential and authenticated ) */
rule ChanOut_S :
[Out_S($A ,$B ,xn ,x)]
--[ ChanOut_S ($A ,$B ,xn ,x)]->
[Sec($A ,$B ,xn ,x)]
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rule ChanIn_S :
[Sec($A ,$B ,xn ,x)]
--[ ChanIn_S ($A ,$B ,xn ,x)]->
[In_S($A ,$B ,xn ,x)]
/* setup */







--[Key($Z , ~skey )]->
[!Pk($Z , pk(~ skey )), !Seckey (~ skey )]
rule setup:
let details = <$phone , $H , $date , $zone > in
[!CC($H , ~cc), !Pk($Z , vkey), !Seckey (~ skey )]
--[H($H), Roles($P ,$Z ,$S ,$I)]->
[!HK( details ), !HK(~cc), Hst0($H , ’H_0 ’,
<details , ~cc >),
!IK(’wm ’, ’bg ’, $date , $zone), !ZK0 (~ skey )]
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/* the human types the details into their phones */
rule H_1:
let details = <$phone , $H , $date , $zone > in
[Hst0($H , ’H_0 ’, <details , ~cc >)]
--[SendCC (~cc)]->
[Out_S($H , $P , ’details ’, <details , ~cc >), !Hst1($H ,
’H_1 ’, <details , ~cc >)]
/* the phone forwards the details to the DSB server */
rule P_2:
let details = <$phone , $H , $date , $zone > in
[In_S($H , $P , ’details ’, <details , ~cc >)]
-->
[Pst2($P , ’P_2 ’, details ), Out_S($P , $Z , ’detailsPZ ’,
<details , ~cc >)]
/* the server stores the sn for the scanner and sends
the ticket to the phone */
rule Z_34:
let details = <$phone , $H , $date , $zone >
s1 = <$H , $date , $zone , ~sn , ’wm ’, ’bg ’>
signed_qr = sign(<$date , $zone , ~sn >, ~skey)
in
[In_S($P ,$Z ,’detailsPZ ’, <details , ~cc >), Fr(~sn),
!Pk($Z , vkey), !ZK0 (~ skey )]
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--[ Zassign (~sn , ~cc)]->
[Zst2($Z , ’Z_34 ’, ’make_ticket ’, <details , ~cc , ~sn ,
signed_qr >), ! StoreSn ($Z , $S , ’store_ticket ’, ~sn),
Out_S($Z , $P , ’make_ticketZP ’, <s1 , signed_qr >)]
/* P gets the ticket from the server */
rule P_5get:
let details = <$phone , $H , $date , $zone >
s1 = <$H , $date , $zone , ~sn , ’wm ’, ’bg ’>
in
[Pst2($P , ’P_2 ’, details ), In_S($Z , $P ,
’make_ticketZP ’, <s1 , signed_qr >)]
-->
[! Pstore($P , ’P_5 ’, <s1 , signed_qr >)]
/* P leaks the ticket to ATP */
rule Pleaks:
[! Pstore($P , ’P_5 ’,<s1 , signed_qr >)]
--[ PleakstoATP (’ticket ’, signed_qr )]->
[Out_S($P , $ATP , ’leak_ticket ’, signed_qr )]
/* On demand , P shows the right ticket to H*/
rule P_5out:
[! Pstore($P , ’P_5 ’, <s1 , signed_qr >)]
-->
[Out_S($P , $H , ’fw_ticket ’, <s1 , signed_qr >)]
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rule ATPgets :
[In_S($P , $ATP , ’leak_ticket ’, signed_qr )]
--[ ATPKnow ($P , signed_qr )]->
[! ATPK($P , signed_qr )]
rule ATPsends :
[! ATPK($P , signed_qr )]
-->
[Out_S($ATPP , $PP , ’fake_ticket ’, signed_qr )]
/* P gets fake ticket from ATP */
rule Pfw:
[In_S($ATP , $P , ’fake_ticket ’, signed_qr_atp ),
!Pstore($P , ’P_5 ’, <s1 , signed_qr >)]
--[ Pgetsfake (’ticket ’, s1 , signed_qr_atp )]->
[Out_S($P , $H , ’fw_ticket ’,<s1 , signed_qr_atp >)]
/* note that Human can ’t parse signed_qr */
rule H_6:
let details = <$phone , $H , $date , $zone >
s1 = <$H , $date , $zone , ~sn , ’wm ’, ’bg ’>
in
[! Hst1($H , ’H_1 ’, <details , ~cc >), In_S($P , $H ,
’fw_ticket ’, <s1 , signed_qr >)]
-->
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[Hst2($H , ’H_65 ’, s1), Out_S($H , $I , ’show_ticket ’,
<s1 , signed_qr >)]
rule I_7:
let s1 = <$H , $date , $zone , ~sn , ’wm ’, ’bg ’>
in
[In_S($H , $I , ’show_ticket ’, <s1 , signed_qr >),
!IK(’wm ’, ’bg ’, $date , $zone )]
-->
[Out_S($I , $S , ’switch_screen ’, <$H ,signed_qr >),
Ist0($I , ’I_7 ’, $H , $S , $date , $zone )]
rule S_8:
[! StoreSn ($Z , $S , ’store_ticket ’, ~sn), In_S($I , $S ,
’switch_screen ’, <$H , signed_qr >), !Pk($Z , vkey),
Ist0($I , ’I_7 ’, $H , $S , $date , $zone )]
--[Eq(verify(signed_qr , <$date , $zone , ~sn >, vkey)
, true), OK($H ,~sn)]->
[]
restriction Equality :
"All x y #i. Eq(x,y) @ i ==> x = y"
/* just one server and one public key pair */
restriction singlekey :
"All z1 z2 k1 k2 #i #j. Key(z1 , k1)@i
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& Key(z2 , k2)@j ==> z1=z2 & k1=k2"
/* lemmas claims */
/* Functionality Lemma */
lemma functional1 : exists -trace
"( All x y #i. Eq(x,y) @ i ==> x = y) &
(Ex #k s m . OK(s,m) @k )"
/*if the scanner says OK for a sn , than the human sent
their cc and the server assigned that sn to that cc ,
in other words someone paid for the ticket */
lemma functional2 :
"All hx s #k. OK(hx ,s)@k ==>
(Ex c #i #j. SendCC(c)@i & Zassign (s,c)@j & i<j & j<k)"
/* the same ticket may be inspected moret than once */
lemma functional3 : exists -trace
"Ex h1 s1 #i #j. OK(h1 ,s1)@i & OK(h1 ,s1)@j & i<j"
/* two different humans cannot ride with the same ticket */
lemma oneticketpertraveller :
"All h1 h2 s #i #j. OK(h1 ,s)@i
& OK(h2 ,s)@j & i<j ==> h1=h2"
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/* without malicious P and ATP no attack */
lemma correctness :
"( All s1 signed_qr #i.
Pgetsfake (’ticket ’, s1 , signed_qr )@i ==> F) ==>
(All h1 h2 s #j #k. OK(h1 ,s)@j
& OK(h2 ,s)@k & j<k ==> h1=h2)"
end
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A.3 The Oyster Ceremony





/* Channel rules */
rule ChanSndS :
[SndS($A ,$B ,xn ,x)]
--[ ChanSndS ($A ,$B ,xn ,x)]->
[! Sec($A ,$B ,xn ,x)]
rule ChanRcvS :
[! Sec($A ,$B ,xn ,x)]
--[ ChanRcvS ($A ,$B ,xn ,x)]->
[RcvS($A ,$B ,xn ,x)]
/**** RULES ****/
builtins : asymmetric - encryption
functions : bal /1






, Neq($oyster ,$ccard )]->
[ !Type($Human ,’card ’, $oyster )
, !Type($Human ,’card ’,$ccard)
, !Type($Human ,’balance ’,bal( $oyster ))
, !Type($Human ,’balance ’,bal($ccard ))
, !Type($GateIn ,’gid ’,~gid)
, !Type($GateIn ,’goid ’,~ goid)
, !Wallet($oyster ,$ccard)
, !GateID($GateIn ,~ gid)





, !GateID($GateIn ,~ gid)
, !GateID($GateOut ,~ goid)
]
--[ Setup($Human)
, Roles($Human ,$GateIn , $GateOut )
, GateIn($Human , $GateIn )
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, GateOut ($Human , $GateOut )
]->
[ State($GateIn ,’1’,<~gid >)
, State($GateOut ,’1’,<~goid >)




[ State($Human ,’1’,<$oyster ,$ccard ,bal( $oyster )
,bal($ccard )>)]
--[H()
, Send($Human ,’card ’, $oyster )
, To( $GateIn )
]->
[ State($Human ,’2’,<$oyster ,$ccard ,bal( $oyster )
,bal($ccard )>)
, SndS($Human ,$GateIn ,’card ’, $oyster )
]
rule GateIn_1 :
[ State($GateIn ,’1’,<~gid >)
, RcvS($Human ,$GateIn ,’card ’, $oyster )
]
--[ Receive ($GateIn ,$Human , $oyster )
, CommitGid ($GateIn ,$Human ,~ gid)]->
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[ State($GateIn ,’2’,<~gid ,$Human ,$oyster >)
, SndS($GateIn ,$Human ,<’card ’,’gid ’>,<$oyster ,~gid >)
]
rule H_2:
[ State($Human ,’2’,<$oyster ,$ccard ,bal( $oyster )
,bal($ccard )>)
, RcvS($GateIn ,$Human ,<’card ’,’gid ’>,<$oyster ,~gid >)
]
--[H()
, Receive ($Human ,$GateIn ,~ gid)
, Send($Human ,’card ’, $oyster )
, Send($Human ,’balance ’,bal( $oyster ))
, Send($Human ,’gid ’,~gid)
, To( $GateOut )]->
[ State($Human ,’3’,<$oyster ,$ccard ,bal( $oyster )
,bal($ccard ),~gid >)
, SndS($Human ,$GateOut ,<’card ’,’balance ’,’gid ’>,< $oyster
,bal( $oyster ),~gid >)
]
rule GateOut_1 :
[ State($GateOut ,’1’,<~goid >)
, RcvS($Human ,$GateOut ,<’card ’,’balance ’,’gid ’>,< $oyster
,bal( $oyster ),~gid >)
]
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--[ Receive ($GateOut ,$Human , $oyster )
, Receive ($GateOut ,$Human ,bal( $oyster ))
, Commit($GateOut ,$Human ,’finish ’)]->
[ State($GateOut ,’2’,<~goid ,$oyster ,bal( $oyster ),~gid >)
, SndS($GateOut ,$Human ,<’card ’,’balance ’,’finish ’>
,<$oyster ,bal( $oyster ),’finish ’>)
]
rule H_3:
[ State($Human ,’3’,<$oyster ,$ccard ,bal( $oyster )
,bal($ccard ),~gid >)
, RcvS($GateOut ,$Human ,<’card ’,’balance ’,’finish ’>
,<$oyster ,bal( $oyster ),’finish ’>)
]
--[H()




"All H1 H2 GIN1 GIN2 GOUT1 GOUT2 #i #j.
Roles(H1 ,GIN1 ,GOUT1) @i & Roles(H2 ,GIN2 ,GOUT2) @j ==>
not H1 = GIN1
& not H1 = GIN2
& not H1 = GOUT1
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& not H1 = GOUT2
& not GIN1 = GOUT1
& not GIN1 = GOUT2
& H1 = H2
"
restriction Inequality :
"All x #i. Neq(x,x) @#i ==> F"
restriction OnlyOnce :
"All #i #j. OnlyOnce ()@#i & OnlyOnce ()@#j ==> #i = #j"
lemma Same_Card : all -traces
"( All H oyster #j. Hfin(H,’card ’,oyster) @j
==> (Ex #t. Send(H,’card ’,oyster) @ t & t<j)
& not (Ex ccard #c. Send(H,’card ’,ccard) @c
& not (ccard = oyster ))
)"
lemma Card_Clash : all -traces
"( All H GateIn GateOut oyster gid #j #t.
Receive (GateOut ,H,oyster) @j
& Commit(GateOut ,H,’finish ’) @j
& Receive (GateIn ,H,oyster) @t
& CommitGid (GateIn ,H,gid) @t
& t<j & not (GateIn = GateOut )
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==> not (Ex ccard #i #k.
Receive (GateOut ,H,ccard) @i
& Commit(GateOut ,H,’finish ’) @i
& Receive (GateIn ,H,ccard) @k
& CommitGid (GateIn ,H,gid) @k
& k<i
& not oyster = ccard ))"
lemma Complete_Journey : all -traces
"( All H oyster #j. Hfin(H,’card ’,oyster) @j
==> (Ex GateIn m #i. CommitGid (GateIn ,H,m) @i & i<j))"
/* Functional lemma */
lemma functional : exists -trace
"( All H1 H2 #i #j.
Setup(H1) @i & Setup(H2) @j ==> #i = #j)
& (Ex H oyster GateOut #k #n.
Hfin(H,’card ’,oyster) @k
& Commit(GateOut ,’Human ’,’finish ’) @n)"
end
/**** ENDOFMODEL ****/
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A.4 The Single Sign-On ceremony
Here the Tamarin code for the Single Sign-On Ceremony. This code is original and it

























[ !Ltk($nx , ~x), !Pk($nx , pk(~x)), Out(pk(~x))]
rule Register_pkNotReveal :
[ Fr(~ ltkIdP) ]
-->
[ !IdPLtk($IdP , ~ltkIdP), !PkIdP($IdP , pk(~ ltkIdP ))
, Out(pk(~ ltkIdP ))
]
rule Reveal_ltk :
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[ Fr(~ id_SP )]
--[Roles($Client ,$SP ,$IdP )]->
[ State($Client ,’1’,<$SP >)
, State($SP ,’1’,<~id_SP >)
, State($IdP ,’1’,<’init ’>)]
rule C_1:
let
httpReq = aenc{’get ’, ~URI , $Client , ’nil ’} pkSP
in
[ State($Client ,’1’,<$SP >)
, Fr(~ URI),!Pk($SP , pkSP )]
--[ OUT_C_1 ( httpReq )]->
[ State($Client ,’2’,<$SP ,~URI >)




httpReq = aenc{’get ’, URI , Client , ’nil ’}pk(ltkSP)
authReq = <id_SP , $SP >
httpResp = sign{’code302 ’, $IdP , authReq , URI
, ’nil ’} ltkSP
in
[ State($SP ,’1’,<id_SP >)
, RcvDY(Client ,$SP , httpReq )
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, !Ltk($SP , ltkSP )]
--[ IN_SP_1_uri (URI , httpReq )
, OUT_SP_2 ( httpResp )
]->
[ State($SP ,’2’,<id_SP ,URI ,Client >)




authReq = <id_SP , SP >
httpResp = sign{’code302 ’, IdP , authReq , URI
, ’nil ’} ltkSP
httpReq = aenc{’get ’, IdP , authReq , URI , ’nil ’} pkIdP
in
[ State(Client ,’2’,<SP ,URI >)
, RcvDY(SP ,Client , httpResp )
, !Pk(SP ,pkSP)
, !PkIdP(IdP ,pkIdP )]
--[ Running (SP ,Client ,<id_SP , Client , IdP , SP >)
, IN_C_2_id_sp (id_SP , httpResp )
, OUT_C_2 ( httpReq )
]->
[ State(Client ,’3’,<SP ,URI ,IdP ,id_SP >)
, SndS(Client ,IdP , httpReq )
]
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rule IdP_1:
let
authReq = <id_SP , SP >
httpReq = aenc{’get ’, $IdP , authReq , URI
, ’nil ’}pk(ltkIdP)
msg = < id_SP , Client , $IdP , SP >
AA = sign{ msg }ltkIdP
respIdP = sign{’code200 ’,’nil ’,SP ,AA ,URI}ltkIdP
httpRespIdP = aenc{ respIdP } pkClient
in
[ State($IdP ,’1’,<’init ’>), RcvS(Client ,$IdP , httpReq )
, !IdPLtk($IdP , ltkIdP)
, !Pk(Client , pkClient )
]
--[H()
, IN_IdP_1_id_sp (id_SP , httpReq )
]->
[SndS($IdP ,Client , httpRespIdP )]
rule C_3:
let
msg = < id_SP , Client , IdP , SP >
AA = sign{ msg }ltkIdP
httpReq = aenc{’post ’, SP , ’nil ’, AA , URI}pkSP
msgIdP = <’code200 ’,’nil ’,SP ,AA ,URI >
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respIdP = sign{msgIdP}ltkIdP
httpRespIdP = aenc{ respIdP } pkClient
in
[ State(Client ,’3’,<SP ,URI ,IdP ,id_SP >)
, RcvS(IdP ,Client , httpRespIdP )
, !Pk(SP ,pkSP)
, !PkIdP(IdP ,pkIdP)
, !Ltk(Client , ltkClient )
]
--[Eq(verify(respIdP ,msgIdP ,pkIdP),true )]->
[ State(Client ,’4’,<SP ,URI ,IdP ,id_SP >)
, SndDY(Client ,SP , httpReq )]
rule SP_2:
let
msg = < id_SP , Client , IdP , SP >
AA = sign{ msg }ltkIdP
httpReq = aenc{’post ’, SP , ’nil ’, AA , URI}pk(ltkSP)
httpResp = sign{’code200 ’,URI ,’resource ’} ltkSP
in
[ State(SP ,’2’,<id_SP ,URI ,Client >)
, RcvDY(Client ,SP , httpReq )
, !PkIdP(IdP ,pkIdP)
, !Ltk(SP , ltkSP)
]
--[Commit(SP ,Client ,<id_SP , Client , IdP , SP >)
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, Eq(verify(AA ,msg ,pkIdP),true)
]->
[ SndS(SP ,Client , httpResp )]
rule C_4:
let
msgX = <’code200 ’,URI ,’resource ’>
httpResp = sign{msgX}ltkSP
in
[ State(Client ,’4’,<SP ,URI ,IdP ,id_SP >)
, RcvDY(SP ,Client , httpResp ),!Pk(SP ,pkSP )]
--[ Receive (SP ,<’code200 ’,URI ,’resource ’>)





"All x y #i. Eq(x,y) @i ==> x = y"
lemma types [ sources ]:
"( All uri m1 #i.
IN_SP_1_uri (uri , m1) @i
==>
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((Ex #j. KU(uri) @j & j<i)
| (Ex #j. OUT_C_1 (m1) @j)
)
)
& (All id_sp m2 #i.
IN_C_2_id_sp (id_sp , m2) @i
==>
((Ex #j. KU(id_sp) @j & j<i)
| (Ex #j. OUT_SP_2 (m2) @j)
)
)
& (All id_sp m2 #i.
IN_IdP_1_id_sp (id_sp , m2) @i
==>
((Ex #j. KU(id_sp) @j & j<i)
| (Ex #j. OUT_C_2 (m2) @j)
)
)"
/* Injective agreement from the perspective of both
the initiator and the responder .*/
lemma injective_agree :
" /* Whenever somebody commits
to running a session , then */
All actor peer params #i.
Commit(actor , peer , params) @ i
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==>
/* there is somebody running a session with the
same parameters */
(Ex #j. Running (actor , peer , params) @ j & j < i
/* and there is no other commit on the
same parameters */
& not(Ex actor2 peer2 #i2.
Commit(actor2 , peer2 , params) @ i2
& not (#i = #i2)
)
)
/* or the adversary perform a long -term key reveal
on actor or peer */
| (Ex #r. RevLtk(actor) @ r)
| (Ex #r. RevLtk(peer) @ r)
"
lemma functional : exists -trace
"(Ex SP URI #m.
Receive (SP ,<’code200 ’,URI ,’resource ’>)@m)"
end
/**** ENDOFMODEL ****/
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A.5 The Ticket Inspection Ceremony
Here the Tamarin code for the Ticket Inspection Ceremony. This code is original and
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, Roles($Client ,$S ,$D)]->
[ State($S ,’1’,<~kS ,$D >)
, State($D ,’1’,~kS)




journey = < ~date , ~dtime , $from , $to >
in





[ State($Client ,’2’,<$S ,$D ,~date ,~ dtime ,$from ,$to >)




journey = < date , dtime , from , to >
solution = < date , dtime , from , to , ~price >
in
[ State($S ,’1’,<~kS ,$D >)
, RcvS(Client ,$S , journey )




[ State($S ,’2’,<~kS , $D , Client , ~price , date , dtime




solution = < date , dtime , from , to , price >
confirmation = <price ,’ok ’>
in
[ State(Client ,’2’,<S,D,date ,dtime ,from ,to >)
, RcvS(S,Client , solution )]
--[]->
[ State(Client ,’3’,<S,D,date ,dtime ,from ,to ,price >)




confirmation = <price ,’ok ’>
ticket = <Client ,~ tknumber ,price ,date ,dtime ,from ,to >
encTicket = senc{ticket}kS
msg = <ticket ,encTicket >
in
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[ State(S,’2’,<kS , D, Client , price , date , dtime
, from , to >)
, RcvS(Client ,S, confirmation )
, Fr(~ tknumber )
]





ticket = <Client , tknumber , price , date , dtime
, from , to >
encTicket = senc{ticket}kS
msg = <ticket ,encTicket >
in




[ State(Client ,’4’,<S, D, date , dtime , from , to , price
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tck = <encClient ,encTKnumber ,encPrice ,encDate , encDTime
,encFrom ,encTo >
encTicket = senc{tck }~kS
ticket = <Client ,tknumber ,price ,date ,dtime ,from ,to >
msg = <ticket ,encTicket >
ack = <tknumber ,date , ’ack ’, ’valid ’>
in
[ State($D ,’1’,~kS)
, RcvS(Client ,$D ,msg)
]
--[Eq(tknumber , encTKnumber )
, Eq(Client , encClient )
, Eq(price , encPrice )
/* This is the action removed during the mutation */
, Eq(date , encDate )
, Eq(dtime , encDTime )
, Eq(from , encFrom )
, Eq(to ,encTo )]->
[ SndS($D ,Client ,ack )]
rule H_4:
let
ack = <tknumber ,date , ’ack ’, ’valid ’>
in
[ State(Client ,’4’,<S,D,date ,dtime ,from ,to ,price
,tknumber >)
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, RcvS(D,Client ,ack)
]




"All Client1 Client2 S1 S2 D1 D2 #i #j.
Roles(Client1 ,S1 ,D1) @i & Roles(Client2 ,S2 ,D2) @j ==>
not Client1 = S1
& not Client1 = S2
& not Client1 = D1
& not Client1 = D2
& not S1 = D1
& not S1 = D2
& Client1 = Client2
"
restriction Equality :
"All x y #i. Eq(x,y) @i ==> x = y"
restriction OnlyOnce :
"All #i #j. OnlyOnce ()@#i & OnlyOnce ()@#j ==> #i = #j"
lemma functional : exists -trace
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"(Ex Client tkn date #m.
End(Client ,’ack ’,’valid ’,tkn ,date)@m)"
lemma auth: all -traces
"All Client tn date #i.
End(Client ,’ack ’,’valid ’,tn ,date)@i ==>
Ex Driver #j.
ValidTicket (Driver ,Client ,’tn ’,tn ,date)@j & j<i"
end
/**** ENDOFMODEL ****/
Listing A.5 The full code of the Ticket Inspection Ceremony
